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T H E  L 0 H D 8 H I P  0? GOD
AN BmwmATION OF THE TimomOY OF m % 3 œ  GOLmiTKlBR
by Lloyd D# Bmithi B.A. #B.D#
By Gxm'âining the matwo witi%%ga (poet-1950) of a 
oontemporary German theologian# Helmut Kane Gollwitaer# 
this thesis fooueoo on thrao major aroaa of debate in 
modem Zoology « the (g^wetion of methodology# % e  pro^ '^
M e m  of speaking of God* e amity# m d  the effect on 
Ghrletlm faith of a modem oonaoiomneas of the hidden- 
nees of God#
Following an egdmwtivo list of Qollwitaer' b pub­
lished works end a biographioal section (Chapter 1) 
indicating the eouroee of hie thinking# the *bheeia 
investigates (Chapter 2) the key to m  understanding of his 
writings# via. » his unexpreGeed but underlying oonoeption 
of the nature and task of theology ae eearohing# in faith# 
for the Measmger vfithln end behind the proolmnatlon of 
the earliest wiisnesBee (the Bible) end then renewing this 
proclamation In euoh a way that modem m m  may underetmd 
who it la that enoountera him in the Oteist-evont.
On this basis# then# the thesis examlmes Gollwltaer*a 
proposed solution to the problem of how we may apeak 
appropriately of God— God-in-himself # God^for-us m ü  
God-ls-^^ooimunity. First it investigatee (Chapter 3) 
Qollwltaer* e oritiolem of Herbert Braun*e exlGtentlallot 
tlieology and of Dorothea Bollele theology of representation «
both of which# dompite illmoinating insights# w o  regwdod 
ao imving trmsformad methodology Into ontology# Chapter 4 
details Gollwitaer^s proposals for a vocative# mnfeeeional 
theology which epeaks appropriately o f both God-in-him eelf 
and God-for-UB by adhering to f o w  eafegtmrdes a) giving 
primary authority to eorlptwal testimony;
b) apeWsing only as m partiolpmt In % e  eneotmter with 
the Wholly Other; a) not imputing aa ontology *bo biblloal. 
etatemente about God; and d) on the baele of oondeaomsion 
m d  permlBBlon e p e a k W  cnly by m
God-in-oonm%m3.ty# that la# God*a ee3.f^wl'^me through the 
aotivity of hie oosmimll^r of believere# fomis m  integral 
m d  important part of Gollwit^er'e vfritinge* and oonetltutee 
a eubeequent chapter (Chapter g) of thle theeie* with a 
epeeial refermee to hie reply to oommmlem m d  the threat 
of nwlear V7ar.
These vwioum "parte* of #eolo^# like the "aepeota* 
of God's being# are# for Gollwit^er, a unity# and in 
Chapter 6 the theeie retumm to this oneneae of ewroaoh 
to comment on tt%eology*@ taek of proclamation in the more 
apeoifio context of preaohing,
Finally# in Chapter ?# while indicating the etrengtha 
and weakneems of Gollwltier's approach to -kheology# the 
themle mdertakee a jwtifloatlon of hie methodology 
oomparimoti %'fith. alternative, stremm of oo%&teï)3porary theology# 
vim.# Ohriatian A#eiem (A1 timer m)d Hamilton)# Gliristian 
Hermeneutioa (Braun)# end Gliriatim Pmientheiem (Pittenger 
and %%tshome). This leads 'bo some brief hints as to the 
way fomvard.
INTRODUCTION 
The PurpOv^ e anà Plan of the Thesis
In certain circles today it is considered inappro­
priate to choose the works of one man a,s the subject 
for a thesis. It is indeed true that to examine in 
detail one carefully defined area o.< theology seems 
to make a more direct contribution to the corpus of 
theological knowledge. It is also true that the study 
of one men’s theology can be a disjointed and therefore 
difficult affair because few people work rigidly within 
a system, and also because the range of areas covered 
is so laige that in the scope of one thesis none can 
be dealt with at great depth. As a 3?esult# the critique 
may appear to be either simple adulation or narrow­
minded disparagement.
Similarly, to choose the theology of a living and 
still very active man— — a man from another go  un try as 
well--— would seem to compound the difficulty. Full 
assessment becomes impossible. For whatever impact 
his thought might have is only just being felt.
Nevertheless, that is what I b m offering in this 
work. Various related factors make this exception 
not only possible, but oven desirable. Those factors 
relate partly to the man whose thought is the subject 
of this thesis and partly to the present situation 
in theology.
At various times in the history of theology 
certain people have 'bean given the gift of seeing 
clearly what the demands and the promise of the Word 
of God eire for their era., Still fewer have been g^remted 
an ability to proclaim this with equal clarity, Helmut 
Gollwitzor is one of these rare people.
And yet he remains virtually unlmown in the 
English-speaking world, The English translation of 
his experiences as a Russian prisoner of war was a 
best-seller when it was first published (1953)* Hnfor- 
tmately, the publisher has allowed this to go out of 
print. Similarly, a collection of sermon-méditâtions 
on Ltike’B account of the Passion and a collection of 
essays and lectures dealing with the role of the 
Christian in politics are also out of print. Thus, 
until very recently, all that remained available to the 
English-speaking reader was his very difficult book,
made even
more difficult by the awkwa,rd translation.
In Gollwit'zer’s eulogy on the occasion of being 
awarded an honourary degree by Glasgow University we
From his chair at Boron he has been 
called to Berlin University, Today 
that is a move towards a centre of 
conflict# and there he will no 
doubt prove himself a doughty 
wai'rior.
read s
I, Tpm* If ta,* ,  UK (uw, w
 ^"The Glasgow Herald" (Glasgow), 20 June 1957, p. 11,
Perhaps a:a indication that we are beginning to heed 
this x)rophotio statement is the fact that in the past 
few years translations of his definitive study of 
Marxism and of his comments after the Uppsala, meeting 
of the World Council of Churches were published in 
Scotland and America,,
It is the intention of this thesis to be an 
examination of the theology of this man. The thesis, 
for reasons of time and space# concentrates on the 
mature writings— those produced after his return 
from Russia in 1950# Therefore only brief background 
information is given about the development of his 
thinking prior to that. But even within this restriction 
the range of topics seems# at first# to be beyond the 
scope of a single thesis, Since I963 Gollwltzer has 
been involved with Herbert Braun in a lively debate 
on the "God question"# i,e, how Ghristians can speak 
of God and his existence. More recently# in 196?# 
he entered the field against certain aspects of Dorothea 
Bolle’s attempt to describe the relationship between 
man and God, Throughout all this he was involved in 
a range of political-ethical questions. Also he 
remained# in these 'twenty years# a preacher. Any of 
these areas might have formed the subject for a thesis, 
But if they had# it would have indicated a grave mis­
understanding of Gollwitaer’s theology. For his talk 
of God existing in end for himself cannot be separated 
from his talk of God’s existing for us. And these#
in turn* oarmot be separated from the response of 
the Ohristian oommuni'by# that Is# from ethios* from 
polltios# from praotioe* All this# of oourse* is 
hound up with proolamtion— both epag^^jigo. and
both 33§#^ and Therefore* although
to expedite examination I have divided these areas 
of thou^t into separate chapters* it is the whole* 
the unity, which is the subject of this thesis,
Further* I would hope to serve, in a small way* 
international theology* Despite the exlstenoe of a 
large number of journals and papers, theolo^—  
espeoially what goes under the peculiar title of 
systematic or dogmatic theology* or even more peouliar, 
Divinity-'— 'remains a very insular subjeot. It takes 
many years before the work done in one country reaches 
the theologians of another, for this very reason* 
Helmut Gollwitser himself could not understand why 
Bishop Robinson's Honesj;,to pod created such a stir 
in England, It said very little that was new for 
Germany. Therefore* by giving a survey of Gollwitier's 
contributions to German theology I am also indicating 
some of the things that have recently come under dis­
cussion there,
These aims and hopes* of course* have affected 
the plan of the thesis. After a short biograpliy 
jjndicating some of the sources of Gollwltaer's theology 
I have proceeded in Chapter 2 to the very key to the 
understanding of his thinking) the nature and task
of theology. The points developed in this chapter 
recur continually throughout the thesis, Gollwitaer’s 
theology# although expressed in very diverse ways as 
he took the field in various debates# has a very distinct 
imity deriving from his approach to theology as a whole#
Hlfj concept of theology determines his answer to the 
problem of how we are able to spealc of God today and 
of his relationship to man, To this# then, following 
on the discussion of the nature and task of theology# 
are devoted i;wo lengthy and somewhat involved chapters 
(Chapters 3 and 4), Chapter 5 deals with the role of 
the Christian in %)olitios with special emphasis on the 
relationships to communism and to nuclear war# that is, 
with practical Ghrlstianity which, for Gollwitaer# is 
as much an integral part of theology as talk of God 
and his relationship to man. Indeed, this chapter must 
be seen as deriving directly from the earlier ones,
I have returned in Chapter 6 to the unity of these 
parts in a discussion of preaching, Then in the final 
chapter are indicated both the wealmesses and the strengths 
of Helmut GollwitKor's theology. This has led to certain 
hints as to the way forward,
List of Works by Helmut Gollv/itaer
In an attempt to ‘bring acme order to this list 
of published works I have olaaaified them into various 
eategoriea. Xe._) Books # Included here are all the major 
works of which Helmut Gollvfitzer was author or co­
author# (b) BemonBJ That is, published sermons 
and sermon colleotions,
Comprising two sectionss (i) those published separately 
or in collections of Qollwitier’s lectures and essayss 
and (ii) those which appear as articles in other 
00lieétions or journals. This latter section, unlike 
the other categories, is necessarily incomplete. Oon- 
sidoring the volume of work Collwitser has produced, 
a complete list of all articles in journals# newspapers, 
etc, is impossible, Therefore X am limited here to 
listing those Imown and available to me during ray time 
of research. Iâ)._MLtS.Ï.4,siJ'i2E&‘ As the title suggests, 
this is a, complete list of published works of which 
Helmut Ctollwitsar was editor, joint-eclitor, or to which 
he has written an introduction*
poena Domini * Die altlutherische Abendmahlslehre in 
ihrer âuseinandersôtsung mit dem Oalvinisraus 
dargestellt an der lutheriechen Fruhorthodojcie 
(Munich) Ohr. Kaiser YarXag, 193?)*
Die Fraude Got te s. Binfülirmg in das Lulmsevangelium 
(Berlins BurckhardthauB-Verlag, 1941).
. *. vcaà f ühren. vmhln du nieht wills t. Berioht einer
Gefangensohaft (Munrohs Ohr. Kaiser Verlag# 1951)* 
ET@ A nlary from Russia#
E.M. Delaoour# tms. # v/lth help from Robert Fenn 
(Londons SOM Press# 1953)*
Daa Yermaûhtnie, with Katho iWin and Reinhold SclmeiderfW«NMA»ri,«fctoSlwswiti-w%ik*y1ii#ei«ïPS*wtrAhWwir#!î?VawAw#> ^  .
lohs Ohr. Kaiser Verlag, 1953)*
(Tübingen
J.O.B* Mohr# 1954).
Bibelarbeiten am Deutsohen
Bvangelisehen Kirohènto,g in Frankfwt, 9. -11.8.1956 
(Neukirehen Kreis Moera a Verlag der Buohhandlung 
des Eraiehmigsvereins, 195?)» vol. 14 in the series,
Biblis che B tudien «
» Ohr. Kaiser Verlag, 
1957) I n®. 61 In the series, #m.Mgimhe_Bxigtmm
ite. Neue Folge.
goaeasen (excerpt from, mT.AjeMhMn 
willgtj (Wuppertal "Barmen 3 J. Kief el, 195‘TT*
with Heinrich Vogel
and Frit% Heidler (Berlins Evonge1isoher Verlags- 
anatalt, 1959), vol. 1 in the series, Bymgallahha
IM-llolM - m i:tl.J.Sll-,g-<aia. 2 Blhalarheiten, gehalten am 
9, Deutschen Evangellsohen Kirohentag in tïîinohen.
Mith Johannes Hamel (Munich: Ohr. Kaiser Verlag,
1962), vol. 34 in the series, Eihlisohe. StMien
(Tubingen s J.C.B. Mohr # 1962)@ in the eeriea•
4. Poige. s t «
and. the. Jfersiat. Gritloigro of R.Qliaion. David G aims,
tniB. (Edinburghs St. Andrew Press, 19?0).
( M m io h *
Ohr. Kaiser Verlag, 1963), vol. 34 in the series,
, James w.
Leitoh, trna. (London; SOM Press, I965), in the 
series, ®haJkiMæY:^1.2Mtessjeh£_æOik9oi9ss;.
(Munich s ohr.
Kaiser Verlag, 196?).
3LQn.deiLiitally^tjr^^ Ohristlicher Glautoe
in der Brfahrimg der Verborgenhoit Gottes#
GôBprach mit Dorothea Solle {Mmilohe Ghr. Kaiser 
Veriag, 196?).
Die Konse-
cjuenKon von Uppsala (imiohs Chr. Kaiser Verlag#
1968). Eï!
David Uairnso trns. (Edinburghs St. Andrew Press#
1970).
"Mir dürfen horen Predigten (Milnohens E vange 1 is oh e r
Verlag A* Lempp# 1940).
Naoh dem Berioht des Lukas
(Mmiohs Ghr, Kaiser Verlag# 1941). ET s The 
Dvin^ and Living Lord, Meditations on the Passion 
and Resurrection of our Lord# Olive Wyon# trns. 
(Londons SGM Press# i960).
Predigt über l.Theas. 5,1-2 (Basela
Reinhardt Verlag# 1953)# in the series# Easier 
'SmâiEim.i Jahrgang 1?, 1953, 3 July.
Das Buch Jona in Predigten# with 
Theodor Jaenicke and Friedrioh-Wilhelm Marquardt 
( Ge Inhaus on § Burckhardtha.uB -Verlag # 1953) *
Predigten (Muniohs Ohr, Kaiser
Verlag, 1954),
Predigten, gehalten in dor Gemeinde 
Berlin-Dahlera 1938 bis 1940 (Berlins Evangelisohe 
Vorlags ans talt, 1962).
WcLhlmillLdeig^ Roden uher die ersten Kapitel
dor Bibel, with Theodor Jaonicke and Friedrich- 
Wilhelm Marquardt (Gelnhausena Burckhardthaus- 
Verlag, I963),
Predigten, with Theodor Jaonicke 
and Friedrioh-Wilhelm Marquardt (Neulcirohen-Vluyn s 
Neulcirehener Verlag des BrKiohungsveroins # 1967).
Neue Folge....Predigten aus den 
Jahren 1954-1968. Mit einem Naohwort des Verfassers 
(Municha Ohr* Kaiser Verlag, I968),
"Between Christmases", ins Master Sermon ;3eri_qs 
(Royal Galt, Michigan.s Cathedral Publishers), 
vol. 1, n*'. 12, December 1970, pp. 678-683.
(i) Published separatelya
Oia.JJ;Maw®â.,ââJOiengo^ Vertrag (Berlins
Burokhardthaus-Verlag, 1940), in the series, 
§iMÎSDSSlAe_âS£JL!SSSS^
Kann gin Christ Kormiuniet sein? (Gütsrslohî Verlag
Kirche und Mann, 1951/1
Z.U Maaer bailigen^Zeil (Muppartal-Barmeni J. Kief el,
1956T.
v/ith Gerhard bahmbruch (Bonns Publikationsstelle 
des .BundesminlBteriui'üs für gesamtdeutsche Fragen,
1956).
Israel und wir (Berlins Lettner-Verlag, 1958).
Auslegung von
Matthaus 4,1-11 (Düsseldorf § Verlag Kirche in 
der %eit, 1958).
Bin Disputation 
mit Eugen Gersteirmaier (Dortmimd, i960).
Forderungen der Freiheit. AufsatsiQ und Re den zvœ
politischan Ethik %Munich§ Ohr. Kaiser Verlag,
1962 ), BT a The Demands of, Freedom, X^ apers by 
a Christian in West Germany. Selected and trns, 
Robert W. Fenn, with an introduction by Paul 
Oestreicher (Londons BOM Press, I965).
Vortrag (Munich: Ghr. Kaiser Verlag, lÿSIHu
IilîJ&l*™Bt^at_^^ Vortrag im Rahmen einer
Abendvortragsreihe der Froien Universitat Berlin 
über "Bimdeswehr und Staat" am 4.Desember 1964 
(Berlins Lettner-Verlag, 1964).
Vortrag (Munioh) Chr.
Kaiser Verlag, I965T*
Dqnken,....:uad Glamben. Bin Btreitgesprach, mit MilXielm
Weischedel (Stuttgart: Kohlhsmmr Verlag, I965).
Post Bultmann locutTO. Bine Diskussion swischen Professor 
D, Helmut Qollwitîsef-Berlin m d  Professor D, Herbert 
Brami-Mainsa am 13#Februar 1964 in der ^ Johannes- 
Gntenberg-UniverBitat z\x Main% am Rhein s ed. Horst 
Symanowski (vol. 1) and Hans-Werner Barts oh (vol. 2) 
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THE SOmXOES OF G^OLIMITZER’S THEOLOGY 
Introduotion
The sources of any man’s theology are alv/ays very 
complex. It is often a relationship of factors rather 
than individual events themselves which affect a person’s 
development, To isolate these and to assess their 
importance is difficult for the man himself. Hindsight 
often gives a clearer view. But even hindsight is 
difficult when the person is still very much alive and 
active. And one is wary of attributing any given effect 
to B. particular source,
A biographical method offers itself as the most 
appropriate. Many factors can be introduced in the very 
relationships in v^ rhich they touched the life of the 
subject. Unfortunately'— and this is its drawback— — 
biogra.phy often includes factors which tell more about 
the life at that time than about the Intellectual or 
personal development of the individual. Therefore, 
although some of these are necessary in order to set 
the stage, I have kept these latter references to what 
I consider to be a bare minimum.
The years 1940 and 1950 mark two caesuras in Go3.1- 
wither’s life. These are not watersheds# i.e., points 
of radical change or even complete revolution, but
pauses between a change of environment. The first period 
up to his banishment from Berlin, is mainly an academic
one (although during the last few years he also worked 
in the Confessing Church’s active resistance to Nazism), 
The next decade was spent as a soldier, at first active 
and later as a Russian prisoner of war. Following his 
release in 195c# Go3.lv/itzer became a prominent voice in 
German theology aad politics, It is here v/e see the 
results of the earlier influences. And it is mainly upon 
the writings of this mature period that this thesis 
concentrates#
Aoademio Bio g r a p h y 1908 ‘■•1940
Helmut Hans Gollwitzer was born 29 December 1908 in 
Pappenheim (Bavaria), one of six children of a Lutheran 
pastor# And this Lutheran beginning hae been a oharao- 
teristic of much of his subsequent development, Although 
in his life and writ3,ngs he has always esciiibited a free 
openness to other approaches and even argues for a 
softening of denominational boundaries# nevertheless 
his approach is Lutheran# This becomes especially 
apparent in his vocational attitude to social responsi­
bility and his continuing pains to distin-guish clearly 
between Law end Gospel. Indeed, Gollv/itzor himself, in 
a letter to a friend# recognizes this as a basic factor
in his developments "The vital influences on me were
3those of Barth and Luther."
1 Quoted in Paul Oestreicher*s introduotion to * The Demande 
of Freedom# Robert W. Fenn, trns. (London, 1965T? 
p # 3.2 #
Having îgradiiated from a high school in Augsburg 
ho began his university studies in Munich in 1928* 
fhere he came under the influence of Georg Merss who
9
was then chaplain to the students." In true German 
fashion Gollwit%er moved from one university to another» 
Sleeking new men and their ideas* From Munich he went 
to Erlangen where he studied under Paul Althaus and 
sat his first theological examination in 1932. Perhaps 
Gollwitzer* s interest in eucharistie theology was sparked 
here* Undoubtedly his already Lutheran approach to 
ethics was underlined by Althaus* Lutheranism.
The next stop was to Jena and Friedrich Gogarten 
who, with Karl Barth, Eduard Thurneysen and Georg Mora, 
had founded the journal ZglmhQn._dm_?^taB, In 1922.
By this time, however, Gogarten and Barth had parted 
company. While at Jena, Gogarten had devoted his time 
to the problem of theological method, He raised a sword 
against the reigning idealist philosophy (e.g. Ernst 
Troeltsoh) which, as he thought, turned theology into 
a rarified species of intellectual history, and against 
a theological orthodoxy which, he claimed, sought refuge 
in traditiona]. formulae--— -a double-edged sword which 
Gollv/itser later took up aaid still brandishes. Theology,
9
■“ Of. "Crrup unrl Danis. Georg Merz ztm 60, GeDurtstag", In: 
Bvem%ell8oA@_$heolaai@_ (Mimloh) Jhg. 11, 1952, pp. 
^28-434; and in the article, "Biera » Georg", ins
BisJleMsâoaJB-GââPMsMajffi^ 3rd ed.
Cfiibjjigen, 195?)» vol. IV, col. 881f.
said Gogartons must listen to the living Word spoken to 
it in the Scriptures and the preaching of the Ohuroh and 
it must care for this Word* This it cmi do by "making 
clear the truth claim vfhioh this Word raises in our time, 
against our times against ouj? effort to virithdraw from 
its truth"* This emphasis, also shared by Barth, recurs 
continually in Gollwitaer^s theology. From Gogarten@ too, 
Gollwltser probably received fmrther stimulus in two 
other related areass Law end Gospel, and political 
ethics.
At Jena he also heard Gunther Dehn, thus spurring 
an interest in socialism and its problems which later 
bore fruit in his detailed study of Marxism,
And finally at Bonn GollwitBer heard Frit% Lieb 
lecturing on Russian philosophy of religion. There# 
too, he studied under Karl Barth to whom# in 1937# 
he presented his doctoral thesis & "Goona domini. Die 
altlutherische Abendmahlslehre in ihrer Auseinao-dersetsung 
mit dem Oalvinismus dargostellt an der lutherischen Frilh*- 
orthodozie".
We have had occasion already to note the influence 
Gollwitaer admits Barth had on him* This is indeed very 
deep and far-reaching. Insofar as Barth’s theology could 
be termed a "theology of the Word of God", so could
 ^Larry Shiner, $tig_§smSsmaSisa™Mjys^ An Intro■
duction to the Theology of Friedrich Gogarten 
(Nashville# 1966), p. 202,
Published by Ghr. Kaiser Yerlag, Munich, in 1937.
dollwi'bzer^ s* But for 'both this oharacteriaes only one » 
albeit major# aspect of their thought. Similarly both 
have presented strongly "irrinitarian" theologies. Perhaps 
here# though, Gollwitaer is closer to Luther than to Barth* 
The latter clearly developed a theology with the doetrine 
of the Trinity in a. central position* His pupil, on 
the other hand, has never done that in a systematic way.
But it has a doctrine of the Trinity in vivo rather than 
His theology fulfils Barth’s intention# it 
cv IS a living, on-going, pilgrim theology. The God-in-him™
self, the God-for-us, and the God-in^oommtmity in Christian 
action are not separate beings, not even separate "modes 
of being". These for Gollwitaer belong together. No one 
of them alone is God, only all three together. Thus 
political Christianity does not derive from theology as 
a fooinote. It is an integral part of it without which 
talk of God and talk: of his relationship to man would be 
meaningless.
While this peripatetio career was typically German, 
the progression of subjects he studied was not. He first 
studied philosophy (Hardtmann and Heidegger) and then 
theology (Altîmus, Gogarten and Barth). This Is doubly 
significant. It means that in his life Helmut Gollwitaer 
bridges the traditional gulf be'lrween philosophy and 
theology, a gulf probably descending from Luther’s 
rejection of mediaeval scholasticism. It also means he 
is not restricted to solely theological arguments but
can use compete],it3.y the resoui'oes of philosophy*
Dtiriîig this last decade (1930-19^ 0^), Helmut 
Gollwltaer began his vocation as a pastor— — a vocation 
which continued to occupy him whether he was a soldier, 
a prisoner# a lecturer# or a political figure. First 
a curacy in Munich# then a short pastorate in Vienna# 
and then (1934fl936) to Prince Reuss
in Brnstbrumi bei Wein. In 1936, by joining the Brudpr’ 
%;^ t of the Oonfessing Church in Thuringia# he openly 
joined the opposition to Nazi rule, Therefore, the 
following year# he was arrested and banished from the,t 
province,
From Thuringia Gollwitser ma.de his way to Berlin 
where he was given "the ’portfolio’ for theological
 ^X say this despite Schubert M* Ogden’s criticism ins
(London# I96?)#
p. 2 6, n, 42g "One constantly senses in his argu­
ment# as, indeed, in Braun’s reply a deficiency
of philosophical resources# which makes clarification 
of the real alternatives impossible." By this Ogden 
really means Gollwitzer fails to us the type of 
analysis common in certain American and British 
philosophical circles— an analysis. which in the 
end is^particularly sterile and unproductive# at 
least in the realm of Christian theology. Gollv/itzor 
like Karl Barth, indeed accepta what might be called 
a "positivism of Christian revelation". But he does 
so consciously and# he would claim# in obedience to 
the Gospel. Ogden’s criticism is legitimate only 
insofar as it is a statement of his own intention 
that such a method is, in fact® not obedient to 
the Gospel# but not as a critique of Gollwitser’s 
use of philosophical resources. It is interesting 
that at no point in their dialogue, Benken und 
Oriauben (Stuttgart# 1965)# does Wilhelm Weischedel 
accuse Gollwitzer of philosophicEil incompetence.
On the contrary# these parallel oolloquia smd lec­
tures were carried on in mutual aoademio respect.
ecli^ cation in the Prussian Council of the Confessing
Ohurciu"^ In Berlin he began to help Martin Niemoller
in the Bahlem parish— a leather special parish# as
Martin’s brother wrote g
It was characteristic of "Dahlem" 
that one really cfeaûâ for another 
there. On this point there is no 
dissent* It is so self-evident that 
one need not speak of it* That is 
proven also inf the loyal service of 
the young friends who were closely 
connected v;ith the manse on Cecilian- 
allee* They all knew "Alex8nderplat% " 
and "Prina Albreoht-StraPe"* And 
they were not mtoown to the Stapo*
But they did not complain about their 
fate ; about the inconveniences and 
annoyances which came upon them day 
by day, There were Hermine Hermes# 
the faithful scoretmry of the Covenant 
of Need? and the vieareas Christa 
Mtillor* Thera were Ernst Eisenhardt 
and Wolfgang Sass who never tired of 
serving* There were Franz Hildabrandt 
who was Boon to go to England, and 
Helmut Gollwitzer who besides serving 
in the parish did valuable theological  ^
work,  ^ ^
Part of this "theological work" was lecturing in the 
illegal and therefore underground seminary of the Con­
fessing Churoh, "As a lecturer at the Theological 
College of the Confessing Church in Berlin he was soon
PaiJj. Oesteeloher In: 31MJK§a®âS-ÆS'-JES.SââB» P. 13.
 ^Wilhelm Kiemo’ller,
Kirohe (Bielefeld, 194'8), p. 1 ^  Whenever possible
I have used available English translations. Where 
none is available, as here# I have included in the 
text of the thesis my' own translation in order to 
avoid the tedious and distracting alterna.tion of 
English and German*
8the leading light of the ’confessing ooMûmiity*," In 
the smmer of 193? Martin Niemoller was arrested. His 
choice for a successor was Helmut Gollwitzer.
Life in the Dahlem parish was far from easy for 
the Confessing Church, It was a wealthy and therefore 
conservative suburb of Berlin, Many people with power 
and influence in Nazi Germany also lived there* As 
Paul Oestreioher says# "To preach the Gospel here was 
to preach it in the jaws of hell.”  ^ But like his pre­
decessor# Gollwitzer courageously continued preaching 
biblical sermons "based on the statement of faith of the 
193 '^!' Synod of Barmen where the Gonfessing Church pro­
claimed that in all spheres of life# Jesus Christ# and
he alone# was the final authority to whom allegiance was 
„10
During this period also fell one of the most tragic 
events of Gollwitser’s private life. He was engaged to 
Fraulein Bild# the half-Jewish daughter of a famous 
actor. Although such a marriage (between a German and 
a Jew, or a ’half-Jew*) had been declared illegal# it 
was possible to have the law waived by influential
2nd ed, (Munich# I96?)# frontispiece,
Ins p. 14.
1 0 f P# 14, For examples of this daring preaching# 
of, Jeau, Tod imd Auferetajijmg (Munich# 1941) #
ET§ 'Ibe Dyin^ mid Living Lord » Olive Myon# trns 
(London# i^b)%
friends, Xn Gollv/itsor’a congregation was Bmmi Gôring# 
Hermaim’e sister. Thus# eventually, permission for the 
marriage was granted. But when Goring learned from the 
Gestapo that Fraulein Bild was to marry Gollwitzer® the 
openly an.ti-Nazi preacher# he revoked the permission. 
Because of this she committed suicide.
The effect of this on Helmut Qollwitzer is difficult 
to assess, Undoubtedly such an encounter with anti­
semitism made him aware of the desperate need for a 
complete reappraisal of the Christian attitude to the Jews, 
Bqually true # he would recognise clearly that private and 
public# personal and political life cannot he divided.
If there was:lany personal bitterness at this time, it 
certainly does not appear in his writings. On the con- 
trarjr, from this period oame itSü
&âJM™â3^ÆS£iMiMaS» arid ----- - a ll
bearing clearly the stamp of promise# hope, joy and 
11coilf idenoe,
Finally, it is not surprising that in 1940 this 
outspoken young preacher (he was only 3 1) should again 
attract the attention of the Gestapo, Therefore he was 
banished from Berlin and forbidden to spealc or preach 
anywhere in Germany,
11" It is only proper to mention here that later (1951) 
Gollwitzer married Brigitte Freudonberg# also 
half-Jewish, who had been Fraulein Bill’s closest 
friend, Undoubtedly she has been a great help in 
the more recent battles Gollwitzer has had to face 
— battles which, in the main# form the subject 
material of this thesis,
Soldier and Prisoner— 1940-1950
Helmut Oollwitzor was "called up" for national 
service in the summer of 1940# He had agreed previously 
with Karl Barth that a Nazi victory would he utter 
disaster# Clearly, too# this was not a M34MJlB§4ÎtPia»
Ami equally olqarly# to wear the uniform of Hitler’s 
army was to he on the side of wrong# Yet what was to be 
achieved by refusing military service and paying with 
your life? This problem had often been discussed by 
Gollwitzer an^his colleagues# But they were unable 
to come to any ^ definitive answer# Thus# when on 5 December 
1940 he enter%4 the infantry barracks in Potsdam# he did 
not do so lightly or claiming to have the only answer—  
or# indeed# ansiver#^
ydOnce-;», pi tier’s army # he transferred as soon as. 
/// /
possible fffbîii a machine-gun crow to an ambulance unit*
u
Of# "War/ind the Christian Life in Our Generation" #
pp. 124ff.; esp. 
pp*;;,/1127-130# One can see in his decision to obey 
tM !ponsoription also a reflection of the Lutheran 
attitude to the state# In an attempt to follow 
the ^dvioe of many passages of Scripture-™-™©speoially 
1 Peter 2,813'“1?5 Proverbs 24a21 g Titus 3slg a^ id 
perhaps also Matthew 22 s21f. p^eople of a Lutheran 
tradition'■ bee, obedience to the state as a Christian 
duty# The; proper response to a tyranny, then# 
is to reform it from within rather than to overthrow
and Papi tÿillich) # The ehoice was: never eaisy#
Nor ùoûxûfone ascribe moral right tO'-one side and 
wrong tq t}ie other.
! , 
i
In doing so I did not suppose that I 
was escaping the solid weight of guilt 
that rested upon my people and this 
army or that X could lessen my share 
in this guilt In any way, I did not 
jo3n the ambulance unit in order to 
have Gleaner hands than my comrades #
#,, but because the service of the 
wounded was the only one tha/b I could 
perform without prejudice against it.
I.. To bind up the v/ounds amidst the 
slaughter is surely the business of 
a Christian# To that extent my work 
as stretcher-bearer bore some relation 
to the Christiao. witness. But it is .,0
not by any means the whole witness. '
This transfer also moved Gollwitzer from France to
the Russian front. Then# without having fired a shot,
he was taken prisoner by the Russians in Czechoslovakia
on 10 May 1945. Before him lay nearly five years as
a prisoner:of ?Jeir. First at Tabor» then for a short
time in a forest camp at Briansk (1946), on then to
camp 27/X in Krasnogorsk (194?-1949) # than in the
"regime camp" at Asbestos (1949)» and finally to a
oamp in Sverdlovsk where he had previously spent a
short time while in transit from Krasnogorsk to Asbestos
During this period Helmu'fc Gollwitzer continued his
pastoral work among the other prisoners. He also took
the opportunity to study at first hand communism in its
Russian manifestation. Always remaining free and open
he was a.ble to recognize its points of validity without
falling victim to its error. Imter, because of his time
hi Russia» he was regarded as an "expert" on oonmiunism.
1' IMA. » p. 129.
He? indeed, has become such an "export"? but more from 
oaxeful study then from the mere fact of having spent 
five years under its
This section of Gollwitzer’s life ends with hie 
release in December 1949 and hie arrival back in what 
had become West Germany on 1 January 1950. He himself 
sees this as a "cleansing" period— time when God 
was making him one of " such people" ae WEilk in his
"j
Btatutee. ''
The Mature Theologian
While he was still a prisoner in Russia, Helmut 
Gollwitzer was offered the chair of Systematic Theology 
in the faculty of Evangelical Theology in the University 
of Bonn— the chair which Karl Barth had been forced 
to vacate in 1934. Thus? after only a short rest ? he 
took up this post in May 1950. Then in the early 
summer of 1957— *-the year he was awarded a D.D. by 
the University of Glasgow— "he returned to Dahlem in 
Berlin to take up the newly created chair of Protestant 
Theology in the faculty of Arts of the Free University 
of Berlin, a chair he still occupies* Here he has been 
given a free r#lgn in devising lectures to confront 
students of all faculties with the spiritual issues 
of this age.
n 4
' Cf. , E.M. Delaoow, -bms. {London;
1956). pp. 33. 301.
MeaTiWhile Gollwitzer also reraaine a preacher*™- 
In the University, in the Dahlem congregation ? and as 
a guest preacher elsewhere# This close link between 
lecturing and preaching remains so important to him that 
on the occasion of hie 60th birthday he refused to allow 
the normal Festschrift to be published, i.e., a collection 
of essays dedicated to him by other, usually younger 
theologians. Instead he published another collection
I r*
of sermons. '
As a matmze theologian Gollwitzer has also returned 
to the seminary at which he had lectured before the Wgxr.
He still retains there the chair of Systematic Theology.
But he is a pastor not only in the Dalilem parish.
He also remains open to his studentspractice which, 
although fairly common in English-speeking universities, 
is almost non-existent in Germany# Thus he has broken 
the image oftthe German professor v;ho is remote asid 
unavailable #
Similarly? Gollwitser has not clung to the academia 
immunity of his chair* He has gone into the streets of 
Berlin speaking at rallies and joining in protest demon­
strations . But he has done so with calm, scholarly 
arguments, not the ranting dogmatism of most protests 
in this country (despite the fact that Bavarians are 
nick-named "Germany’s hot-heads").
mlrffTTrtfTnm.rrT"*^ —irrnr r-nTfr-^ -irrm-t—rt-ntrrr-rimfVT*Vi|f7i intr—r-T"rn r n ini lir: vr'rtrimr.niTiitvr# ni»w mi iifwrtnmi *wrr *rt ifTr.rr--ittitî
■ Nsuo Folge. Predlgten aus ûen
Jahren 1954-1968. Mit einem He.oh?;ort des Verfassers 
(Munich, 1968)..
Again in 1962 Helmut Gollv/ltzer was nomiimted to ba 
Karl Barth’s BucoesBor, this time to the ohair of Systematic; 
Theology at Basel* For this honour he was willing to 
leave Berlin. But in Switzerland such appointments 
involve not only the university, hut also the munici­
pality and the can.ton. Gollwitzer’s nomination aroused 
a heated debate in the Swiss newspapers ? with the con­
servative ones speaking out against, the appointment of a 
"near-oommmist* professor. In the end ? with no refex*3sn.oe 
to his abilitys the Minister of Education for the canton 
vetoed Gollwitzer’s appointment on 19 March I962.
What hotter way to end this section than with 
Ernst Wolf’s tribute in Evan^elische Thooloe:ie on the 
oocasioncof Gollwitzer’s 60th birthdays
With the end of this year? 011 
the 29th December, HELMUT GOLLWITZER 
will have completed his 60th year of 
life. Through the decades since he 
studied theology and since the begin­
ning of the church struggle his has 
been a life surpassingly moved to 
work and sortie# joy and pain ? 
friendship and argument* help and 
— — necessarily— protest ® moved to 
pastoral service ? liberating preaching 
and manifold teaching and TOitingi a 
very rich life of rare intensity-—  
even as £i prisoner of war— and a 
life which ever again displayed self- 
sacrificing participation in the lives 
and troubles of others and in the 
ordering and shaping of the insti­
tutional realm of human existence in 
society. .,. May Helmut Gollwitzer also 
in the future retain what is promised 
by today’s text from Psalm 34:6a 
"Every face turned to him grows 
brighter and is never ashamed# "
3S21SSSll?jBk0™ JSM aiagm  (M œ ic h ) , 1968, p . 613.
Just ae Helmutt Gollwltzer displays many 
diverse talents— preaoher, pastor? aoademio, 
political revolutionary— *' $ so, too? he writes 
in many diverse styles, Paul Oestreicher’s 
understatement aptly characterizes his strictly 
academic? theological writingss "Indeed when 
he is entirely thrown hack on the mind, he is 
as capable of falling prey to academic obscu­
rity as any professional theologian# or at any
rate as apt to fall victim to the linguistic
17
maze of German syntax."^'
On the other hand, his lectures, although 
dealing with subjects of equal difficulty, have 
a directness of style which makee them more 
readily understandable. Because most were 
delivered to university audiences, they contain, 
of course, many toctoieal terms which are the 
philosopher’s stock in trade. But most sentences 
are simple and direct# There is no piling of 
one subordinate clause upon another.
Finally, Gollwitzer’s preachings like Karl 
Barth’s, is utterly different from his academic 
writing. The content is still the same, But 
the style flows and rises joyfully and confidently 
like a Psalm, Although constantly presenting to 
his hearer8 the demands of the Word of God, 
Gollwitzer never uses the "pulpit-pounding",
"fire and brimstone" style of the American 
evangelists. Instead there is a joyful serenity 
in his sermons reflecting the promise and the 
present fulfilment of that promise which is 
equaJ-ly the content of the Gospel,
Paul Oeetreichez*, in» , P* 8.
Tmi: TA8K OP THEOLOGY FOR G0LLWIT2ER
Introduction
The starting point for an understanding of Helmut 
GollVifitzer* B works must he a delineation of his approach 
to theology. To begin elsewhere leads to the pitfall 
of asking questions which he is not attempting to answer 
and speaking in a language completely foreign to his 
writings* On the other hand, once this step has been 
understood and accepted the remainder follows fairly 
easily*
Gollv/itzer’s work best Imown to English-speaking theolo­
gians, is a eoathing a'btaok on Herbert Braun’s existen­
tialist approach* But it is not just a polemic, "Goll- 
witzer makes his negative criticism of Braun’s theology 
against the background of his own positive view". He
intends his book "to point to the true hermeneutic task 
o
of theology"*'"' Thus, as I. will show in a later chapter, 
he develops in his book a vocative or confessional theology 
as an alternative to the existentialist way of speaking
'indirectly* of God the only alternative, he olairas,
which remains true to the task of theology.
Hoinz Zahrnt, , R.A. Wilson, tms.
(Iiondon, I969), p. 2?7.
^ James W.
Lextch# trns. (London, 1965)9 p* 11.
Similarly@ his rejection of Dorothee Solle’s 
position^ is based on his own positive view of the 
nature and task of theology. Indeed® this is true of 
all his books which at first appear either polemical or 
politica,!? as well as those which are more theological 
or philosophical in nature, For ethics ? in Gollwitzer'a 
theology# is not subsequent to theology» does not follow 
as a result of theology. It is an integral part of 
theology. So, too, preaching cannot be regarded apart 
from his theology as a whole# Although not explicitly 
formulated in them ? Oollwitzer’e concept of theology 
determineB his approach in his sermons.
Thus? to establish his concept of theology is vital 
for an understanding of his other work. But to do this 
is as difficult as it is essential. Gollwitzer nowhere 
stops to fully explain this background to his position.
He shows where and why it differs from whatever position 
he is attacking, but he does not present it systematically. 
Therefore? the researcher must glean the relevant material 
from what he .dpââ Gay and then systematise it himself. A 
pertinent question would then be s Is this systématisation 
fair to (?rollwitzer? How much of it does Gollwitzer 
actually presuppose and how much has been imposed by the
 ^ÏPJLAS2LS.l^Lmd;ESâWSjaaMea. Christllohei- Glav.toe in
der Erfahrung der Yerborgenheit Gottea. 2urn Gespraoh 
mit Dorothea Solle? 2nd ed. (Munich? 1968)g in reply 
•bos Dorothee Solle, ( t . »
David Lewie® tms. (London? I967)*
reaearoher’s own syatematio?
On© further preliminary remark g Theology here ® and 
for GfOllwitzer# means apeoifioally Christian theology#
And? as will he seen later® I might go a step further mid 
say it means Protestant Christian theology. For Gollwitzer 
is a Protestant theologian? "and besides that", according 
to Wilhelm Weiaohedel? "a warlike Barthian". I make 
this observation? which at first seems so self-evident 
that it need not be mentioned, because of its converse.
When Gollwitzer says the task or method of theology—  
specifically Christian theology—— is such-and-such, he 
implies that those involved in other activities are not 
doing Christian theology, although they may call themselves 
Christian theologians. That is not to say tha.t such other 
activities are not necaseary, useful and valid within their 
scope# but merely that they are not within the category of 
Christian theology. This negative judgment points once 
again to the importance of examining Gollwitzer’s concept 
of theology# i.e. Christian theology. For the only way 
one can refute his judgments on other attempts at theology 
is to show whore end v/hy he is mistaken at this point,
This negative judgment# although unavoidable, is 
unfortunate for Gollwitser’B works. It sounds so absolute 
and perhaps impertinent that it immediately raises the 
hackles of those who think otherwise. Dialogue then
With Wilhelm Weischedel, DeW m n _ m l.Maubm.. Ein Strait'
gesprach# 2nd ed, (Stuttgart, 1965)# p. 14,
beooraes impossible, For the dividing wall of partition 
between orthodoxy and heresy has been raised? even though 
these words may be spurned. At the same time one wonders 
v/hat effect this has on his discussion with Marxists and 
with his students. Gould not the Marxists accuse him 
of a dogmatism similar to that of which he accuses them? 
Could his students find here any real discussion or merely 
a disguised o,uthoritarianism? And yet he remains one of 
Europe’s leaders in the Ghristian-Marxist dialogue ? and 
students have always found him ready to listen to them. 
Perhaps it is because they respect his honesty in not 
abandoning what he considers are basic Christian principles.
In so far as it is possible to delineate major 
sections within this chapter? I shall deal first with 
the task and subject of theology and then with its method 
and nature. To be sure? this ie not a clear-out division. 
For the whole subject is the concern? not its many inter­
related parts. But some division is necessary for prac­
tical ‘understanding,
The Task snd Subject of Theology
The task of theology for Gollwitzer arises out of 
■fev/o thingss 1, the claim of the Christian message "to be 
able to unite into pjie faith distant generations notwith­
standing their differences? an,d to be able to be transmitted 
in substantial identity from generation to generation
notwithstanding every historical break"g and 3 2, the
situation facing the church today. Part of this— an
important part— is the oonteiaporary world-view.
Not only has the natural explanation 
of the phenomena of external nature 
become unavoidable? creating a deep 
chasm from both a pre-scientific 
world-view and a magical relation to 
the world® now even psychological 
events are no longer traced back to 
supra-mundane 9 heavenly or demonic 
influences but are phenomena, which 
come under sociological and psycho­
logical analysis» i.e. from the begin­
ning they are subordinate to the 
judgment of the merely-human* That 
holds for the psychological events to 
which the biblical proclamation cor­
responds® thus for the experiences of  ^
ti^ e prophets and the apostlee •
But also a factor here are the various debates and die,- 
logues in which Chrietians find themselves today» e,g, 
the Marxist-Ghristian dialogue » the recently revived 
debate between theology and philosophy (too quickly 
characterised as a confrontation between faith and dis­
belief, theism and atheisDi) » as well as the manifold 
involvements in politics» society and economics,
From these background factors correspondingly arise 
two major aspects of the task of theology— -but Wo 
inter-related aspects with an hermeneutic character. To 
state them briefly and together,
^ p- 16.
^ IMA., p. 15.
we are not confronted by the alter­
native , either as men of an atheistic 
age to traïisform ourselves back arti­
ficially into men of a the is tic one 
and thus (which is the same thing) to 
accept without translation texts from 
an age whose world-view had theietio 
premises® q t  to translate them into 
atheistic terms, Rather, our task is, 
that as men of an atheistic age we, 
too, should hear the moasage of the 
self“revelation and sovereignty of the 
true and real Lord which was delivered 
to an age that thought in theistic «., 
terms and that v/e should translate and 
pass on that message to the man of 
this atheistic age in such a way that 
he remains himself, that he and the 
message about him can. neither be con­
fused with the ancient gods nor with 
the modern brand of godiesenesB, ‘
It is generally accepted that ancient man had what might
bo called a *sa,cral world-view*. Behind the events of
nature and inter-hwaan history operated a complex of
divine and demonic influences, To a certain extent
biblical man also shared this attitude, Although more
and more he recognized YHirJH as supreme over the other
spiritual forces, the principalities and powers still
remained potent. Today, however, because of the de-
saoralising effect of the biblical doctrine of creation
8we no longer think this way. All of nature, and man 
himself, is secular and open to examination. We sire no 
longer at the mercy of capricious spiritual powers. At 
any rate, we no longer believe such powers to be in con-
7 , pp. 122-123.
Cf. Langdon Glllcey, A Study
of the Ghristian Doctrine of Creation (Nev/ York 
1965), esp, ch. 5» PP* ll?ff.
trol. Indeed, for many today, "God" is an unnecessary
metaphysical hypothesis. What, then, in this situation®
is the task of Christian theology? Must we abandon o w
present world-view and blindly accept the theistic one
of the Bible? Or must we reproduce the essential teaching
of the Bible in our atheistic terme, i*e, erase the
theism of the Bible? The former v^ ould make us untrue to
ourselves and we would cease to be modem men* The latter?
on the other hand@ is unfaithful to the biblical witness.
Instead, we must remain true both to our modern experience
and knowledge and to the testimony of the biblical writers.^
Theology, then, must hear this message and pass it on to
others without sacrificing the distinotive elements of
either the Bible or the modern consciousness*
Or more explicitly, with regard to the church’s claim
that faith and proclamation are the same today as in
apostolic times, theology has to ask about the criteria
10of the identity of this message. For modern man theology
Wr*V*,ey*<'^rTnewriiiueBivflwt%fvi«*eprtewF»*Vrt'iMe*»îw»s»rtn,ii»F"T»ri,«*ii!ir*#«*l ,
 ^Here we meet a method which recurs throughout Gollwitzer*s 
works. The true way® that is, the method indicated 
in his own writings, is to affirm both the trans­
cendental and the immanent at the same time, both 
G-od and man* This is the method neithea? of dialectic 
nor of paradox, ]?or in the former the two poles 
interact and are dissolved in the solution® the new 
way. And in the latter the two polea strain against 
each other like oppositea* In Gollwitzer’a method, 
however, both poles must be affirmed together?*— “they 
are not opposites but complementary factors of the 
whole truth. Nor can they be dissolved into some­
thing new. The essential nature of each must be 
retained,
10 Von der Btellvertretung Gottes, p. 16*
theology must give an "expository presentation of the
11Christian message." " Or again, the task of theology "is 
the determination of the standard, for distinguishing 
between ‘shell and kernel’". And more particularly® 
in relation to the social? political and economic respon­
sibility of the church, theology has a special tasks
The oft expressed intention that 
religion and politics are to be 
separated and that the church must 
not get mixed up in politics was 
false and impraoticable from the very 
beginning. ... The problem which must 
always be solved afresh is not whether 
this responsibility exists, but only 
ji,QW it should be seen legitimately ^9
and how not.
In seeking to solve this problem "theology ... must always
*ibe prepared firmly and un.oompromisingly to say Yes and No, 
Thus theology is to be the tool of the church, is to 
supply the church with the material it needs to carry out 
its task of proclaiming "the will of God, as made Imovm in 
the biblical message, in relation to the actual situation 
existing at a particular time,"^^ The church is to pro­
claim and theology is to guarantee that what it proclaims 
is the same as what it receives from the apostles and
11 From Gollwitzer’s introduction tos Karl Barth, Church
  A Selection, G.W, Bromiley, trns. and ed.
(New York9 1962), p. 3.
19
p. 58,
^ud ed. (Munich,
1968), pp. 8-9.
' ' OhTO.oh...BQ.aim:i;iQ.gi. A selection, p. ?,
15
BmJ?ammd8__oÆ_Emedom, Robert W. Penn, trns. (London, 
1965), p. 40.
prophets*
Herein lies a further aspect of the task of theology’s 
to he the church’s judge and critic? i.e. "theological 
thinking tests the statements of the church’s proclamation 
■foy the message given to her? and to do that must always 
first extract this message from the proola^ ïiation state­
ments in order to measure these for their suitability to
16the proclamation they are oharged with". In a negative 
way this aspect of theology’s task is applicable in the 
face of Marxist criticism of religion. "Theology s,s a 
self-examination on the part of the Church will first 
have to distinguish what is valid in this criticism of 
religion from what is out of place, inadequate and false."  ^
Finally, theology has a special task with regard to 
reason or philosophy. Indeed, Gollwitzer devoted a whole 
series of parallel lectures and colioquia with Wilhelm 
Weischedal in 1963/1964 to a discussion of this relation­
ship, And his major position throughout v/as this?
The ambition not to be talcen in by 
mere affirmations certainly should be 
shared by every man? even the theolo­
gian and the believer. And in a people 
for whom a "frenzy of faith" led to 
a most evil fate, education in critical 
questioning and warning against all 
light credulity will be most important.
Thus the theologian will have to show 
how the Gospel’s summons to faith in 
God differs from a summons to light 
credulity which is talcen in by every
of Religion
David Cairns, tms. (Edinburgh? 1970), p. 150,
sort of unfomded affirmation and  ^g 
seduction ,*• •
Or more positively: "Faith cannot avoid being ... confused,
but must resist it. The theological interpretation of
biblical theism is one of the things that serve to that 
*19end." "
Before turning to the methods implicit in and appro­
priate to the tasks of theology conceived in this way, a 
few remarks on the subject matter of theology are in order.
Etymologically, theology (thOQS, - logos.) ought to be 
the Bcienoe or study of God. And at first Gollwitzer 
seems to say that, "That {theolog^ Q must speak of {bod 
and his action within history] is an obligation laid on it
9 0
by its texts."*" But speaking of God and studying God are 
two very different things. Theology must, in its service 
to the church’s proclamation, speak about God. Indeed, 
because of the many usages of this vocable today "it is 
imperative that Christian theology should again make the 
word ’God’ unambiguous? i.e. that it should determine 
precisely in what sense it is used in Christian procla-
91
mation.""' "The central task of theology is, after all,
9 A
S M . , p. 54.
3rd ed, (Munich, 1965)» p. 8.
to make clear what Christian proolm^ation means by this 
word ÿ how in its mouth this word gains a partieularity 
deeply distinguishing it from other usages® wherein this 
particulœity exists# how Christian proolamation is 
capable of suoh particular talk of God and what it points 
to with it.
But theology can never have God a.s its subject# 
its matter for study# because it does not possess God# 
it does not have God at its disposal# in its control.
God does not ’exist* in the same sense as a table exists. 
There is no tangibly existent God. In this the existen­
tialist approach is correct* Suoh objective language is 
inappropriate vdien applied to God* God can never be the 
subject matter of theology. Rather# the ’living God* of 
the prophetic-apostolic proclamation is he who reveals 
himself as Lord# even of theolog;y.
Similarly# faith and revelation# as gifts of God’s 
grace # cannot be subjects of theology, No one am have 
faith as a possession, Ho one can demand revelation as 
a right* God reveals himself and God gives faithi this 
we can aoltnowledge# confess and proclaim* But he also 
hides himself. And we can lose faith. Therefore# with 
the Psalmist we pray# "God# ... do not banish me from 
your presence # do not deprive me of your holy spirit"
99
" "Nachwort zur Bisîcussion mit Herbert Braun"# ins
Hans-Werner Bartsoh® ed. # Post Bultmemn looutum. 
vol. II (Hmaburgo 1965) » P* 28.
(Psalm g l s l l ) A n d  at Oonfirmat:lon we pray over the 
candidates e "Establish them in faith" # then at the Eucharist 
we repeatedly pray that God may assist ub with his grace 
so "that we may continue in that holy fellowship” "which 
is the blessed company of sXi faithful people"
"Rather# the subject matter of theology is the 
church’s proclamation, and the task of theology# its con­
tribution to the permanently neoeesary reformation# is to 
improve this proclamation, And not just the present- 
day proclamation of the church g for that would give theology 
no standard of judgment or means of improvement. Instead » 
its subject must be primarily the Christian message con­
tained in the prophetic-apostolic proclamation and secon­
darily the ongoing proclaiiation of this message by the 
church. Thus to a large degree proclamation ie both the 
subject and the task of theology.
Therefore# to the extent that the church must spealc 
of God and that this proolaimtion is theology’s subject# 
theology may be called a science or study of Clod. It must 
make statements about God and his relation to man. But 
it makes these statements on the basis of Clod’s disclosure 
of himself in his Bon» in the scriptures# and in the on-
As iin Alssander Jones, ed., The. JerusalorLBima.
Reader's Edition (London, 1968).
The Ohnroh of South India, The Book of Çonnnon 
(London, 1964), pp. 129, 19.
 ^ p. 4i.
going proclamation of the church. Similarly» because the 
church proclaims this aelf-revelation of God and hie gift 
of faith* theology by examining this proclamation is a 
science or study of revelation and faith* But it must 
always be remembered that it can never have God» faith 
or revelation at its disposal, as objects of scientific 
study*
To the humility of theology « *, be­
longs the Imowledge that it never 
controls its subject* %he subject 
of theology is not just God but Clod 
in his revelation, and: his revelation 
is present only in the message which 
the church brings to men, This ongoing 
message is the real theme which theo- 
logy presupposes as the basis of its 
ovfn existence and on which it reflects.
To carry this one stop further, then* theology, in so 
far as it is a new translation and proclamation of this 
Christian message, can be the subject of theology. Like 
the scriptures which are its primary subject, theology is 
a place of **practical attesta.tion” to the concrete, .in*- 
cursive act of God in the course of the world’s life^\^^ 
Therefore * just as it examines the present-day witness of 
the church, it must examine its own attestation and prove 
it by the norm of scripture, In other words, theology 
must be self-critical* ’’For this reason there is no 
question which can be raised in the face of the Christian 
message which the theologian has not to take seriously,
" a selection, p. 'I'.
98to take up and to think through”/"
Between a presentation of the task an.d
sulDjeot matter of theology and a discussion of
the method(s) appropriate to Christian theology
belong some remarks regarding the question of
whether or not theology is a science and of the
relationship of theoloigy 'to the sciences.
Answering this requires some statement of
the nature of theology* Follov;ing the above
delineation of its task* theology
resembles a science such as medicine 
Yfhich likov/ise is not responsible for 
the natural given things of the body 
but for its perception of thorn and 
their use, If theology takes up, for 
examplep the philosopher's question, 
hûE in fact can revelation and faith 
be possible, then it places in question 
the possibility that church and faith 
exist in our midst just as little as 
medicine in its research places in 
question the possibility that man has 
a body. After all, there is a difference 
between asking about a possibility 
without knowing of its reality and 
proceeding from a reality to ask about 
its possibility. In the former situ­
ation is found, for instance, an inven­
tor in whose mind there is not yet an 
existent reality and who asks how he 
shall make it possible. In the latter 
situation is found the positive scien­
tist who asks how an existing reality 
ha.B become possible, In this mann.©r 
the theologian asks about the possi­
bility of faith, church, revelation * 
and these questions he ... passes on 
to the Christian message to see how 
it answers them. 29
28 Denken und Glaulien. p* Al
aid., p. 42-43.
ThuBp to this extent* theology is more like a 
soieno© than an art,
Determining Gollwit^er’s position at this 
point is made more difficult by the fact that 
he writes in German, includes a
broader spectrum than does ”science”. We might 
do better to create a new cognate in English s 
”wisdom-Fjhip”, This “wisdom-ship” * then, would 
include all branches of learning and investi­
gation which follow a method of systematic 
observation of their particular subject matter, 
abstraction of general principles which are then 
tested by predicting on their basis and comparing 
this prediction with further observed data. It 
can be seen* then, that in the observation-ab­
straction aspect theology shares a ooiimon metho­
dology with ”wisdom-ship”, including the natural 
and social sciences.
How, then, can Feuerbach, Engels and Marx 
flatly contradict this? How can it be said, 
zfcxr jLcis'beKn.oe, t)y (&, K3.aue; :Ln
fetorie i ”1îîiat religion hinders the investigator 
in the consistent pursuit of his inquix’ios”?-^ ^
Or how can a modem Moscow newspaper say "reli­
gion 'moulds in believers a non-soientifio out­
look*” and ” * the influence of religion prevents 
them from fully ihpwing their creative forces*”?-^ ^
The freedom of science is not threatened 
'-™^so long as it rightly understands 
itself™— by theology, but principally 
by soientism, by the superstition which 
makes a world-view out of modem science,
30 m
p. 159s referring to : Cî. Klaus, pn, 8 5, 87f., 166,
240.
Quoted from "Leninskoye Znamya", in "The Scotsman"
(Ed inburgh), Novamber 22, I969* p. 9#
and uses it as a quarry for the 
building of world *^ picturos allegedly 
demanded by science, Rightly 
understood, theology opens the way 
unconditionally to every investiga­
tion of fact. Faith in the Creator 
is actually an affirmation of things 
as they are, and is opposed to all 
we 11 -memiing misrepresentation or 
taboo * # *, The scientific attitude 
is not incompatible with Ghristien 
fadthj but with the superstitious 
faith in science ,.. ,
The conflict between science and theology, pre­
sumed to exist by some philosophers snü soion- 
tists, is seen to be non-existent by those v;ith 
a correct understanding of both science and 
theology. Only a theology which rejects the 
validity of any moans of obsewation or inter­
pretation but its own* or which seeks to go 
beyond its omi legitimate field will come into 
oonfliot v/ith soience* And only a scienoe which 
rejects any method of knowing except empiricism, 
or which seeks to turn itself into a substitute 
religion will oorae into conflict with Christian 
theology.
If, then, theology resembles a science and,
at any rate, does not stand in opposition to
the sciences, is it a science itself? Under the
broad definition of theology is
mdoubtodly a science. But in the more normal
sphere of language the answer is not so clear,
Theology indeed participates in the 
other sciences, has a nexus with them, 
uses them,welcomes them in its omi 
sphere, inasmuch as here also, for
pp. 159-160.
examplej philosophy end history in 
the strict sense are studied, it is 
certainly not really "a” science, but 
(in this sense resembling luedicine), 
a sphere in which different sciences 
are united by their service of a deter­
minate purpose* the critical self- 
examination of the church in relation 
to the correspondencQ between its 
actual achievement and its task. Thus 
interwoven with the universal life of 
science @ theology must justify the 
responsibility given thereby to it for 
this life by ,.* not misleading the 
other sciences into unreality through 
dogmatic prejudices and restrictions, 
but by showing itself positively 
interested in a. free investigation 
which is limited by no law save that 
of the toowledge of its subject ... .
,#. It proteste by its existence even 
more strongly than the mental sciences 
against the establishment of a concept 
of science which is merely copied from 
the model of the natural sciences ... ,
The Method and Nature of Theology
Implicit in what has been said about its task and 
subject matter are very definite concepts of the methods 
proper to Ohristian theology. Indeed, "theology must 
justify the responsibility given to it .#. by not failing 
to develop methods suited to its special subject".*^ '* As 
we have already said, the task of theology is two-folds 
1, "to show how what we receive from the apostles and 
prophets ever still stands befoye us” ands 2, "the
m m . . pp. 15?“159. 
m M . , p. 158.
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oontinua3, oritioal comparison of the factual proclamation 
of the church with this prophetic-apostolic proclamation 
so that the Gospel contained in the latter is not changed 
by adaptation to human wisdom or shortened by being gauged 
to human wisdom* rather so that, as Paul says, ’every 
thought is our prisoner, captured to be brought into 
obedience to Christ* (2 Corinthians 10:3)
We see here how closely theology "is bound to a text, 
to the text which the church has recognised and aolrnow- 
lodged as the Canon, i.e., the standard, the noriaative, 
basic mid exemplary form for the continuing delivery of 
its message, in other words to the Bible.Within this 
text theology must hear the message which it is its task 
to translate. By this text it must oonbinually judge the 
ongoing proclamation of the ohmroh.
Why does Christian theology presuppose these particu­
lar texts? The plural is neeessary because
the Bible *,• is .•• a library with 
diverse books and voices, a choir, 
however not homophonie but polyphonie, 
and often enough dissonant. "The” 
biblical message threatens at closer 
examina/bion to break up into the diverse 
messages of the Old and Hew Testament, 
of old, middle and late Judaism of 
the pre-Christian era, of Paul, of 
John, of the synoptics, etc* ... The 
imity does not lie at hand, "‘The” 
message must first be sought :m and 
behind "these" messages, in and be­
hind their historical forms. This is
m i * . p. 57.
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the modern so-called hermeneutic oq
problem.
Why does Ohr3_stlan theology not exaralne these texts 
alongside other ones? What makes them unique? "That is 
a thing jtheology] ^ust give a reason for» and can give 
no other reason for than by testifying to the uniqueness 
of the message oontainodiin those texts as a uniqueness 
far surpassing any other kind of historioal individuali­
ty*"^^ It is not theology’s task to do more than this.
It does not have to justify or establish its subject. 
Rather » it aooepts it as something given. Thus theology
is derived from "preliminary decisions" 
or things given beforehand by which it 
is first set in motion? it presup­
poses the church» the event of this 
certain faith, confession and procla­
mation withnut which it would be unne­
cessary and impossible. If things 
did not stand just so with this speci­
fic faith— nmaely that it is tied to 
an historical event, that it should be 
transmitted in understandable human 
words, that it is fides quaorens in tel­
le c turn (faith seeking insight),'-*™- 
then there also would be no theology 
in the specifically Christian sense 
and no distinction between theology 
and philosophy,
To some this an.sv/er must seem inadequate and perhaps
circular, A particular historical event evoked faith 
' \
evoked faî^ araong a group of people who in t«m began 
to proolaliB this event and their faith to others. This
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growing oommmity eventually recorded its Impressions of 
that historical event and some examples of its own proela- 
mation, And now the theologian who wishes to fulfil his 
critical function is told by the modern descendant of 
that early community that the criteria must be these 
self-produced accounts, But this is not truly circular 
— at least no more so than to say an ornithologist must 
study birds. It lies in the realm of tautology or defi­
nition,
One might then ask : Why accept definition rather
than any other? There is no simple answer to this. Perhaps 
the only thing that can be said is that the task described 
above as being that of theology has been undertalsen by 
people in the past, inoluding Helmut Gollwitaer» and in 
all likelihood will be undertaken by others in the future.
If one does not call it Ohristian theology then another 
name will have to be found. It is thjgjt task, however, 
which Gollwitser has undertaken and therefore he can be 
judged only on the degree to which he has ful.filled jji and
no othez%
Statements like those above, or likes 
"At this point theological work as such is a
Üfi'l
This answer, admittedly, has evaded the question and the 
matter will have to be faced again later, especially 
in Ohap'ker ?, However, it is sufficient for the 
moment and allows us to continue in our examination 
of Gollwit%er*s thought.
h g
piece of practical attestation”, " raise the 
question of the •theological circle* » the 
question of who can do theology. By such re­
marks GollwltBer seems to .draw the •circle• 
very narrowly and exclusively. On the other 
hand, however* in his debate with Wilhelm 
Weiachedel he says theology's task is to 
"direct questions to the Ohristian ffi©ssa.ge 
and hear the questions this message directs 
to us. " This means that anyone can do theo­
logy who decides "in a serious way to address 
ones own questions to this message and to 
recognise oneself as being addressed by the 
questions of this m e s s a g e . B u t  this is not 
as simple as it sounds. For asking questions 
of this message and being questioned by it is 
not like going to some law-book or the Delphic 
Oracle. There is no tangible authority, not 
the Pope, not some church council, not some 
theologian, not even— or perhaps, especially 
not “ "the Bible.
We have "the” message in no other 
way than by interpreting: its .forme, 
the statements of the messenger. .•• 
Therefore, to be able to a^ k^ 
amailma (Mfï’agan) of it we must 
first asge£i;aia (aï'.fï’agen) it, seek 
it, by attempting to hear and lender- 
stand the messenger to whom they 
Gommnly refer . • • •
Yet even this, the primary task of theology, 
is within the realm of everyone ability. Faith 
is not a primary requirement for hearing the
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message* Rather, this message, which is a
declaration of faith, evokes faith*
The message whioh exists before faith 
and which evokes faith does not 
become audible among us in any other 
way than in the declaration of faith*
..* And we understand it not by 
stepping out of our modern historical 
existence and reciting things from 
the past unchaaigod, but by hearing 
it as spoken to u.s and by taking it 
up fatQ our existence **• «
'From what has been said it can be seen that
"Theology is a htmian work, I can plan to do
theology*"^ ^^  That cannot be said of faith!
This means, then, that no •theological cix'cle*
oan be dravm with regard to who can do theology.
It is a general human possibility. The * circle
\ \however, can and must be dravm with regard to \ /
the task and methods appropriate to Ohristian
theology.
Here Gollwitger has attempted to open the 
• theological circle* to include all persons.
The only condition is that one decides "in a 
serious way to address ones o m  questions to 
this message and to reoognize oneself as being 
addressed by the questions of this message.
However, to do this one must indeed first accept 
that the Messenger, who brings and is himself 
this message, is able to answer our most radical 
questions of life and to most radically place 
our lives in question. Surely this can mean 
nothing other than that we trust him so com­
pletely tha,t we place, indeed risk our whole 
being in his hands. But Gollwitaer says later
that "'Credere in* means .,#: to stake ones
whole existence on the friendship and ability 
of another, to grant complete credit of con­
fidence in another.Thus he, in fact, 
wishes to retain some form of 'theological 
circle * although he seems, on the surface, to 
abandon it. Indeed? a. statement made two years 
earlier still stands unchanged: "This encounter
can be assessed only i.e. our assess­
ment is at once always that of participants 
or of outsiders? that of those who 'know what 
they are doing* and what they have to do with, 
or that of those who *îmow not what they do* 
and thus misjudge what they have to do with.”
In other words» complete objectivity or detach- 
ment, even if possible elsewhere, is impossible 
here. The great truth of existentialist theology 
is the recognition that "even the Old and New 
Testaments did not speak in a detached way of 
God in himself b u t  always spoke, together with 
God, also of man. .... One cannot in the biblical 
sense spealc neutrally of God but always only 
exlstentially, or else one has not spoken of 
him,#"-^  ^ The allusion to St. Luke then,
means that those who attempt to remain detached 
do not Imow that by doing so they make it 
impossible to fulfil their intentions, i.e. to 
speak properly of God, or even of man. There­
fore, they so *object-ify* (idol-ise) God that 
the statement, "There is no God", becomes both 
possible and neoessory. The Ohristian would 
agree with this judgment on such an * objective*
JMA,. . P* 77.
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God. The kerygmatic nature of the hihlioal
texts* especially the New Testament texts*
confirms this need for assessment in actu.
"In reality I can only speak of God in such
a way that at the same time I stand before
him5 for every word whioh I spealc about him is
at the same time a confession about rûyself,
about the judgment and the grace which,
standing before prha, I receive from him.”"^
Closely related here is a limitation used
by almost all writers in this tradition, To
do th e o lo g y  one must undortatee
WiZ to address ones own questions to this
message and t o  re c o g n is e  oneself as being
a.ddreBsed by the questions of this message."
This phrase* "in,,esms^ thafter^  lAleisp” is never
defined by Qollwitser. let it seems to be a
key phrase in the sentence* Without a doubt
it is a restrictive phrase, The person who
uses the Bible in general? and the life of
Jesus in particular, ae rules and examples for
l i v i n g  has n o t  " pwfc h i s
questions to the Gospel nor let himself be
questioned by it. His understanding of the
message is too superfioia.l. But what about
Wilhelm Weisohedel’s concept of philosophy?
Philosophy* s basic way of looking 
at things now is the aspect of 
questioning. Philosophising mate­
rialises as questioning about 3?eality.
And certainly philosophical question- 
ingf understood more accurately, has 
the character of radical questioning, ^
If the philosopher turned to the texts forming
the subject matter of theology and subjected
them to "radical questioning", would he be
îMâ.. p. 19.
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doing theology? Apparently not* because he is 
not ready to accept the answer the message gives 
him since the "radical” nature of his question­
ing causes him to question even the miev/er, 
Gollwitaer's " W f  thus seems
to include a faith-commitrnent to the God of 
that message. In other words, he in fact 
narrows the 'theological circle* by requiring 
faith as a precondition for doing theology»
To conclude this excursus, then * theology 
is certainly a hmian act» and? because through 
grace faith is for all persons # it qgn be under­
taken by anyone s the only condition being his 
response to the Gospel, But this remains a 
matter of grace, not vmrks. Hence our prayer 
"that our schools of theology may be homes of 
f a i t h " T h i s  also means that, like any other 
human activity, it is not within my control
whethei' it is good theology, thus 
whether my work is successful, ,,»
Whether our work turns out well 
depends upon grace— that seems to 
me to be one of the most difficult 
Ohristian statements about life to 
dispute, ^
The Method and Nature of Theology (contmued)
In an attempt to delineate what methods are appro­
priate to Ohristian theology it is easier at the start 
to note some that are inappropriate, We have mentioned 
many times theology’s task of exposition, interpretation,
(ili
Anglican Church of Canada, She_Bej?k...fif.Coimion grayer 
(Cambridge, 1959), p. 45.
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translation. But all methods of Interpre tat ion are not 
equally appropriate. Interpretation must not be prac­
tised in such a way that Jesus is separated from the 
Word, the man from the message. If this s e p a ra t io n  is 
made it would mean that "it is not that Jesus this 
word, but that he brings it. Hence its historical 
character# which is what distinguishes it from a general 
truth, derives mainly from the fact that it comes as 
address, but not from the fact that in it Jesus himself 
encounters us as the grace of
Here we are dealing with the difference between the 
methods of philo Em phy and theology. In a somewhat over­
simplified way this could be expressed as follovme
Philosophical thought is .a 
transcendental thoughts behind the 
reality of the individual being it 
asks about its universal conditions 
of possibility . . .  . T h e o lo g ic a l 
thought i s  thoughts it
looks at a certain reality and 
interprets it, thus is exagetical 
thought.'
This is a reflection of theology's nature as a solentia 
prj>Gt,ip.a. It does not have to describe "self-existent 
facts, eg# the plans and accomplishments of a self- 
existent Supreme Being, but it has to help to see that 
the proclamation aims straight at faith and does not 
transform itself into instruction on suprammidane fants,
iHie--J:4Tl3;.fcëîiçL6_pJ.J.lQ_d^ a a ^ ^  . te  P a i t b . p . 21 , n .  1 ,
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nor into propaganda for a world view g it is a question
precisely o f  distinguishing the Gospel as a message of
<g
ijfe from any w o r ld -v ie w  o r  any doctrinal system .
In other words, this means that Why-quostions are 
in a p p ro p r ia te  in theology. Every Why-question directed 
a t  theology's subject receives the same answer^— ^ in o o n -  
ceivable to the outsider but fully Bufficient for the 
believer-— 8 "it hath pleased God'S or in modem trans­
lations* "God wanted", "God chose" (Isaiah 53s10;
1 Corinthians Is21 g Oolossians Is19? et al.). Rather, 
theology must as Wha.t- and How^ -q.uestionsg "it does not 
abstractly consider the possibility of faith and salvation 
but enquires about the meaning of the Ohrist-story con­
tained in the title of the Gospel and how far the
Ghrist-story reveals the possibility of man's faith and 
6osalvation."
In order to express this more accurately we must
d is t in g u is h  c a r e f u l l y  among In fm g m gj ia l lm . , -ESSSSa and
6l, & l2S S â a S e l,lM Ê E â ia . J a £ s a s a a S jU s a  d i k .  " p la c in g  in  
q u e s t io n " ) i s  a fo rm  o f  q u e s t io n in g  in  w h ich  th e  pa rson
asking the questions judges or assesses the subject or 
partner being placed in question. It concerns my judgment 
about something or someone. Similarly, with £rpii;en (lit.
lte JÈ :jM 3 S M g ™ a £ Jâ iâ -S jiJ la Q £ a sm â ..M ™ E s tilu  p« 21, n ,  1 .
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"asking”) I am directing questions to a partner. While 
Infrai^ estellen refers to the type of questioning prac­
tised in the p o s i t iv e  sciences, refers to such
petitions ass labweh* how long will you he?" {Psalm 
633) ands "My God, my God? why have you deserted me?"
(Psalm 22 si : Matthew 2,7 %k6)- questioning which calls
for help iîi the void. But whereas I pronounce the answer 
in In;Pra^ï:estelien, in Fr^%en I can only wait for an anevær 
that lies outwith me. Whereas Infragestellon is an 
expression of my power, Fragen is an expression of my 
impotence,
T h ir d ly ,  ( l i t ,  "b e in g  p la c e d  in
question”) is an expression of ”questionableness” (Fragli^% 
keit), In this I speak not the question but the answer.
In this it resembles Infragestalien where I utter both 
question and answ er. But with Iiif,% gestejl M  the
answer comes not out of my Imowlodge— as v/ith Infrage- 
ste lien-— but out of the questioner's unveiling of my 
true being. This is most radical as the sinner's experience 
of God's judgment. Viîhenever this is experienced most 
radically— -^ -"My v/hole being trembles before you, your
rulings fill me with fear” (Psalm 119 s120)-- -it excludes
the possibility of reversing the situations and placing 
God in  q u e s t io n  ■
Thus, in Christian theology, questioning of the 
type Infraf^estellen is inappropriate. It is restricted 
to Fragen and Infraa-estelltv/erden. where God is the active 
partner providing either the answer or the question and
1b not merely the subject of our investigation.
Secondlyj speaking negatively still, "the apologetic
62search for questions to he answered by God" is not a
method appropriate to Christian theology. This is not
to place in question the correlation between our
questions and the Gospel's answer, between our needs and
the Gospel's promise and message o f  f u l f i lm e n t *  An
answer which does not correspond to a question is no
real answer, .tod a promise or message of fulfilment which
does not satisfy a need gives no real hope $
Rather the q u e s t io n  is only whether
and how f a r  this correlation may be 
Ghown e x t r a -  and p re -
theologically, whether the Gospel only 
brings the answer or whether it does 
not also change the q u e s t i o n , o r  at 
least widen and sharpen it. If 
question and answer are  arranged in 
such a way that the question can 
already be ascertained ©part from and 
before the Gospel and can be developed 
sufficiently without hearing the Gospel, 
but the Gospel only has to bring the 
answer to this already established 
question, then there exists a great 
danger that what the Gospel has to 
bring is determined by this previously 
est©,blished questions it dictates and 
the Gospel has to obey™— or more 
clearly § man dictates end God has to 
obey.
ÎM4.- » PP- 28-29.
C h r is t ia n  A p o lo g e tic s  is not completely 
rejected. Rather, Christianity will 
have to acknowledge the weakness of 
traditional apologetic methods. Apolo­
getics is necessary, if by this word 
the task is meant of going beyond the 
positive exposition of the meaning of 
the statements of Christian faith, to 
a polemical rejection of the appeal 
of Marxism to so-called contradictions 
between Christian faith and modern 
science, to challenge the validity of 
the opponent's arguments, and so on.
Thus apologetics is involved in both the positive
(expository) and negative (polemical) aspects of
the task of Christian theology. But thereby it
must also use only those methods appropriate to
theology.
However, the question might now be raised, 
does it remain a.po logo tics, or is it just absorbed 
into » say, exegetical theology. The type of 
apologetics which carefully analyses sociologi­
cally, psychologically, economically, or by any 
extra-biblical means whatsoever, the needs of 
man and then builds on these stones an apologetic 
for Ohristian faith or a supposed way to faith, 
— that type of apologetics is not absorbed, 
it is abolished. So also i s  the type of apolo­
getics which endeavours to make Christian faith 
"acceptable" to modem man, perhaps translating 
it into atheistic or abstract or unhistorioal 
terras. Both these methods make the Gospel 
subordinate to human capabilities. But the 
Gospel comes f3fom without. It is not the pro­
duct but the solution of our needs. Therefore
otÆ@llg3,pn,
this message is not for us to control or 
manipulate, but to accept and proclaim.
Indeed, what I am saying dggs absorb apolo­
getics into an exegetical and vocative theo- 
logy. Yet this is not a lessening of its 
possibilities for effect. Bather, it is a 
wideniïig and strengthening. For it allows 
the Messenger who is also the subject of the 
message to make the only effective defence-— - 
80 If -re ve lat ion.
There has been, however? another form of 
apologetics in the history of O h r is t ia n  th e o lo g y . 
Perhaps the best, or at lea,st clearest examples 
of this a re  St. Thomas Aquinas' "ways" of 
demonstrating the existence of God, Instead of 
building on man's needs or possibilities of 
comprehension, these arguments begin by 
affirming something which seems obvious to all 
people, and then proceeds from there to demon­
strate God's necessary existence. For example, 
briefly, modern positivist science presupposes 
that the events and objects it studies are 
orderly, Only on this basis could it go on to 
presume that its experiments end observations 
are repeatable. I f  there is an order, then, 
the universe is not the result o f  chance or 
accidents i.e. order implies and Orderer. 0?he 
Orderer is God. There are many variations of 
this argument and of the related ones based on 
the events of "motion", "cause", etc. But, 
even if we accept Charles Hartshorne's argument^ -^
In a paper he delivered to the Divinity Colloquium on 
the evening of 25 October 19&7 at the College C lub  
Extension of'Glasgow University,
of the validity of the a priori demonstrations 
of God's existence? we cannot accept that they 
have proved the existence of the biblical God. 
First, there is no logical reason f o r  equating 
this Prime Mover, this Orderer, with the God 
who revealed himself in Jesus Christ. On the 
contrary, secondly, there are tv/o good reasons 
for rejecting such an equations (a) Such a 
o r  m e ta p h y s ic a l God w ould be an 
abstract, miaddressable Being incapable of the 
p e rs o n a l relationship with man to which the 
prophets and apostles unanimously bear wi'kness.
(b) Even by calling this metaphysical God the 
summum bonum we have not justified, any equation 
with the biblical God. For in the Nev/ Testament 
te rm in o lo g y  t h i s  i s  a t i l l  p a r t  o f
the created order and is called 
(S a ta n ) o r  ( th e
Prince of this world). God remains above even 
this power as Lord of lords and King of Icings.
Therefore, without a doubt, Gollwitaer is 
correct in saying that there can be no "way" 
built by means of Christian apologetics fro m  
man to God. God is always both the initiator 
and the perfecter. And yet, does it not seriously 
limit him to say he cannot use this method to 
help prepare persons for more direct, though 
still mediated, self-revelation? Surely the 
Lord of creation is also Lord of apologetics!
Also, the Christian message is to be pro­
claimed and passed on to modern man in human 
language conditioned by our modem historical 
situation. To do this adequately requires an 
understanding both of the Gospel message and 
of the modern situation. This Gollwitsser 
reoogni&es and does not deny. Indeed, as we 
shall see later, a large section of his develop-
ment of a vocative theology is devoted to the 
use of language. But perhaps this aspect of 
"correspondenoe" is not emphasised enough,
The Method and Nature of Theology (continued)
Turning now to a positive statement of the method
appropriate to theology's subject we are confronted by
a circle? a dilemma, a paradox? "the gospel is the
answer to a life-questioni relevamt, fully satisfying
answer, but the question only arises through the p ro o la -
66mation of the answer. " Once again we meet Gollv/itser* s 
paradox-dialectic methodology, but here in a. most 
i l lu m in a t in g  way. The Gospel brings both the question 
and the answer. In other vmrds, the Gospel determines 
all the terms of reference. For if we obtained the 
question from anywhere else, the answer could come only 
in terms dictated by that source. This leads to some of 
the oharaoteristio elements of Gollwitzer*s theology, 
elements which we will e n co u n te r in more detail later#
But to note briefly two of them hares 1. What do we mean 
when we use the vocable "God”? Asked in this way, a. form 
of historical-etymological research would supply the only 
legitimate answer. Yet, as informative as t h i s  might be 
it would contain nothing of the Go sue 1. On the other
66
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hand, the Gospel asks this in terms of "Who is XHWH?",
and provides the only sufficient answer in terms of a
particular Heilsge.schioM;.9. namely, that of Israel and
Jesus Ohrist, 2» Similarly, when we approach the problems
of political action it is possible to analyse the
situation in terms of economics# or balance of power,
or general social benefit# etc* And each of these
methods would indicate a course of action to fulfil its
particular aims* But no matter how much information can
be gained by these analyses™— and they are indeed
valuable in clarifying the situation— the Christian
ultimately must use another standard. For he is# in the
end, not subject to the principalities and powers of
this world. His goal is the promise annomoed and
initiated in the Gospels fellowship with God* By this
standard he must make his decisions*
The task of theology, as we have said repeatedly,
is partly to determine the message, the Gospel# v/ithin
the biblical proclamation and the ongoing proclamation of
the church. But this
can only be solved theologically, 
i.e. by examining the biblical mes­
sage# but not in such a way that 
the momentary consciousness of the 
age is the decisive factor. Where 
it so happens that "we" "today” can. 
no longer take over anything of the 
Christian tradition the theologian, 
instead of joining* in without con­
sideration, will be particularly 
cautious# afraid of replacing the 
biblical norm by that of the con­
sciousness of the age, and will
(9V
press therefore to a careful dis- 
tinotD^ on.
This does not imply a literal!st or fmidamentalist 
interpretation of the Bible, All the available means of 
literary and historical criticism must be used to find 
the message and the Messenger within this proclamation 
whose form was influenced as much by the consciousness 
of that age ae the theologian's re-présentâtion will be 
by that of today, We have had occasion already to note 
this difference of world-views. ,Biblical men thought in 
"theistio" v/ays and? of course# reflected this in the v/ay 
they expressed this message and this encounter with the 
Messenger. We think differently today*— — "atheistically 
"eeoularly", "technologically”# etc. And yet# if the 
Gospel is truly "relevant" and "fully satisfying" today 
in awakening the question of life in us and providing the 
answer to it# then it must be still capable of being pro- 
claimed# and that means being proclaimed in the modes of 
thought of contemporary man. Since v/orid-views are con- 
stmitly changing# even if only slowly# one of the ta.sks 
of theology is to heai" the Gospel contained# perhaps even 
hidden# in the old ways of thinking, and then to translate 
it into terms understandable to modern man without destroy 
ing either the Gospel or modern men's consoleusness of 
his age. Hence the need for ongoing, pilgrim theology*
Nor does it mean that the theologian must ignore 
analyses of what modern man can understand and what he
y-on.d M L _ g t , p. 58.
needs < How oan he? He is himself a contemporary men, 
These analyses and his own self “examination will serve 
to point him to his task of interpretation and of 
mediating landerstanding. At the same time, there is 
an advantage in this now and changed capability of under­
standing, JuBt as in the positive sciences a new way of 
looking at something gives new insights as to its nature, 
so » too# o u r modem capabilities give us the opportunity 
ofr.a fresh and new luidorstanding of the Gospel, Yet 
this in itself should never satisfy the Christian theo­
logian, He should never be content merely with what he 
can understand now. For like past insights those of 
modern man will be partial and one-sided. Ohristian 
theology# then, must strive to exceed these limits of 
co n sc io u sn e ss. "Like each individual person, eo too th e  
individual g e n e ra tio n s  of th e  church have been able to 
a p p ro p r ia te  the biblical message always only in selection. 
For that very reason there exists the opportunity for 
each individual and each generation to discover i t  anevf.
.,, But a theology whioh is con sc io us  of its task will 
always reach out beyond the one-sidedness and partiality
of such a selection to the limit? to what has not yet been 
6Ba p p ro p r ia te  d . ”
On© final w ord— —perhaps a word of w a rn in g — in  
this s e c t io n  a As we have already s a id ,  in f u l f i l l i n g  its
m t .  = p . 58.
task theology must speak of God, But#
Spealsing of God never oocurs in God's 
absences not even a t  a time when v;e 
lament God's absence. Speaking of 
God means a speak5.ng of him who 
already always listens? it meanss 
speaking in  God’s presence. H is  
hearing is immediately his judgment# 
his Yes or his No to what we dare to 
say about him, his judgm ent on our 
talk but also his jud^ gment on our 
silence. 69
In the few pages here devoted to a statement of 
Gollv/itser*s concept of the methods appropriate to 
Ohristian theology j|,t has been impossible to be exhaus­
tive. We have said that theology must be biblical in a 
double way-— -the biblical p ro c la m a tio n  is the norm for 
judging and the source of the church's proclamationg 
and the Bible eilso provides the example of the way 
proclamation must be continued. How t h i s  is practised 
in ape ale ing of God in himself, in spe ak ing  of G o d -fo r-u a  
and our relationship to him, in speaking of our political 
life with God (politics and ethics) is the concern of the 
remainder o f  this thesis.
"GOD INAJggw im tlATE lAMCaWKMS j&BOU% GOD
iBtrocIuciîion
Although God is not the subject matter of theology, 
yet, because the proclamation of the Bible and the church 
*-*~the true subject matter of Christian theology— spaaks 
of an encounter and a relationship with TMi, theology 
must speak of God. But, as indicated in the previous 
chapter» not all means of doing this are equally appro­
priate . Therefore Gollwitsier* s writings include polemics 
directed against ways of speaking of God which he con­
siders to be inappropriate.
The first of these began as "a brief skirmish v/ith
Herbert Braun*s lecture on the problems of a theology of
1the New Testament" and grew from there into one of his
9
most important books.This is» to date, "the most com-
o
prehensive argument with existentialist theology".*"’ But 
it is not totally negative. Gollwitser also attempts 
a statement of an alternative vocative or confessional
'■ Janies W.
Le itch, trns. (London, 19^ 3) * P# 10. Of, H, Braun,
P *" The o r ig in a l  "s fe irm ia h " i s  c o n ta in e d  m a in ly  ins ghe
W a  , P art'T 7
ch . 2 , pp . 35~39î and P a r t  2 , ch.. 1, pp. 8 1 -9 7 .
H einz 2 a h rn t ,  ThaJteaflM P iL..o£.Jaâ» R.&. W ils o n , t m s .  
(.hondon, 1969)» p . 2?6.
theology. His aim is "to point to the true hermeneutic 
task of t h e o l o g y " o r ,  in o th e r  words, to answer the 
question of "what it moans to he permitted to converse 
w ith  'God* as an 'entity* in suoh a way that God still 
remains God,"^ The underlying question throughout iss 
What does it mean to say "God is"? Or more correctlys 
In what way axe we able to say "God is"?
More recently, Gollwitzer intends his hook, Toyx der 
8tellvert;retu^ g Clottes (M un ich , 196?), to he a debate 
with the type of "post-theistic" theology sketched in 
D orothee S o l l e ' s
6nanîi_dem_'Jipjl (1956). But once again, Gollwitaer
attempts to develop an alternative position, to give hie
own solution to the problem of "Christian Faith in the
y
Experience of God's Concealment".'
Both of these criticisms and positive statements are 
based on what has been developed in the previous chapter. 
They are practical extensions o f  th e  theory ske tch ed
there. That background they have in oommon. But for the
/
sake of examination, I will deal with them separately.
/
Then, in the iiext chapter, I shall concentrate more 
positively on Gollwitîser's own answer to the question of 
how Christian/faith can appropriately apeak of God.
^ Ife iJ.*» p . 168. /
6 /' iETs D av id  la w ls , t r n s .
(London 196?).
¥on_dÆg...S:b9llveyt^^^^^  2nd ed. (M m ic h , 1968) ,
subtitle * I ■'
Gollwitsier and Existentialist Theology
The overriding concern of the early church was to 
witness to the Gospel of Jesus Christ in its time— — and 
to interpret it to contemporary men so that they too 
would understand its implications and obligations for 
themselves. And this has remained its task throughout 
the ages. But in the past century and £i half this has 
taken on a new form. Previously it meant pointing to the 
reality of the "living God" over against the "dumb gods"
of a pagan but theistic world. Now, hov/ever, the proola-
/
m o tio n  i s  carried on against an "atheistic" background.
What caused this change of world-view is not important 
here. But it /is slgnifiosmt that this new attitude 
prevails. .ilov/ lives in an environment of the
Cartesian definition of "object".The advance of scienoe 
has made every 'man in the v/estesrn world aware of the 
"objectivity:^ *, the "thing-ness", of the world about him.
/ j
Aga:WW this background widely different theologies
j
agree t^% on^ cannot talk of God as "existing" in the 
sens© tfi'at a/concrete object exists. God is not a "thing- 
like" objec'ÿ ad; our disposal for examination and judgment.
/■
How, thenr oah/the Christian speak of God? In what way
I /
are wo tp/ undj^ x/stand and translate the Bible which seems
 ^I VIK.'Î ,-1This influence has been general in the West. In England 
and America this has been sharpened by Positivism. 
Howeve^s\this did not reach Germany to any great 
exteht h%d is therefore not mentioned in Gollwitsaer's
works, ' \
i I /
to refer to God "objectively"?
All existentialist interpretations "have in oommon
the understanding of the New Testament texts as confession
and address, not as objective information about facts of
a historical and metaphysical kind which have an existence
of their own. They examine the t e x ts  to discover the
self-“Understanding that expresses itself in them,"  ^ To
put that another way * Although the New Testament writers
make what appear to be factual statements about God and
his actions, modern criticism shows these to be instead
statements about themselves and their owi reactions.
Their statements s,bout God, claim the existentialists,
are really statements of their new self“Understanding.
It is at this point that Gollwitzer accuses
Bultmann, whom he has chosen as a leading example of an
existential th e o lo g ia n ,  of "imprecise te rm in o lo g y  and
10inexact logic". According to Bultmann, speaking of
11God must be "an expression of our existence". If words 
are given their normal meaning, such a statement ought to 
lead one to stop speaking of God and to make statements 
only about man's e x p e rie n o e s . To say, as Bultmann does, 
that "speaking of God ... ie only possible as t a l k  o f
3 3 m . , p. 52.
.IMA., p. 16.
11 Rudolf B ultm ann, F , Robert W. Funk, 
ed., Louise Pettibone Smith, tms. (London, I969), 
vol. I, p. 6 0,
ourselves"implies that "God" i s  only a teria signifying 
one fan et or mode of our existence.
But such a conclusion is not reached by Bultmarm.
He wants to take seriously the "encounter" between God 
and man as an "encounter" between "different" beings. He 
"has no wish to spealc of God otherwise than as the One who 
*is different and encounters'"Thus he says, "God is
outside me in so far as he encounters me— and that,
too» transforming me in my existence." *
That is an imprecise and ambiguous use of language.
For it allows for the possibility of resolving God's
existence into the event of the e n c o u n te r. A more precise
wording, to avoid this ambiguity, must run: "I know God's
being outside me and thus God's reality only in so far as
he encounters me trs m s fo rm in g  my e x i s t e n c e . That says
nothing of God, but s im p ly  exp resses an epistemology*
Bultmann compounds his imprecision with illogicality.
He does not carry out a "logically consistent existen-
tisl-iaing of the assertions of faith. "
He stands between revelational theology 
and philosophy, between the existential 
in t e r p r e ta t io n  as a method
i M a . . p .  61.
l>i Quoted by Hermann Sauter, i n :  Hans-Werner Barts o h e d . ,
(Hamburg, 1952 ) ,  v o l ,  I I ,  p . 55.
a m . , p. 35.
to the end of working out the proper 
interpre tat ion of biblical texts and 
the existentialist interpretation as 
a transformation of the Bible's 
assertions into assertions of man's 
self-understanding withpj^ . God's 
revelation, and thus with the loss 
of the real object of the Bible—  
between theological and atheistic 
exposition of the Bible. ‘ ^
Thus both his position as an existentialist theologian 
and his position as a theologian of revelation are 
weakened. And yet, this saves him from falling into 
the pit which opens before the wholly logical existen­
tialist, T h is  is perhaps his greatness— that he 
realises the limitations of existentialism as a method 
in Christian theology.
Bultmann faces a dilemmas On the one hand he wishes
to avoid speaking "objectively" of God, and on th e  other
hand he wants to give importance to "encounter", which
implies objectivity on both sides of the encounter. But,
like GolXwit^ar, he is unwilling to let go of either pole
of this dilemia. However-,'...one of his pupils, Herbert
Braun, has not been so scrupulous. He avoids the dileiima
completely by "consistently pursuing the one possibility
18of existentialist interpretation." But this means the
I M A . , p. 31.
1 8 ibid,., p. 35, It is beyond the scope o f  this thesis to 
give a complete analysis o f  Braun's position. His 
writings are very difficult to understand and in 
style resemble poetic speech rather than closely 
logical theology, Nevertheless, some representation 
must be ma.de of this important and long-standing 
debate between Gollwit%er and Braun. The latter's 
position is most clearly presented ins Geaammelte
©nd of theology. The dilemma has been avoided by completely
dropping the one side of it— the theological.
At the end of his essay *Vom Yerstehen 
âS âJeiîm JiSaJâ'B SûS êâ’ QJrauiS info;nns 
US delightedly that ... he has suc­
ceeded in managing without the word 
•God*. ... But on closer examination 
it transpireB that Braun also 
manages v/ithout all the things that 
are there oonneoted with that word : 
without Word and act of God in any 
serious sense of the term, without 
revelation and faith in a Lord who 
encounters us in concrete ways, ...
God (becomes for hiiiD a transcendental 
♦Whence of all my being upheld and 
all ray doings*, ... which is merely 
the expression of a relation felt in 
the experience itself. 19
This is reflected in the dissolution of the subjeot-objeet 
dilemma,
The rejected subjeot-objeot pattern 
is 'transcended by falling back on 
its one pole— the human existence
19
(Tubingen, 1962), and in his oontributxons to : 
ïiûS l.J.UkbJ!aîBLJ=aQ ji^J. 2 v o is .  (HamlJurg-Beï-gstea-b, 
1965). To these I have attempted to remain true. 
Gollwit%er*s counter-position can be found mainly
and in his replies ins Pcm^^gultnmiin^l^
This latter work, a transcript of a debate Braun 
and Gollv/itaer held in the Johannes Gutenberg 
University, Mains, on 13 February 1964, indicates 
clearly that despite their basic differences, these 
men can say some very similar things. Indeed,
major difference lies in the meaning each gives to 
the vocable Gpjd, as Gollwitaer himself reoogniaess 
"With the question about what is meant by the word 
•God* in the last sentence of Braun's theses the 
discussion had, for me, reached its kernel." (vol. 
I I ,  p. 28.)
Xbid., pp. 37”38» of. H, Braun, Gesammelte 
TeslaaimA., Md. , "PP
S tod i en ^  urn 
297% 98,"
in to  whose p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  th e re  i s  
ta ke n  up everything t h a t  in the o ld ,  
now improperly applied terms, was 
onoe s a id  o f  th e  r e a l  r e la t io n  to  
God as the Other. .«• The encounter 
w ith  the call o f  God . . .  becomes an 
e xp e rie n ce  in  which i t  i s  solely th e  
encounter with the oall that m a tte rs , 
whereas th e  O a l le r  i s  sw a llow ed up
in d a r k n e s s ................  * and the biblical
oonoep ts , though  th e y  a re  s u re ly  a l l  
r e la t io n a l  c o n ce p ts , a re  g iv e n  a new 
interpretation as descriptions of an 
a t t i t u d e  w h ich  in r e a l i t y  now only 
moves between man and h is  f e l lo w  man, 
but not ( o r  o n ly  verbally) between 
man and God. F a ith  in  God i s  tu rn e d  
in to  b e lie v in g n e s s  o f  e x is te n c e , in to  g* 
a b e l ie v in g  a t t i tu d e #
Commonly, e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  th e o lo g y  attempts to abandon 
an th ro pom orph ic  language by s u b s t i t u t in g  an a b s t ra c t  
phrase f o r  th e  word "God" # But t h i s  a tte m p t i s  doomed 
to f a i l u r e  from th e  s t a r t .  For " a l l  language i s  derived
91
fro m  th e  th in g s  in  w h ich  man has a p a r t , " " "  The a p p l i -  
o a t io n  o f  m eanings to  g roups o f  sounds i s  an a r b i t r a r y  
human p ro c e s s , And th e  meanings them se lves come fro m  
m an's own e x p e r ie n c e . T h is  i s  no le s s  t r u e  f o r  th e  
a b s t ra c t  ph rases  adop ted by B raun, F o r exam ple, th e  
"Whence o f  a l l  my b e in g  u p he ld " draws on human e xp e rie n ce  
no le s s  then does d e s c r ib in g  God as "h im  who ultimately 
upholds me" # Both employ an anthropomorphic c o n c e p t"—  
u p h o ld in g — *~"and a p p ly  i t  by aneilogy in  an u l t im a te  way 
to  God, In  t h i s  sense a l l  language i s  a n th ro p o m o rp h ic ,
The a n t i t h e s is  i s  between a b s t ra c t  and c o n c re te , n o t  
between a b s t ra c t  and a n th ro p o m o rp h ic ,
IM A . . pp . 50, 63 -64 .
m m . , p . m g .
This preference for abstract terms ie used also with 
the aim of "decoding" the New Testament so that modern 
man, meaning modem a/bheistic man, can understand it and 
thereby feel compelled to renomo© his atheism# "Let us 
describe as an atheist, in keeping with his own definition 
of himself, the man who confesses that, since as a modern 
man he can no longer reckon *naively with the existence 
of a deity*, he keeps resolutely to the sphere of t h i s  
world and abandons every use of the word *God* » that 
indeed he denies that anything at all can be made of this 
word once we have left behind us the speculative presup-
p9
positions of earlier times" • To this man all Braun can 
say is, "The atheist misses man". The atheist misjudges 
man! It is indeed difficult to understand how Braun can 
say this at all. For the view of humanity upon which he 
bases h is  approach to the New Testament is precisely the 
same as that of the atheist. To suggest, then, that the 
atheist ought to talce up theism? a theism which has just 
been p ro ved  dispensible, is totally inconsistent. Without 
a doubt, the atheist would be more in order if he demanded 
that Braun give up his last few fragments of outworn 
mythology.
Thus, Braun's further doubt whether there can be any
m m . ,  p . 94.
23 H# Braun, "The Problem of a New Testament Theology 
Jack Sanders, trns., ins Robert M# 3?unk, ed.,
Ï IS L M E S M ila B S l (New York, 1965), p. I8 3.
«»
!
suoh thing as an atheist is equally illogical.
On his lips the question .,. has no 
longer any adiBissihle m eaning. For 
it means nothing but : whether there
is any suoh thing as a man who, 
however corrupted his relation to 
other men may he, does not also share 
in the experience of being protected 
and claimed by fellovmen— --and this 
no atheist will deny, yet without for 
that reason seeing any groimd to give 
up his atheism,
More to the point would be the question whether, given the
extreme exist©ntia,list aqjproach, there can be any such
thing as a theologian.
Although G o llw ita e r  quite ruthlessly discards this
approach he does not fail to see its values.
That for many texts, even within the 
New Testament, this method o f  exami­
nation can be appropriate and fruit­
ful, is not to be denied .,, . It is 
not a case of the permissibility and 
appropriateness of suoh an approach, 
which can be denied only by a theo­
logically erroneous fundamentalism, 
but it is a question of its being 
made absolute, ... Existentialist 
interpretation, as long as it seeks 
to be theological® can regard itself or 
only as a not as an end*
This is a point made by many writers. Christian theology, 
when it is being true to the Gospel, must not tie itself 
to any one philosophy. I t  must certainly be willing and 
able to use the hermeneutic end logical tools of philo­
sophy, and to recognise where philosophy has made valid 
insights, but never to become completely identified with
ï M â . , pp . 53. 57
one philosophical system . Of course, some systems of 
philosophy must he rejected as absolutely inappropriate 
to Christian theology. For example, the extreme forms of 
logical positivism with their presupposed epistemology 
deny validity or reality or even meaning to statements 
suoh as those which the Christian must make about God, 
faith, etc. Similarly, language analysis, although very 
helpful in determining what "word game" is being used 
and thus pointing, by way of clarification, to its dif­
ferences from other "word games", is itself sterile in 
the field of theology. While, on the one hand, Christian 
theology will find little use for such philosophies as 
these, it can, on the other hand, gain valuable insights 
by using other, more compatible ones. Nevertheless, it 
must subject whatever system it uses to the standard of 
the biblical witness to the God-encoimter, They must 
remain the tools, the servants, of the message and the 
Messenger being proclaimed,
Behind this is the concern to do justice to the 
biblical witness to the Lordship of God. Braun is quite 
right to say: "Those who confuse assent to the met a -
physic contained in the New Testajnent with the address!- 
bility, or even with the faith, of raan are adopting a 
well-intentioned apologetic position which denies the 
Mord of God its sovereign power to deal freely and unoon-
26ditionally with men." What Braun fail Is to recognise
26' ÆMâ. - P* 41 ; q u o t in g !  H. B raun ,
p- 291.
i s  t h a t  t h i s  judgm ent a p p lie s  to  e ve ry  fo rm u la t io n  o f  th e  
Christian f a i t h  » including his own. Insofar as it is 
absolutized? "d o g m a tiz e d "» any statement of th e  Christian 
faith has limited the Lordship of God,
In  th e  e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  approaGh— - p a r t i c u la r ly  in  
its m ost consistently developed fo rm , but also in h e re n t  
in i t  fro m  the s t a r t  — —th e re  exists the danger of 
severely limiting th e  ways God can reveal himself to  man, 
Thus, for i t  "God can only become perceptible in h is  
fu n c t io n  of serving men's interest in a u t h e n t i c i t y . '
How does t h i s  happen? It derives from the f a c t  th a t#  
following B u ltm a n n , t h is  approach c la im s  to  be able to  
determine the n a tu re  of m an's existence v/ithout reference 
to  God or the Gospel, b u t by philosophy,*" Man, th e n , 
is  one who seeks his own a u th e n t ic i t y .  But this means 
th a t  the f u n c t io n  of the Word of God which encounters him 
i s  d e te rm in e d  a p 0 . o f i . I t s  purpose i s  to  h e lp  man to  a 
fuller slef-understanding? a more a u th e n t ic  existence.
In a second v/ay th e  existentialist approach limits 
God's s o v e re ig n ty )  "The q u e s tio n  w h e the r w hat i s  s a id  o f  
t h i s  God o f  C h r is t ia n  faith is d e m y th o lo g iz a b le  . . ,  can 
only be de c id e d  falsely if w ith o u t  closer e x a m in a tio n  
C h r is t ia n  th e ism  i s  equated w i th  e x t r a - C h r is t ia n ,  and 
thus the same thing happens the o th e r  way round as was
m m . , p. 33.
9H O f. H.-W. B a rts o h , e d . , EmSM m -m A JtfM oM .. v o l .  I I ,  
p . 194: v o l .  I ,  pp. 3 4 f f . : and B u ltinann ,
v o l .  i ,  pp . 305f f .
done by the early fathers when they identified classical
monotheism with that of the B i b l e . Gabriel Valianian
also expressed this need to distinguish between God and
the gods when he wrote that,
from the Biblical point of view the 
demarcation line is not between the 
sacred and the profane or betoeen the 
religious and the secular— let 
alone between one world-view and 
another# or betv/een theism and atheism 
$.. . The line is between God and 
the idol ....
To forget this distinction, or to develop a theology as 
if the God witnessed to in the Bible were one species of 
the genus "god" along with the gods of pantheism, heno- 
theism, polytheism, etc., and the Absolute Being of meta­
physics, is to deny him sovereignty in this realm. He is 
different, for he is Lord even of the dumb gods, the
Iml&Um'
Thus, even as an hermeneutic tool the existentialist 
approach has certain built-in wealmesses which make it 
unsatisfactory for Christian theology unless it is careful 
ly balanced v/ith valid insights gained from an equally 
inappropriate transcendentalism. Again there is a need 
for a paradox-dialectical method, Christian theology 
needs the strong points of both sides. In other v/ords, 
we must not discard the valid insights of existentialism.
lG M „la d S ie n sS -.M j[îM -S S m p a te 8 g e â ..M J ÏS A .lh , p . 40 . O f. 
on th is »  ito x n e liu s  H. M is k o fte , â lfj..„4a-jSM gn. 
a l i a m  (Am sterdam , 1956) ; ES« W W _ jim _ go dg_ ^re .
3lient. John W, Doberstein, trns. (London, I967).
G, V'ahanian, (New York, 1966), p. 9.
Rather, what is necessary ie "to define the bounds of
31theological existentialist interpretation"Thus, one 
must distinguish between "the programme of exietentialist 
interp3fetation as a theological one" and "a general pro- 
gramme of demythologizing which, being guided by a modern 
concept of objective reality, can understand the gods and 
the stories of the gods only as objectifieations of other 
thing’s of existentialist significance, and subsumes in , 
that also the biblical witness to God."-^  ^ Making this 
distinction is part of what it means to talse the Bible 
seriously
/
We have seen that the existentialist approach can 
either be "a methodological precept which is occasioned 
by the state of the texts and justified by them”, or one 
"founded on a general ontology of existence, of which 
it then becomes the consequence and expression, and to 
which everyone who adopts the method is bound*"^^ The 
latter has already been rejected as inadequate,
How, then, can this be used as an hermeneutic tool? 
What are its limits? "The methodological precept aims to 
distinguish between intention and statement, between what 
is really meant anclllts representational form," That is, 
it endeavours to separate whg,t is said from the way it is
S«iW.Mfnai„Mj.«VBl 11 il*JWno>S«* f a g j f t ü jnMtl«a«3HTgSW,US**™»
31
, p. 60.
I M A ' , pp. 6of.
IMA.'. p. 109.
IMA.. p. 110.
said, the kernel from the shell. It ought, therefore, 
to "explain" the texts, make them "understandable".
The meaning of theee two terms must first be cleared 
of all ambiguity, Braun has "explained" the word "God" 
by showing that what it refers to is not "God" but 
"a tx’anaoendental 'Whence of all my being upheld and all 
my d o i n g s ' " T h i s ,  however, is "correction" not "expla­
nation" , "I thought it was the function of an explanation 
to render it evident that the something in question was
this definite thing, so that the explanation took away
36the obscurity but not the object,
A similar ambiguity is encountered in the word 
"understand". The existentialist approach— -and this is 
the trap into which Bishop John Robinson falls in Honest
to God"'— — "makes too much of an effort to make Christianity
37acceptable,Understanding is not attained by erasing 
all the peculiarities of the object in order to show it is 
similar to what we already know. Rather, understanding is 
knowing the object in all its peculiarity, That is the 
task laid before all theology— dogmatics as well as
38: quotings Braun, o%), oij;., p, 298.
8/ren Kierkegaard,
David P. Swenson and Walter lowrie, tms, (Princeton, 
1941)3 p, 1 9 6. Braun's formula, "God is within this 
event" (Post Bultmann looutum. vol. I, pp. 11, 29), 
does not make his position any more tenable, "God" 
is still dissolved into the event of hearing and 
accepting him, he is "explained away".
TMJMsS§m&.Æ.MM.ÆSJimi£âSMââ.-M-ÆsÀSb.> p- 2 5 2 .
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Exegesis has not to endeavour to 
bring the reader to see what he can 
•make of* the statements of the text » 
and to trim them to that end Be.Giyid.um
Dwt although it 
does have to show where they touch the 
life of the hearer today® yet at the 
same time it has to give a clearcut 
picture of them precisely in their 
foreign-noas, so that there arises 
an encouo.ter, perhaps even a conflict® 
between the hearer and the text's 
message which had not so far come 
within his range and is at first not «o 
yet accessible to him#
How, then, can we assure a proper approach? What 
must our safeguards be? That v/ill be part of the content 
of the next chapter* But first we must examine another 
inappropriate was of speaking of God, of the relationship 
between God and man#
Gollwitzer and a Theology of Representation
This second ina,ppropriate way of speaking of God is 
represented by Dorothae Solle's book,
( 1956 )
She presents in this book a, novel approach to Christian 
theology in the twentieth century* It is also very 
appealing, bringing to light many valid insights. This 
novelty and a.ppeal is enhanced by her straightforward,
M Â .  . p. 122
Christ t 
(London, 19©7)
^ DT: D a v id  L e w is , t r n s ,
readable style. All this, of course, makes any oritioism 
of her work diffloult and oomplex. For these reasons,
then, I shall begin by summarizing her book briefly, yet 
in some detail, Then the examination of Gollwitzer's 
oritioiam which follows will be more readily understood.
Both Bolle and Gollwitzer live as thinking people of 
the modem world— -both are "contemporary”. Although 
their approaches to it are different, they share this 
twentieth century environment and want to fao© it honestly, 
What is this common environment, this modem setting?
Dorothee Bolle, following Nietzsche and others, 
calls it "the death of God", ore more precisely "the 
experience of the death of God"• It is difficult to 
determine exactly what she means by this. On occasion 
this slogan, "the death of God", is meant to indicate 
acme alteration in God's mode of existence. If God has 
changed, then mania experience of God will now be different, 
Thus, "Any direct surrender to God, suoh as the saints of 
the great religions exemplify, is no longer possible for 
us in this post-theistic age. For us God is not directly 
present."^^ But more often, and more accurately, she 
regards this as a change in human experience caused by 
scientific and technological progress and the spread of 
a critical consciousness throughout society. The areas
p * 132.
where God 1b needed as an explanatory factor have all 
been eroded, "The phrase 'the death of God* is meant to 
give theological expression to these changed psychosocial 
conditions,
This phrase, "the death of God", is meant to express 
not only the experience of God's absence. but also of his
This® according to Bolle, is an eEspe­
cially painful experience today. Me have experienced 
Auschwitz, Hiroshima, Vietnam and Little Rock. After 
these, how can we praise God who governs everything so 
wonderfully that we cannot see his hand in it? In other 
words: God "has not finished his work." " He has left 
some of his work undone. Thus» he needs to be represented 
For without someone to do what he has left undone» without 
someone to fulfil his promise, "we should have to 'sack' 
the Clod v/ho does not show up® who ho.s left us.
In this milieu Bolle has attempted a new start in 
theology based on a re-appraisal of the concept of repre- 
sentation "Representative" is not
itself a new Ohristological term. Although commonly used 
in classical soteriology it has been neglected of late.
p. 12.
lio
Lindemann, Rademann and Kuîilmaain» in an open letter to 
"Ber Spiegel", July 18, 1966, p. 9 0g quoted ins
p. 162. a trans­
lation of this very moving letter can be found in 
S, Paul Schilling,
(Nashville, 1969), pp. 13-14.
0 , p . 132.
Of course, to make use of a concept so rich in significance 
a careful analysis of its possible meanings and implications 
must be executed. And Solie devotes an early chapter to 
such an analysis,
But she has already made an earlier presup-position. 
"This concept e^preBentatioîîj can only be used to describe 
the worîs; of Jesus if it is firmly rooted in human relation­
ships in society— — in other words® only if it matches a 
universal phenomenon in our world as well,"^'*^'' This is 
her steirting pomt, And her chosen method is a dialectic 
which mediates the experience "of the death of God and 
that of the life of Christ" "into a new unity » into a 
•theology after the death of
One aspect of this modern setting» which is expressed 
theologically by the phrase "the death of God", concerns 
Bolle tîiroughouts the personal identity crisis. On the 
one hand, man feels a compelling need for personal identity, 
This is expressed in "the bourgeois idealist thesis that 
the individual is irreplaceable",^ '^  But every day, on 
the other hand» his experience negates this, The teotoo- 
logy which gave us mass production and intorchangeability 
of parts has begun to have a social effect, Heplaceability 
hais invaded also the human si:>here. When we quit a job or 
retire we are replaced by another. Computers and machines
IM â . , p. 15.
m m . . p. 134.
m m .  • p. 43.
are able to do many things faster and more efficiently 
than human workers. How, then, oan man gain the sought- 
after personal identity, irreplaoeability?
In the past this was guaranteed by God. No matter 
what happened in the world each person was irreplaceable ® 
an unique individual to Clod. But the modern "experience 
of the death of God" has made this impossible. Several 
alternatives have been suggested at various times-— - 
society, vocation, love, fatherland, art, etc. But, in 
the end, none of these has proved sufficient. Indeed, the 
identity-orisis, the feeling of replaceability, has taken 
on ultimate proportions. We are torn on the dilemma of 
needing to feel irreplaceable but sensing at the same 
time our replaceability.
Dorothea Bolle sees in the concept of representation, 
as distinct from replacement, a way out of the dilemma.
But this distinction between representation and replace­
ment must be very carefully maintained. Representation 
means assuming conditional responsibility for the person 
represented for a limited period of time. Replacement, 
on the other hand, is complete, unconditional and perma­
nent substitution, To fail to maintain this distinction 
leads, in the end, to substitution and replacement. To 
■guarantee someones personal identity, his irreplac©ability 
one must represent him, not substitute for him.
The de terminât ive conditions for representation, then
47are personality and temporality,  ^and its characteristics
ïMâ... pp. 5 6 , 1 0 2.
are identification, dependence and provisionality, Icjenti- 
fication must be twofold: identifioation of the represen-
tative with the one represented, otherwise the one repre­
sented would he depersonalized and thus replacedi and 
i dent if ic at ion of the one represented with the represen­
tative, otherwise the latter*b action and suffering would 
he wasted, would he for nothing, S.cpphdapae must also he 
reciprocal? you are always irreplaceable £qr someone (the 
deitive case cannot he ignored) ; hut the representative 
must also gain the consent of the one represented or else 
he reduces him to a "thing", that is, he is dependent 
upon his consent, purpose of repre-
sentation is to guarantee personal identity, irreplacea- 
hility, hy holding the person’s place open for hira while 
he is absent, so that in the future he can return to it. 
Therefore, representa.tion must he provisional, temporary, 
incomplete,
All this Bolle has gained from a loyalty to the 
general experience of raodern man an.d froRi axi analysis of 
the concept of "representation", But she maintains a 
double loyalty. Therefore, she also turns to the New 
Testament to find the distinctively Christian elements 
of representationg "historicality, universalisâtion, 
voluntariness, and suffering” This part of her analysis, 
however, is very soon laid aside. In applying the concept 
of "representation" to Christ she divides her discussion
S â â . , p. 68.
into two sections g "Christ-— -Our Representative Before 
and "Christ— God*b Representative Among Men".
And within both of these she has three sections dealing 
with his provisionality, his identification# and his depen­
dence, In other words # she returns to the tîiree charac­
teristics of representation discovered by an examination 
of the concept end ignores the work done in her chapter 
on "Representation in the Haw Testament",
if we understand 
Christ's pro vi s ionality rightly# contends Bolle » it will 
help in our continuing dialogue with Judaism. Thus
redemption ought to be conceived not as "a perfeotionistia
onoe-for-all event but an unceasing process, A final 
Christ— the replacement who perfectly and completely 
secures for us the reconciling grace of Clod***— -vanishes. " 
And in his place appears a Christ who represents us only 
incompletely and temporarily,
The pattern chosen by Bolle to describe Christ's 
i#%itificatipp, is that of the teacher# and the "yardstick 
for measuring the degree of identification in a given case
î M â . , Ohs. 1.6-19, pp. 107-1 2 9.
I M â . . Ohs. 20-22, pp. 130-149.
iMJ>. I oh. 9, pp. 6 7-7 1. ®o her credit Solle does not do 
this blindly. Rather# she proposes at the start 
(p. 1 6) that "readers not already trained in theology 
can simply skip" the part of the book containing 
this chapter, Therefore# she must regard it as 
merely theological superstructure which may be 
igno red s afely,
m m . . pp. 1 0 8, 1 0 9.
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Q.s3 the teacher's attitude to p u n i s h m e n t T h e  purpose 
of punishment is not expiation nor satisfaction ® but 
rehabilitation. In other words# it is a personal trans­
action in V7hich the identification between the tv/o 
partners is so complete that the one meting out the 
punishment suffez's from it just as much as the one being 
punished. But this identification does not abolish the 
distance between Christ and those he represents# a distance 
emphasized by his provisionality. Rather it is a relation 
"of identity in non-identity# of ' one-ness in separate-ness' 
as the young Hegel formulated it,"-^ '^*'
Provisionality and identification are bound up with 
Ohrist's dependence on us# on our assent.
Only in this way can his suffering be 'for us’. Nor is 
this just a once-for-all dependence. Rather# he continues 
to put himself at risk, Suoh a "doctrine of Christ's 
continuing# representative suffering" can be denied# 
claims Solle# only by those "who see the resurrection ,,, 
as Clod's final victory over his enemies and not simply an. 
anticipatory sign of hope,"^^
This aapeot of
Christ's repre s entat ion has never been developed as com­
pletely as the former. Also # it is this aspect which most 
needs development in the light of the "experience of the
îMâ.. PP- 117-118. 
IMA., p. 122.
IMJ... p. 125.
death of God"* For an "a/bsent God" needs a representative, 
Therefore# Salle is oareful not to omit this aspect in her 
development of a theology of representation,
Christ's representation of God* like his representa­
tion of us, is ;ip?o vis ional. He is not replacing a dead 
God, hut representing a living God. And he does this hy 
guaranteeing God's future hy "running ahead of him”, 
reaching man on his hehalf before he is able to. The 
image, then, that Solle uses here is that of the "fore­
runner"* Christ does this as one who identifies himself 
with this absent God, Indeed, Bolle claims that this
fact "is the ground for believing in God
36today.However, this section is very confused and con­
fusing, beginning, as it does, by stating that "Identifi­
cation is a relation between those who are differentiated"-^  ^
and going on to asserts "]:n Christ God himself left the
immediacy of heaven, abandoned the security of home, for 
38e v e r * T h u s ,  she abandons her principle of provisionality 
by ascribing to Christ an identification "for ever", and 
she forsakes her concept of identification as a relation­
ship between differentiated individuals by confessing at 
once the divinity of Christ and the humanity of God, Like­
wise, she revises the characteristic of dependence, as she 
proceeds. At the outset dependence involved the acceptance
IMA., pp. 139-140 (ray italics) 
IMA., p. 137.
IMd., p. 141.
or rejection t>y the How, then, is
Christ dependent upon God's acceptance or rejection?
SolXe spurns the traditional answer that the resurrection
was a sign of God's acceptance and prefers insteads "He
depends upon God hy depending upon us and living by our
decisions. But that is to say that God depends on us".
It seems, then, that dependence involves the acceptance
or rejection not of the one being represented, but of
those to whom he is being represented.
All this Dorothee Solie imbues with an appeal for
action. The corollary of Christ's provlsionality is our
discipleship. It means that the company of believers
must eventually take up the future held open for us by
Christ and assume responsibility for the world. Similarly,
it means that "Christ is present implicitly whenever
60a m&ui acts or suffers in God's stead." His identifi­
cation with us and with God makes possible now our repre­
sentation of God, "Me, too* can now play God for one
61another.” And that, she claims* we should begin doing 
now, at last.
IÎ2M- . P« 1#.
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In hie criticism of Dorothee Solle's book, Helmut
GoXlwitser does not malce the mistake of one-sidedly
affirming or denying all that she says. Indeed, he takes
great pains to show the value a,s well as the error in her
approach. His re-presentation of her argument in his own 
6?words, " in faot, avoids many of the self^oontradiotions 
present in her essay and retained in my sumnary above# 
Thus, an examination of his criticism caamot be divided 
nea.tly into sections dealing with agreement and disagree­
ment separately. The extent of the agreement is always 
limited by some disagreement, and likewise, the areas of 
disagreement are tempered by points of agreement.
Before beginning this examination, however, it 
should be noted again that Gollwitaer, like Solie, also
writes against this background experience of "the ghastly
Ô S *massacres of our century". Hia concern here has led to 
many books and tracts which will be considered in a later 
chapter. But already a basic difference is apparent. For 
Gollwit'zer affirms that it is against this very background 
that Christians hear and proclaim the gospel, "very much 
challenged by this situation, by their o\m situation, by 
God's concealment, by his impotence, by his apparent 
absence— in and despite this challenge and against it 
they hear the gospel 'that the kingdom of God appeared in
, pp* 48-53, 103,
îMâ... p. 142.
Christ's and cling fast to it,"^^ Bo lie 'began by 
analysing man's need and the concept of representation and 
only then turned to the gospel to see if she could make it 
fit* Gollwitaer tries to work the other way round; to 
begin with the gospel and then see how it challenges man, 
This basic difference of approach underlies all the 
specific points of disagreement and pervades even the 
areas of agreement*
It is true, CJollwit^ er admits, that Dorothee Solle 
gives us an honest report of the way a contemporary person 
can hear the gospel, how Christ can still apeak today.
She tries to be loyal to the two experiences of the 
"death of God" and the "life of Christ", "This book is 
a report of this attempt at loyalty and at mediating these 
contrary experiences ' into a new unity* ? in that lies its 
sincerity and its signifioanoe," She does not try to 
write a timeless sort of theology, but reoogniaes that 
she speaks "as a contemporary person whose first presup­
position is contemporaneity, •«• It is this very fact 
that makes her book •*, more honest and significant than 
the studious attempts of many theologians to adapt the 
gospel to contemporary wording*"
îMâ., p. 116.
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But the extent of the agreement must be noted care­
fully, In reporting the questions and problems and 
experiences confronting contemporary man, Solle has done 
what every Christian must do. "Since the church is a 
community of modem men and since, as contemporary men, 
they owe their contemporaries a witness in modem language 
therefore, they are not permitted to renounce their
67contemporaneity hut must confess to it and practise it." *
It is this contemporaneity (2M=lSS?XQS§eQgS,Mtl) for which 
Solle*8 hook is praised. However, merely to he contem­
porary is not enough. Indeed, this is to ignore the other 
side, the experience of the "life of Christ". The dif­
ference between Christians and their contemporaries is 
that "they ^h© Christians] neyejrthelam.Mill stand in 
persistent hearing of the message and thus their thought
and their life is itself the exemplary place of this
68message's encounter with modern raan,"‘ This does not 
Die an seeing what they can make of the gospel in the light 
of modern experience. Such a capitulation before "modernism" 
does justice neither to the modem experience nor to the 
gospel message. Properly, as Solle herself intends, the 
tvm should be "present simultaneously to join battle as 
to what is real.
a J J , . . p . 55.
,M... p. 5 5.
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We have here, as I mentioned briefly above, the erux 
of the matter, their basic methodological difference.
Solle begins with the human question about how to attain 
personal identity, irreplaceability. She makes an analysis 
of the concept of representation in himan terms. On the 
basis of this she concludess "Incompleteness constitutes 
the mode of [Ohrist's] being for us." Then, in her 
final section, she develops a ohristology in the light of 
these criteria. Therefore, she condemns those whose 
"thought does not move from below upwards, from the anthro- 
pological reality to the ohristological event”, accusing 
them of using strange methods "requiring of theology prior 
acts of specific belief”.
Gollwitser's criticism, then, is to the point. For 
it is undoubtedly true that Solle "strives to elevate 
men's condition of need purely phenomenologioa.lly in 
order to make Christ universally intelligible as the 
answer to the question of the human situation.In 
other Y/ords, she wants to see what she can still make of 
the gospel in the light of modern thought. The dangers 
of this methodology become clear when one examines it in 
relationship to the Lordship of God. Any methodology 
which begins with an independent analysis of the human 
situation and then seeks the gospel's answer to it has
rypBiüWMlli
ma . ,  p. 106.
mm., p. 94.
Von der Stellvertretung Gottes. p. 65.
determined already beforehand what the gospel can ..bring, 
Thia means, then, that Solle, by employing such a method, 
has not in faot been loyal to both the experience of the 
"death of God" gn.d, the experience of the "life of Ohrist" 
as YJas her intention, but has made the latter subservient 
to the former. Or, to put this even more accurately# she 
abolishes the Gospel and returns to the Law.
Indeed, a fatum is always Lav/, 
and if a theology begins vd.th Law, 
then, in the end, nothing can come 
from it other than Law, The fatum 
saysB "We are no longer able ,,,, 
we are no longer able ,.,', and enu­
merates what men of an earlier age 
— supposedly— ~v?ere still capable 
of but which is impossible for us 
todays the resulting Law sayss "We 
must ,, •, we must ,.. " , and enumerates
v/hat we must do ,,, .
Secondly, Gollwitaer admits that much of Solle's 
background analysis is useful and necessary. She makes a 
fundamental distinction between irreplaceability and unrep^  
resentabillty. The individual, feeling as though he is at 
present replaceable, gains a future irreplaceability 
because he is representable, "In the differentiation of
these tv;o ,,, lies an achievement of Solle's analysis
which is not to be forgotten,Also, her section on 
the "Problem of Punishment" (chapter l?“b), though incom­
plete , is a fruitful piece of work, "It is to be aclmow- 
lodged very highly that the authoress works out her
îMâ.. p. 144.
m m . . p. 2 6.
example of a post-theistic theology precisely in the 
doctrine of reconciliation which ie so neglected by modern 
theology and in doing so contributes, e.g. a very useful 
analysis of the notion of punishment, a concept so often 
used unthinkingly by theologians. " *
However, the basic error in Solle's methodology 
noted above affects the content of her analysis. "For the 
very reason that already in her antliropological analysis 
she makes the preliRiinary decision concerning the content 
of the answer, this analysis cannot develop freely.”' For 
example® her strict distinction between "representative" 
and "replacement" a dravm from her ao.alysis of man's quest 
for identity, prevents a development free from pre-judgment. 
Representation must have as charaoteristics, she a3?guecl, 
identification, dependence and provisionality. But she 
presumed that the consent of the one represented, on which 
the representative depends, must temporally precede the 
representative act. Thus, her arguments "betray an 
astonishing forgetfulness of the reformation problematic 
regarding the notion of consent (assensugi), "  ^ She did 
not ta3i:e seriously— -that is, in a way which would have 
an effect on her thinking— --the Pau]_ine anthropology 
which sees man as "dead in sin" (of. Ephesians 2s1,3p
JMâ-i p. 66.
imi., p. 29. 
.mm., p. 31.
Oolossians 2 s13) and incapable of prior consent. Subsequent 
consent is both possible and necessary, Otherwise represen­
tation indeed becomes replacement. But in Belle's analysis, 
"our small ability to co-operate, which is really the 
gracious permission of him v/ho does not need us, becomes
the replacement for divine action-*— replacement even
78though called 'representation*
Similarly, from her analysis Dorothee Solle concluded 
that one criterion of true representation was that it must 
be temporally transient, This leads her to see Jesus as 
a teacher, a pioneer, a forerunner— — ,e3sempluDi-*~»and to 
affirm an inclusive; as opposed to an exclusive, doctrine 
of reconciliation, Thereby she confused replacement of 
persons and replacing action. The aim of true represen­
tation is to gain time for the person represented, who at 
present is incapable, so that in this acquired future he 
will be capable. But, for example, in the case of a battle 
against a superior enemy this can only be done by defeating 
the enemy on his behalf— an action which he then does 
not have to repeat for himself. Thus, "representation of 
the can also include replacing action.* It depends
upon the fact that the relationship of persons is not a 
matter of replacing, but not that the„,p,e/bipn is not a 
matter of replacing."- In other words, the true criterion 
of representation is not Solle's temporal-tranBionoe but
IMd.. pp. 109-110.
I & M . . p. 37.
whether or not it eetahliehes personal oommunity so that
by means of this lop-sided community the ability of the
one gains time for■life for the other despite his inability.
Since she errs here, she then makes "no distinction between
what Ohrist does so that through him we, too, can do it
some day, and v/hat he does but we can never do and never
will be able to do, and, thanks to his action, also never
80need to be able to do," Reconciliation belongs to this 
latter category. It is not azmpimgmmi
Thirdly, there are a few places where the two writers
agree on their interpretation of the biblical message. The
most important of these is their christological approach,
Solle's new emphasis in her notion of representation—
namely# that Ohrist represents God in his absence— "is
positively enlightening because it spot-lights how faith
and Ohrist belong together , In the midst of God's
invisibility and distance Ohrist guarantees that he
becomes the basis of our faith without which we could no
81longer hope in God", Gollwitser also supports Solle*8
many statements to the effect that God depends on men and
their witness to be alive for other men.
At thfit point it is most certainly 
true that precisely according to the 
Mew Testament also God's existence in 
the world does not bypass men. In an
. în - i i r iiiri tw a '- i ' - r n'Wi'^a ri i'r rr  i  r M -T T r r ' i # r i i r i m i # |T'm.wr r —n
m a . , pp . 6 ? f .
® ^ ï M â . . p .  66. \
\ "\
alarming way he lays his cause in 
men's hands. .*• So we are told 
already in the Mew Testament. One 
cannot say it sharply, one-sidedly op 
enough.
let much of what Solle says seems to Gollwitgier to 
he untrue to the Mew Testament witness. She reverses the 
hi'blical emphasis, "For D, Solle, that representation hy 
Ohrist around which past theological thought circled, 
representation at God's judgment, has been hidden by her 
interest in another representations in God's being repre­
sented by Jesus Ohrist in a, time of his obscurity and 
remoteness.In bo  doing, she makes some remarks which 
are actually contrary to the tenor of the New Testament. 
For instance, she writess "Because God does not intervene 
to establish his cause, Ohrist appears in his place.
"The antithesis is cleax'i for the New Testament says 
precisely the reverses that in Christ's appearing God
intervenes to establish his cause."
Fourthly, and closely related to their at least 
partial agreement regarding New Testament interpretation, 
Gollwit%er and Solle are at one in their demand for an 
active, witnessing company of believers. If the message 
of the gospel means anything at all, it is a call to 
CO s tly di s c iple ship.
IMâ.. p. 129.
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We should apeak of Christ in his 
'being-for-uB in such a way that we 
do not cease but finally begin to 
do something’ for him, i.e. for our 
fellowman. Or more accurately and 
in an older but in no way antiquated 
languages The comfort of the gospel 
should no longer drown out tho demand, 
the pacifying element the motivating oz 
one ... .
This, too, is a limited agreement. Solle is correct
in basing this demand for action on the faot that God uses
men to effect his cause in the world. But she errs in
limiting God's activity to this human activity*
It is readily said today that "God 
can oome to pass between men among 
those 'v/ho have done it to me*".
He oan do that, thguiks be to God!
But— thanks be to GodS- he is not
limited to that. .,. The tautology 
between God and the event of inter- 
human love abolishes the gospel of 
God's love. ^
Finally, Gollwit%er accuses Dorothee Solle of being 
unclear in many places. Mho is Christ and how is he able 
to do what is claimed of him? And related to this, what 
does she mean when she uses the vocable "God"? Is Christ's 
resurrection a transitory stage— an anticipatory sign 
-— or is it the fulfilment? What does she mean by 
"directness" when she says a "direct relationship to God" 
is no longer possible? These, however, are generally no 
more then inconsistencies in Solle*s argument. To go
m â ‘> p- 2 3.
8? T,..'Ebid., p. lAy; quotings D. Solle, "Théologie naoh dem 
Tode Gottes", Merkur. 19^ 4, p. 111?.
into thorn in detail would add nothing to what we have 
leamed already# The root difference is one of method anxl 
approach. And it is time now to turn, in the next chapter, 
to Gollwitger* s own attempt to speak of God appropriately.
"GOD TALK" 3 APPROPRIATE lAMGmGE ABOUT GOD
Safeguards for Appropriate Language about God
In the last chapter v/e presented two inappropriate 
ways of speaking of God and indicated Helmut Gollwltser's 
criticism of them# The simplest solution to this problem 
of talking about God would seem to remain silent. But 
our silence is judged even as our speech. Christian pro­
clamation must speak of God, How* then * oan we assure 
a proper approach? What must our safeguards be?
Gollwitser suggests a four-fold answer here s
1# "The definitions must not be dictated by any modern 
consciousness set up aa norm ...* but must be demanded by 
the biblical proclamation of God itself and bring out its 
intention." This point has been in the background of 
all his criticism of both the consistent existentialist 
position and the poat-theistie theology of Dorothee Solle, 
The Christian theologian must always remain true to "what 
the Bible says" — not in form, but in content. Here is 
where both Braun and Sô*lle failed, despite their good 
intentions. By means of m  existentialist understanding 
of the text, or through the concept of representation, 
their aim was to demythologiae the gospel, to change the 
form into one more understandable to modern man. But they
1 . James w.
leitch, tms. (London, 1965), p. 124.
absolutized their teohniques so that the content, too, 
was altered. Their criterion for judging what was to be 
excised was the consciousneBS of modern man which, they 
claimed, could no longer accept or presume the existence 
of a deity. Acceptance of such a criterion at one© brings 
them under Luther’s condemnations ”
This is the ma,jor and basic safeguard or criterion 
for appropriate talk of God. The other three which follow 
are derived from the application of this one. Therefore, 
it is important that we consider this one more carefully 
before moving on.
The first difficulty to be countered is an epistemo- 
logical one. This proposed method requires the tvm-fold 
presupposition that God exists apart from our experience 
of his action, and that this God is witnessed to in the 
Bible." But how can we know that? To answer that we oan 
Imow it only by faith hardly seems adequate beeause it 
has not explained the necessity for accepting such unveri- 
fia^ blee. Edward J. Machle gives us a clue to a sufficient 
answer in an article, "How is Heresy False?", He dis tin™
O
Ibid.. p. 122) quotings M. Luther, 14. T* 3» 6 7 0.18.
 ^This objection is raised by H. Braun; of. "Gottes 
Existons un.d mein© Geschichtliohkait im Neuen 
Testmmnt. 3l‘ine Antv/ort an H. Gollwitzer", in g
% um 80. Gobutrstag Tihibingen, lÿùWlVpp. 399ff •
IM: pM4lLM=2t-.Sg3Ji4-S33CC=§MSBSâ^^
(Toronto), vol. 1, N®. 3» Winter 1971, pp. 226ff.
guishes between "theologically true" (T-true) and "analy­
tically true". In heresy we have to do with statements 
which are not-T-true rather than ones v/hich are not-true. 
The latter would includes statements of apostasy or un­
belief. The heretic, on the other hand, still believes, 
albeit falsely according to the pagisterium of the 
community which talks about life in terms of this belief. 
"On this accoimt, the basic statements of a faith, like 
•God exists*, ... cannot bo T-true since to declare them 
false would not be heresy ... but would be apostasy or
f'
unbelief,"” Rather, such statements are analytically 
true. They are the behind
subsequent T-true statements. If, then, we apply this 
sort of analysis to the question of appropriate or 
inappropriate language about God we have a clue to the 
solution of this first objection. For Gollwitzer, 
propositions such ass "God exists apart from my experience 
of his existing" and "The Bible witnesses to this God", 
are constitutive to^ utologies. They are not T-true, that 
is, they oaianot be verified by comparing them with any 
prior knowledge, because there is no prior îmov/ledge.
By the same token they are also not not-T-true. The 
question as to why one ought to accept these particular 
constitutive tautologies rather than any others cannot 
be answered except in a circular way. This, however,
 ^I MA., p. 231.
oeases to be a serious objection for the seme is true of 
every constitutive tautology. This means, then, that the 
Braun-Gollwitaer debate will never be solve cl until the one 
abandons his o\m and accepts the others constitutive 
tautologies.
Having accepted Gollwitzer* s constitutive tautologies ® 
one is confronted still with a second difficulty of an 
hermeneutic nature, Gollwit^er*s intention is to seek 
the essence of the gospel message behind the external 
form of the scriptwal proclamation so that it may challenge 
modem man's experience. In doing this we are to use all 
the hermeneutic tools available today. But we must avoid 
using the modern consciousness as a criterion for deter­
mining the gospel message. However, the question Y/hich 
must be asked iss Is this really possible? After all, 
the way we look at things in some measure determines what 
Y/e see. For instance, v/e might draw an analogy with an 
unusual situation in photogra.phy. The subject to be 
photographed is concealed in a cubicle with curtains on 
all four sides for walls* The photographer, of course, 
has a choice of films and methods. With an ordinary film 
and front-lighting he would see only the curtains of the 
cubicle. Using back-lighting* with this same film he could 
photograph the silhouette cast as a shadow on the curtain. 
But with x-ray or infra-red film he would gain a much 
more accurate picture of his subject behind those curtains. 
The point is, though, that the method used determined to 
8, large extent what he saiv. Similarly, in biblical
hermeneutics the method or tool we choose has ati effect 
on the message we find, How oan we he sure we are not 
thus imposing human values on the gospel message? As 
meatisfaetory as it may at first sound, the answer is 
that we cannot he sure, but must strive in the direction 
of objectivity by comparing the results of as many methods 
of interpretation as possible, recognizing throughout the 
ultimate inadequacy of our methods to deal v/ith the sub­
ject matter at hand* To these problems we v/ill have to 
ret’urn in Chapter 7*
2* On the basis of this first safeguard of appro­
priate talk of God, then, we can move on to derive the 
other three* What the Bible witnesses to is an encounter 
between God and man— "an encounter which is not identical 
to any other kind of encounter" — " an encounter v/ith One 
who in relation to self, world and |pur| fellow men is
*Non-identical* » and thus to that extent in actual fact
6•Wholly Other*," In relation to this encounter— -and 
this is the great truth of existentialist theology—“™v;e 
always react as either participants or outsiders* The 
outsider can assess the encounter sociologically, psycho­
logically or phanomenologically* But only the participant 
has any real understanding of what he has to do with. The 
encounter can no t be assessed correctly i>om a distance but 
o n ly  in,,..Bct.u. The question whether God exists i s  not
6 The Existence of God as Gonfeased by Faith. pp, 12Af,
is not v/ithin the realm of theology. Speaking as a par­
ticipant the theologian asks, simply, liqw he can epeaîc of 
God's existence, or ^hen he says "God isS"
I suspect that, to a large extent, this is really Y/ha.t 
Braun intends as well, although he expresses it somewhat 
imprecisely. If Braun's expression, echoing Tolstoy, —  
"Where love i s ,  there i s  God also"--— - is  taken at face 
value, then Gollwitzer's criticism has some point#
However, Braun may simply he emjjhasizing;, in an epigrari^ - 
matio way,*^  the faot that we only come to know God th ro u g h  
experiencing his action in our encounters with other 
people* That i s  not u n lik e  v/hat Gollwitser himself says a 
"He v/ho encounters us hero is the One whose existence can 
ho disputed only apart from tho encounter, only in the 
form of misjudgment"If this is the case, at this point 
their argum ent is verbal, not s u b s ta n t ia l; they differ on 
emphasis, not content.^ We shall see later in this chapter, 
hov/ever, that there is a r e a l  disagreement on Braun's 
preference for "impersonal" language#
3* The third sa fe g u a rd  of appropriate language about 
God relates to philosophy* We must note
the highly important limitation v/hioh
the Bible's talk of God imposes on
 ^This style i s  more apparent in 1]he Germans 'Wb ,,;Lieben
p
 ^p* is6.
This, too, may be stated epigrammaticallys Braun is
concerned about how man can speak about God; Goll- 
witzer about jbpw man may speak about God.
itself in order to remain appropriate 
... • It does not take the step to 
an ontology of God. ^ And thus none 
must he imputed to it either.
This is an argum ent from eilenoe, i.e., it draws a oon- 
elusion from what is not said, and alone, would he susx>eot. 
Y e t, i t  is a eonsistent d e r iv a t io n  from the first safe­
guard and also preserves in our theology the aonoept of 
God's Lordship. Me Imve already noted in the last 
chapter hov/ becoming enslaved to a philosophy, and there­
by to an ontology, defines God in such a way theit he can 
no longer be the Lord. The "living God" is reduced to 
a concept explaining human experience. By not limiting 
oursGlves to suoh an onto logy'-— and today that also means 
rescuing theology from its u n io n  with St. Augustine's 
neo-platonism, St. Thomas Aquina.s* Aria to to 1 ianism, and 
all the other philosophical accretions— i.e., by 
refusing to speak "objectively" of God in an improper and 
limiting way, we make
clear in v/hat a radical sense the 
titles 'Msâ' and 'liyingj^d' apply 
to him with whom we ho,ve here to do.
He is indisposable, i.e. we 'have' 
him in no other way than in the reaction 
of faith and obedience which is demanded 
and made possible by what he says to us « 
in promise and command.
Once again, it will be noted, Gollwitzer and Braun 
sound remarkably similar. But their emphases and purposes
10
; , p. 128.
I M A . . p. 130.
remain different. Bratm, as explained earlier, wishes to 
stress the fact that our knowledge of God is limited to 
our experience of his action. Although in places he 
seems to deny God's existence apart from these events of 
love in which we encounter him, his general attitude is 
one of agnosticism, i.e. v;e just ommot îmov/ of God's 
existence p re v io u s  to or independent of our experience of 
his action. Gollwitzer, on the other hand, v/ishes to 
affirm most emphatically the independent existence of this 
"wholly other" God and only then ask how we may speak of 
him. The quotation above, therefore, has a different 
purpose from Braun's similar remarks. By it Gollwitzer 
means to present the fact that we cannot define God 
rationally or conceive of him speculatively. Even those 
parts of the Hew Testament which Braun claims reflect 
such an "ohjeotification" of God by first-century theistio 
man, by his ovm arguDiont do not, in fact, do that. They 
are examples of speaking of God in the only way possibles 
through the response of faith and obedience.
4. Finally, all this "can be adequately understood
only when we always also bear in  mind that it is said on
the ground of permission and promise and on the ground of
17condo^oension. " This point is neglected by much of
modern theology. The assum ption  is made in so many places 
today, and is shared by Horbez^ t Braun and Dorothee Solle,
I M A . , p. 139.
that man, by h is  ovm power, is able to cliaoover God and
say something abou t him* But this ignores completely the
fact, brought to light by existentialist theologians, that
"what the Bible says is wholly and solely response—
response to a preceding concret© and contingent experience
of being called, in which it is only v/hen this happens
that the Caller is first known for what he is *” This
Caller is none other than the non-identical, wholly other,
living God, the Lord,
In the light of these conditions, then, how oan we
speak of the existence of God? What do w© mean when we
say "God exists”?
It is important to emphasize once again that "there
is no point in prohibiting specifically the use of such
concepts as 'existence* and 'reality* with reference to 
3 AGod*” ' If we were able to distinguish between concepts 
as in themselves adequate or in a d e q ua te  for application 
to God, then such a prohibition might have been in order* 
But upon application to God, he becomes their subject and 
determiner# Concepts gain, for the first t im e , their full 
and true meaning* Thus, it is o u r part to "reflect on the 
transformation which talces place in the concept of exis- 
tenoe when God becomes its subject,
m m . , pp. 139-140.
I M A . . p . 204.
3 4 IteM* » P« ''304* One is tempted to argue that by this same 
principle Gollwitser ought not to have ruled out 
Bô*lle*s end B ra u n 's  methods as inappropriate for 
theology* And superfieially this appears to be an
But, it 1b objected, these terms, "existence” and 
"reality"*— end, incidentally, also "encounter", so 
favoured by Bultmann and B raun! — are  human conoepts. 
tod it has been argued already that if we are being faith­
ful to the biblical witness we cannot define God in 
human or rational eoncepts* This is certainly true and 
must be retained as one of the safeguards of a p p ro p r ia te  
language about God, But it is a safeguard and not, in 
itself 6 total3-y adequate as a definition of how we must 
or must not speaîr. of God, The safeguards, like the 
methods, also must not be absolutized in such a way that 
they determine ^, pripi'i how God oan encounter us and how 
we may speak of that encounter. Once again, V70 have an 
example of Gollwitzar’s use of paradox-dialectic, God 
is v/holly other, transcendent, beyond man's conception, 
Nevertheless he condescends to be spoken of by man, he 
is immanent. The great miracle of condescension, of 
course, is the incarnation, the reality of v/hich we must, 
in remaining true to the biblical witness, affirm. And
on the basis of this miracle we are able to say that
16"human ways of sp e a k in g  om jS a iZ m m m W  to  him." Thus,
our talk of God is legitimate but needs to be accompanied 
by explanations of what we do ^ t  mean as well as what 
we âS. BGan, We must show the limits of correspondence.
inconsistency in his argument. However, he has not 
r u le d  o u t  t h e i r  methods b u t  t h e i r  a b s o lu t iz in g :
of their methods so that they altered the gospel,
Ibid., p. 151 (my italics).
We must pause here to make a few remarks 
about the use of a n a lo g y  in theology* The 
problem facing us, simply, is thiss As huiRans 
v/e are limited to using human words and conoepts. 
Yet we v/ieh also to speak of God ax)propriately, 
i.e. in suoh a way that v/e lose sight of 
neither his traaeoendenGO nor his iimuanenoe.
Thus, we must apply our himian. Y/ords to this 
wholly other subject. Mhat happens to them then? 
"If our v/ords mean exactly the same thing when 
applied to God and to creatures, then God's 
transcendence is eliminated .., . On the other 
hand, if our wox^ ds bear an altogether different 
meaning when applied to God, then God's iiimianence
1 7is obsctu?ed”
Thus, when applied to God our words must be 
trmisformed but not given a completely new 
meaning. In this transformation we are not to 
play an arbitrary game with our words. Therefore, 
a suitability or constancy of use must be pre­
supposed. There must be some clear connection 
between the old and the new meanings. Or, in 
Jo to Manquarrie ' s imrds, "whatever terminology 
may be employed, seem driven to something very 
like the problem that has been traditionally
1 8considered under the heading of analogy." j.a 
this is so central to Christian talk of God, it 
means our task ie one of closer definition.
Language is forever changing. Words gain
1 7" Battista ffiondin, s.x., i’ha PpjjiojplG. .of .Analogy in Pro 
£iaâ_Siàl (London, 1967), p. 212.
new meanings in different ages and locales. 
Similarly, they oan have different meanings 
when applied to different objecte* But, if the 
transformation that occurs when human words are 
applied to God is not to be arbitrary, mid if 
they are still to mediate understanding, then 
there must be some continuity or similitude 
be "We on uses. This does not mean a, continuity 
relating to the whole of the meaning previously 
attached to the word. Rather* it is a, limited 
continuity, perhaps comprising only a single 
factor. Thus, there is both continuity and 
discontinuity, similitude and dissimilitude.
Transformed human words apply to God's 
acts in his revelation and not in his being. They 
denote only his action in history, that is* his 
action in reaching out and taking us into com­
munion with himself. These a re  real acts in 
secular history and therefore within the scope 
of human, words. "Analogy thus exists only on 
the ground of God's descent into humanity, not
as ’b u t as
3 0
(Barth) That is to say, the two usages
have a f u n c t io n a l  r a th e r  than a structural 
similarity. For example, oonmonly in the Bible 
and in Ghristian thought God is designated 
"Fsither”. This does not mean he is ontologi- 
oally our father. R a th e r , as we experience his 
action we recognize a similarity with the action 
of a good human father. By an an a lo g y  of relation, 
then, we call God "Father" , meaning that this 
wholly other acts in a fatherly way. This 
understs\nding should be applied to all the 
doctrinal statements of God's attributes (Lord,
Shepherd9 Creator® etc.)~— — and, Indeed® even
to the predloative "God"* They do not refer to
his 'being but represent appropriate analogioal
ways of speaking about him on the basis of our
experience of his action# At the ontological
level there is no point of similarity. We have
to do with a whollj other# The link, the point
of similarity v/hioh malces the analogy legitimate
and the language understandable is God's action
which is within our esqperience and similar to
70other action we have experienced#
Gollwitzer then goes on to distinguish 
between comparison and analogy, an important 
distinction for Christian theology# "It is .#• 
a qualitatively different jmalogy when it is 
said that Yahweh roars jife a lion (Hos. 11§10) 
or comforts like a mother (Isa# 6 6§1 3), and when 
it is said that he reveals himself gg our Lord,
p*i
Father, King, Judge, etc#" ‘ In fact, this 
distinction is the one we have repeatedly made, 
the distinction between moving fro m  the hmnan 
level to the divine or from the divine to the 
hUBian# "'Like' characterizes the comparison 
Y/hioh we ours elves malces it is a form of 
expression which is meant to make what is strange 
to us conceivable through the medium of what is 
known. It is a very different thing, however.
■0 I anticipate here the comment that this sounds remarkably 
like something Herbert Braun m ig h t say. And th e re  
is superficial j u s t i f i c a t i o n  for the comment, 
HoY/ever, if we accept my earlier suspicion that 
Braun does not intend to limit God's being to human 
experience of his action, we are still fa c e d  with 
the fact that he claims the similarity is to be 
seen from the human side, not the divine* T hus, 
he uses comparison rather than analogy, as explained 
in the ne:ct paragraph.
21
, pp. 190-191.
when in his condescension God himself confronts 
us in such a way that we rem a in  persons p hut 
become persons in oomraunion with him, ”Where 
it is a case of com p a riso n s, the impropriety 
(of human language] predominates; where the 
confession is meant to express the encounter 
with God himself, that is# where v;e mean to con­
fess that he confronts us as such and such# 
there it is precisely the propriety of these 
expressions that will have to he maintained,"
In this way we can speak of God not in definition 
hut in confession.
Therefore# when we say "God exists", 
existence is not understood in the 
sense of existence as Imown to us 
from ourselves and the world ahout us.
He does not belong to the list of what 
is# not even at the head of it as the 
•h ig h e s t  B e in g * , th e
To speak of God as possessing human qualities and
characteristics merely pressed to an ideal or
ultimate degree is either to make an onto3ngi“
cal distinction not justified hy the usual
sense of the language# gr to fail to make an
ontological distinction necessitated hy God*s
self-revelation of his nature in his oondesoBnsion
and witnessed to hy the Bihle* This latter
distinction between the Creator and the created#
between the Judge and the judged# between the
Redeemer and the redeemed, in short# between
God and everything else# must he maintained.
This is the consistent witness of the Bible
from the creation narratives to the apocalyptic
writings of the Day of YIMH. On the other hand#
3Mâ., p. 195.
2'^ p .  204.
the former case# it is the weaîmess of the "proofs 
of natural theology— the cosmological and teleo- 
logical arguments in particular— that they 
attempt to make such a necessary ontological 
distinction* but oannot do it logically, To 
argue hack from something in this world may lead# 
indeed* to an underlying principle of motivation 
still part of the created order— - @ but it 
oannot "prove" the existence of the Clod of the 
Bible who is Creator in a radical sense and not 
just Prime Mover, First Cause, ©to, To function 
as they intend, these "proofs" are dependent 
upon this ontological distinction being mad©.
For th e y  all argue the impossibility of an infinite 
regress. You must come eventually, they declaxe, 
to One whose being is different from all that we 
Imow hero, for example, One who is moved by no 
other mover. The ontological distinction is 
necessary to avoid the question of who created the 
creator# but it is not contained in the experience 
of the earlier part of the argument nor in the 
logical structure of the opening statements. We 
can speak of God's existence only becaue© he him­
self, as the One who is ontologically other, con­
descends to act in a way that we can experience 
and such that, by a functional analogy# we may 
speak in the form of confession.
The existentialist approach also wants to 
say that we m ust male© an ontological distinction, 
that we cannot speak of God existing if we memi 
by that being "tMng-like" and "given". In this 
it has grasped an essential truth. But still it 
fails# and does so for two reasons. First, it 
accepts this ontological distinction for the
wrong reason. Instead of deriving it from the 
biblical witness, existentialist th e o lo g y  g a in s  
this insight from modern* humsm philosophy. This,
in itself, would not Tba oritioal if the principle 
so derived were applied in faithfulness to the 
Bible, Thus* second, it fails because it a'bso- 
lutiaes the principle. Instead of taking it at 
its face value, the consistently existentialist 
approach (Braun) makes it say that since we do 
not moan existence in this one sense we cannot 
apply the word to God at all. Thus, the dis­
tinction is dissolved and we speak, not of God, 
but only of man. In other vfords, this negative 
safeguard is not balanced with a positive one.
The inadequacy of "is" propositions is noted 
without, at the ssjsne time# reoognissing the 
necessity of "is" propositions and the possibility 
of "is" propositions of analogy because of God's 
c onde sceneion•
â Vocative Theology
We turn now to the positive side. From what has been 
said thus f a r  it becomes obvious how Christian theology 
must proceed. We must first determine the biblical 
teaching regarding God and his encounter with men. This 
is the for all our talk of this relationship.
At the outset we exaiaine iîhe 
proclamation of biblical men spoken 
in deepest terror and in highest joy.
With that a standard is establisheds 
the reality of which they speak is 
such that one can speak of it only in 
such perplexity, Apyone who sneaks of
.......................... ' 25
3rd ed. (Munich, 19651, p# ?»
Ab dogmatic and objectionable as this may sound to some, 
it is nevertheless vital to a p p ro p r ia te  talk of God.
After all, it is nothing more than a positive statement 
of the first safeguard mentioned above and of one of the 
constitutive tautologies of Gollwit%er*s concept of 
Christian theology. It's strength lies also in the cor­
rective it provides b o th  f o r  Braun's existentialist 
theology and for Golle's "post-theism". On the basis of 
the biblical witness to God's encounter with man we can 
c o r re c t  existentialism and show how it is possible to 
apeal?. of God's existenoe without detriment either to man's 
limited abilities of conception or to God's transcendental/ 
immanent nature. Similarly# on the basis of a biblical 
anthropology we oen correct "representa^ tive theology" 
and show how the concept of "representative" can be used 
legitimately.
Fidelity to the biblical witness compels us to main­
tain a distinction between YHWH and the gods, and a
similar distinction between YHWH and the abstract god of 
26metaphysics, ' Besides the gods of the nations there 
existed f o r  ancient man innmierable known and unlrnown 
divinities whom one had to take care not to offend. Also,
Gollwitsser admits in this his indebtedness to s Ko melius
H, Miskotte, A Is de Go den zwijgcen (Amsterdam, 1936) 1 
FT: John W, D o b e rs te in ,
tms, (London, 196? ),
t)0h:md mid above these gods there stood some ultimate 
power or being determining the fate of them and of man. 
"This 'besides' and 'behind* and 'above* do not apply to
Nor oan tWH be equated with the demythologiaed, 
impersonal ultimate power of metaphysics # the god of the 
philosophers. Even Paul Tillich's "Ultimate Concern" 
is not adequate to represent the biblical God. For such 
a power is u n a d d re ssa b le. But "the great deed of Israel 
is ... t h a t  it pointed out that this God can be addressed
<p Q
by man in reality".*^ ' Or, to underline t h is  important
double distinction again and somewhat more positivelys
He Cyhmi{1 is distinguished from the 
gods by the f a c t  that for him there 
is no "besides", "behind" and "above" 
to take the last v/ord from him ; he is 
distinguished from what is above and 
behind the gods by the fact that he 
can make himself audible end addressable 
... . Said briefly ... g to him is 
suitable the absoluteness not due to 
the gods and the personality not be- 
fitting the god of metaphysics.
Indeed, of all the various available ways o f  speaking of
God, the.best, according to the biblical witness, is the
personal, because God "in his condescension addresses man
as man, because he addresses him as man, and because in
so doing he takes man up into oommiuiion with himself, and
, 2nd ed, (RUmich, 1968) ,
p . 84.
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Martin Buber, "Bpinosia, Sabbatai# and the Baal-Bhem", 
Î 5 : M au rice
.Pï'ieclraan, é d . ,  and t r n s .  (New Y o rk , i 960) ,  p . 91.
, pp. 93-94.
thus makes himself Thou for man and man Thou for him,
It is not just Christian theology which
UBoa the vocable "God". "In reality, as we all
Imow, the vocable god is a word of the whole
world, used round the world, long before the
appearance of Christ and the Bible* in the
religions, by the philosophers and poets, and
21even in most thoughtless ways of speaking,"*^
Because of such a great diversity of application
the word has lost any distinctive meaning. And
it seems to be impossible to come to any lowest
common denominator, to any minimal agreement as
to its moaning* Even a general agreement that
the use of this vocable indicates a belief that
the v/orld must have a creator is no longer
possible. "Instead of that we have recognised
faith in the Creator as something specifically
biblical and, on the other hand, the causal proof
of God as a claim translated from Christianity
into the language of general reason, a claim
which is by no means self-evident and universal.
A semantic study is of some value in 
this attempt at clarification. What 
is the word god originally? It is not 
a name but a predicative noun, a title# 
a designation of function like the 
words king, lord, father, shepherd, etc.
That is the original usage of the word 
god in Hebrew and Semitic, in Greek,
HKm£ NwyevM Raf p w *  i ## mi i ru. *.*
p. 186.
"Das Wort 'G o t t '  i n  o h r i s t l i c h e r  S h e o lo g ie " , I n :  E rn s t
sommsriath, eel.,
(Berlin), Jhg. 92, March .196?» col. 1&3. 
132M xx,_co1. 164.
Latin, etc,
This predicate, then, can be applied to anything
which is divine. In other words, to whomever or
whatever .theipp, is suitable, that thing or person
is theos. To understand this predicative noun
thmm, we must ask about what is ÆMlm# T h is
can be expressed fairly simplys
either ±hej^ is used in the general 
se n se, in which case it means the 
superiority oonsiderocl here by hum.an 
standards, ,,, Or we understand theiop 
not only according to its form but in 
the sense of content ••« , The t h e io n , 
the divine, is what man strives after, 
what he asks for and what helps him.
It is either the power of realisation 
f t . , ,  o r  it i s  also the moral good,
Tïirough the linguistic history of this vocable 
— we need not go into detail here— polytheism 
gave way to various fo rm s  of monotheism, Thus 
thqos became, eventually, "the Principle of the 
world, the Ground of the world, unchangeable and 
remaining the same eternally, th e  real Being, the
in other words, there was a move 
from the p e rs o n a l, p o ly t h e is t ic  use of the pre­
dicative theos,, to an impersonal, monotheistic- 
pantheistic (panentheistio?) application. That 
is to say, t h i s  classical demy the logig;a.tion also 
involved a depersonalisation,
The same thing could be said of Herbert 
Braun's demythologissation. Any talk of divine 
action is mythological to him and must, therefore, 
be abandoned. No longer can we say, "God is love" 
(1 John s^B), or even "God loved the world" (Joîm 
3216), but only "where .love i s ,  there God is also."
Ibid., col.
IMâ.. eol. 164. 
Ibid., col. 165. 
IMd., col. 167.
In  that sense, th e n , Bram's talk of God is n o t 
b i b l i o a l ,  not Christian, for it is not personal.
(c o n tin u e d )
W hat, th e n , beoomee o f  t h i s  p re d ic a t iv e  noun "God" 
when used o f  t h i s  t o t a l i t e r  a l i t e r  w itn e s s e d  to  in  th e  
Bible? It i s  im m e d ia te ly  stripped of all d e te rm in a tio n s  
o f  meaning or oontent derived from other so u rce s . "D e te r ­
m in a tio n s  of content can no longer be gained from th e  
oonoept o f  god i t s e l f ,  b u t o n ly  fro m  th e  e ve n ts  o f  t h a t  
h is to r y  in  which YHWH a c t s , The s im i l a r i t y  w i th  
Herbert Braun * s w r i t in g s  can be seen once again h e re .
A lth o u g h , as p o in te d  o u t s e v e ra l tim e s  a lre a d y ,  i t  i s  a 
verbal s im i l a r i t y  and n o t  a s im i l a r i t y  o f  in te n t io n .  But 
this sentence is not aimed, t h is  t im e , a t  Braun# G o llw ita e r  
has ju s t  completed a linguistic s tu d y  o f  th e  word "g o d " ,
As in  t h is  thesis, it was done to  show th e  t ra n s fo rm a t io n  
o f  meaning which takes place when YHiH become a i t s  subject. 
However, a branch  of linguistic a n a ly s is  philosophy sets 
out to determine the meaning of words by a s tu d y  o f  th e  
way th e y  a re  used. Indeed, in  a s im p l i f ie d  fo rm , t h is  is  
what D orothea Soil© has done f o r  th e  vo ca b le  " r e p r e s e n ta t io n " . 
I f  we use these te rm s o f  th e  living God of the B ib le  with 
e x a c t ly  th e  same meaning as th a t  de te rm in ed  by l i n g u i s t i o  
a n a ly s is , then  we have sacrificed G od's " o th e rn e s s " , h is
fewïtiÿ» te:$r*«A»s#,5ica».apieritiiFiilao<«-»»wo<^3tetesc$i iessiB»T3*iftTs»c»'.*WBa irjwftt» ►*»
37 ool. 1?2.
trailsoeîidence. Following our first safeguard of appropriate 
language about God we must examine the biblioal witness to 
God's encoxmtor with man and ask of it who God is.
When Moses asked for God's nai'ae—— -which in the 
ancient Semitic world* because of their theology of the 
name, meant asking who he was— — he answered, "I Am Who I 
Am", or, "I Will Be Mho I Will Be" (Exodus 3^ alA), As this 
is changed to the third person "He is*" in the grammar of 
speaking about Ck)d it becomes, in the Hebrew of the Old 
Testament, YHWH, Whatever this name is, and scholars still 
have not fully determined this, it is at least a promise, 
an eschatologioal word. Only on the basis of this promise 
oan theology speak of God, Hence its confessional, vocative 
nat'ore. But what does promise imply?
Three things are referred to here, (a) "The promise 
means ••, that he with whom we have to do here never sub­
mits to the past and to the availability of already existing
oonoepts but always encounters us as the new, the still to
28be first perceived",*'^  Thus YHWH alv/ays meets us in self- 
definition0 However, this is not a giving of himself in 
Buoh a way that we can have a hold on him. The giving of 
the Name in this cryptic way is also a rebulie to Moses, and 
so also to Israel and all himianity, YHWH is the "unpoesoBS- 
able, un-implorable and unrepresentable Speaker from 
inaccessibility" who "stands in place of the gods of the
28 Von dor Ste 1 Ivortretuna: Gott©s, p, ?5•
nations". This demands of us an attitude of trust and 
obedience with no guarantees to One whom we must not 
define or represent in our own terms, The Promiser is,
liiCï
thus, also the Commander,
(b) Secondly, "The promise also means ••• that he
with V’/hom we have to do here will ever and again come to
1help and assist, IliMH's coming, his self-giving in 
the promise of his name, " I  will be there", his self- 
definition is not a past event Imown only to the prophets 
and apostles. Rather, one© having made this promise he 
will not back awa,y from it. Thus, the "experience of the
death of God" has to do not with YH¥H, but with the man
who no longer receives the promise. It is not the "ex­
perience of the death of God" but the "death of the 
experience of God",
(c) "Beyond that, it [the promisalso means • • •  
that he with whom we have to do here will bring to fulfil­
ment Israel, and with I s r a e l  humanity, the whole world,
For the Bible this is never just perfection of life, never 
just a Utopian dream.
JMâ. I P* 84.
T h is  t ra n s fo rm a t io n  o f  p ro m ise  in to  ohefiienoo to  a cormaand
is also noted by Jurgen IVioltmann and expressed well 
using the Latin roots. Thus, promise (nro^issio) 
leads to mission (missio ), O f, Moltmann, Theoloaiv 
pf,Jlppa. James W, Leitch, trns, (London, l^/Tr
p, 2^^ ,
hi
Von der S tellvertre tung Go tte s. p, ?5« 
aid., pp. 75-76.
Here God lives among men, He will 
make his home among them g they shall 
be his peox)l©9 and he will be their 
God I his name is God-with-them. He 
will wipe away all tears fro m  t h e i r  
eyes ; there will be no more death, 
and no more mourning or sadness• The 
world of the past has gone, (Reve­
lation 21 g3-A)
Perfection of life is secondary to life with God, The
promise given in the Naim means that God has come so near
to those who receive his promise that their attention is
turned away from the gifts to the Giver, This s e l f - g iv in g
of the Promisor is the basis for Ohristian life and hope,
for the relationship of man to God, But once again the
limit must be retaineds t h i s  self-giving of the Promisor
is not such that we have him at pup beck mid call, Ro.ther,
it establishes a relationship in which he calls us, "His
self-revelation is not a self-giving into acquaintance and
availability9 but the permission for living community with
him, the Hidden O n e . I n  other words, IWH remains Lord
of the encoimter and the relationship which he enables.
But by the fact of his condescension to make this possible
he truly becomes the "living God" "because the man to v/hom
he allows it can stand in a living, personal, human relation
to him."^^ That is not to say, "God is a person", but tha.t
he allows men to enter into a personal relationship with
him.
Ibid., p. 85, 
I M â .  » P- 83.
A further result of the biblical emphasis on fulfil­
ment as the self-giving of the Promisor concerna theolo­
gical methodology and can be moluded here as a footnote 
to and reminder of that chapter. The promise is not just 
the fulfilment of our needs, but we gain new understanding 
and perception from the promise. That means, "then the 
objection that such and such is *no longer possible* for 
us in our present age can no longer be offered from before­
hand as a decisive objection. What is possible and not 
possible is determined by the promise.
Bo far we have been concerned with an Old Testament
wittiess to God's encounter with man-' -the giving of the
Name. What happens in iiie New Testament to the promise 
included in that Name? Here the original intention of 
the Oovenant with Israel is finally realisedc the election, 
formerly of a nation (Israel), is now extended also to the 
heathens# that is, to all mankind. The basis for this 
u n iv e r s a l iz a t io n  is the new character of fulf j.lBX0nt. "If 
in the Old Testament promise the First and the Last had 
promised community with himself as the only place where 
real life exists, then in Jesus Christ t h is  has been made 
visib.le in the world. The nearness to himself into 
which YHWH draws men is now even more intimate. And this 
implies a new vmy of workings The pneuma theou (Spirit of
IMâ* » p. 83.
rbiâ. > pp. 87-
God) "no longer hovers qy§r the addressed and chosen man
b/7
demanding and decreeing# but works him".  ^ This * then, 
is the distinction between the time ante 0 hri g turn n aturn 
and the time not that faith has
become automatic, but that a new* Spirit-wrox;ght fulfil­
ment begins now.
Here we see again Gollwitzer's consistent paradox- 
dialeotio method as it parallels the biblical witness.
The fulfilment proclaimed in the Hew Testament is bqjJJi a 
once-for-all event m^d em ongoing process. As a onoe-for- 
all event-— --perfeptum— — it is a present reality. Recon­
ciliation has been accomplished and is ours now. The life 
which man was given by God at creation, which is available 
only from the Promisor, which also man forfeited by 
wanting it from elaowher©— even from himself— , this 
life has been restored to him. God has, in Jesus Christ, 
once again esta.blished hie permanentpermanent from his 
side though still destructible from ourB““ Comunity with 
mon. In this is our joy and hope. But it is also an 
ongoing process, a "not-yet-fulfilled" fulfilment. And 
we must maintain c*ide of this in our conception.
Accomplished is the reconciliation; 
not yet accomplished is the redemption.
Fulfilled is the promise of "I will be 
there” even to the ultimate, now first 
indicated consequence of the radical, 
self-“Saor if icing identification of the 
Promiser with his man; not fulfilled
m m . , p. 89.
nPTw*iL*TOnili. i, w *  napytmiytTL.
is the proDiise of the results of
this fulfilment for the world ua
situation « «, #
In other words# even though we live in the age of fulfil­
ment we must still wait, The final fulfilment is yet to 
come, Jesus Christ is the fulfilment of the promised 
"I will he there" of the divine name (YBMH) and the messianic 
name (Em m anuel), the perfectly present s a lv a t io n ; 'but he 
is also the hope in the ultimate fulfilment of the conse­
quences of this already fulfilled promise.
One will note immdiately that there is a great 
similarity here with what Jurgen Moltmann has written in
Moltmann# drawing on A* Oepke's article 
in interprets
the parousia of Christ not as the return of one who has 
departed, hut as a. "presence, y e t  not a presence which 
is past tom orrow , b u t  a presence which must be awaited 
today and tomorrow,The question is raised, then, of 
what we are waiting for, of what the future holds. "The 
Christian expectation is directed to no Other than the 
Christ who has come, b u t  it expects something new fro m
him, something that has not yet happened so fars it awaits
the fulfilment of the promised righteousness of God in all 
things, the fulfilment of the resurrection of the dead 
that is promised in h is  resurrection, the fulfilment of
'■i'9 p . 22?.
\
\ .
m m . , p. 117. A
the lordship of the crucified over all things that is
promised in his exaltation," Moltmann, however, seems
to lack anything corresponding to the presence of the
Promiser, He oal3.s for this pilgrimage or exodus but the
only guidance he oan see is this future hope and vision.
Thus, he has dissolved the completed, once-for-all pole
in favour of the future, yet-to-be-fulfilled pole.
Fulfilment, of course, does not mean that faith asks
no more questions. Indeed, there is one which it must
ask, along with unbeliefs
Is it really so? Has the world and 
have we a Lord, this Lord? Are we
really so judged, so laden with gifts,
so threatened and so blessed? ^
By asking this, faith has not ceased to be faith. It is
not a question of doubt in the sense of unbelief (although
unbelief a,lso asks this same question).Faith oannot
"possess" God like a datum, It oan never be certain in
that sense but must be renewed ever again* And for this
renewal it must always return to the Word that encountered
it in the first place, to Jesus Ghrist.
That he {the man of faith] will get 
it frorâ there is the promise given by
S A l . , p . 229.
S te .-S d .s ± @ a Q â ,.j2 lL J fîiL m -£ a a fa m â â .J Y ^  p . 2 1 3 .
Of. on this Gollwitzer's coMont on Lulie ? ; 18f f ,, ins 
D ie  . 8 th  ed. (B e fflin -D a lile m , I 9 6 9 ) .
pp. 80ff. "Johiii perceived in Jesus the Messiah,
His question does not ask for proof, like the 
question of doubt, but it asks for confirmation"
(p. 81), And for this confirmation faith goes not 
to the world, but to its Lord.
the C h r is t ia n  message itself to its 
hearer. He is prom ised  that he w3iom 
he is here given to hear will s tan d
by his Word and will prove to him that
* it is really so ',
By way of summary, then, how oan we speak of God? How 
can we say "He isS"? Our criterion must a3.ways be biblioal 
talk of-tGod'e encounter with man. In the light of this 
we must re c o g n iz e  ,'bp,i>h the inadequacy gB.d the necessity 
of "is" propositions when applied to God; inadequate because 
God is not an "objective fact" in  the narrow %)ositiviBt 
sense# but necessary beoaust of the fact that God encounters 
man in such a v/ay that thereafter man can address him 
personality, and possible by a f u n c t io n a l  analogy because 
of God's condescension in bringing men into community with 
himself. The statements we make, then, will not be detached,
objective and definitive. Rather, they will be statements
of involvement, encounter cmd response— hence, confes­
sional, vocative end horailetioal.
Up to this point our development of a vocative theology 
has been concerned with how we oan properly speak of God.
In this we were led to talk about his encounter with man.
In this section, th e n , we will turn our attention to the 
question of how to epeaJs properly of the relationship 
between God and man. Th^logy has led us to aiij^ irqpqlogy.
The Existence of God as Confessed by Fa.ith. pp. 215f.
Here# too# our criterion BUist be the biblical testimony 
and our method m ust begin w ith  an examination of that 
w itn e s s ,
Mhat, then» is the new perception of man given by the 
biblical promise? Both the Old and Hew Testaments affirm 
that man "as a creature of God has received life from his 
Creator# full, meaningful* fulfilled lif©,"“ The promise 
tells us that man oan have life only from God# the Creator 
and Pro miser# and "to want to have it from oneself or 
from anyv/here else is a withdrawal from the realm of life 
into the re  aim  of impassibility# of d e a th ", This is 
the p re s e n t state of man. Central to the Bible» alongside 
the promise of the Waîïie and the Ohrist-event # is a viev/ of 
man "as a rebel against God who# by his rebellion# has 
forfeited every claim of creation# It sees man so radically 
in sin that we today find it scarcely possible to u n d e r- 
stand it."*^  ^ The whole Bible is a record of God's promise 
in his encounter with man and man's persistent rebellion 
against it# his rejection of it and his apostasy after 
brief periods of a o c e p tin g  it.
However# man is not in a hopeless situation. To regain 
the right of life granted him as a creature of God there
5 4
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must first be a renewed aooeptanoe of man by God# that is,
reconciJ-iation, forgiveness for his sins, To be sure, man
cannot speak the needed pardon himself; for "pardoning is
nothing# it is a mere wavering sensation of pardon# it is
self-pardoning (and for that very reason really nothing) #
without the Pardoner, This Pardoner xs none other than.
the Promisor himself, And the fulfilment of his promised
"I will be there" has done just this : it has executed
the reconciliation# the forgiveness of sins, This is
what is new in the Hew Testament, what fulfils the promise
of the Name and surpasses every previous seIf-revelation
of the Promisor, It is s t a r t l in g
how and with what consequence this 
Promiser would himself take on the 
burden which^ is inseparable from the  
Covenantg himself stepping in the 
place of the coven an t-b reaker, taking 
on himself his own No# negating him,self 
and suffering it completely# and# by 
this very movement into the depths 
p res erv in g  the covenant-breaker from 
these depths in which he belongs and 
raising him to a new community with 
himself surpassing all previous fellow­
ship# raising him to h is  rightful place 
as child, friend and co-governor, ^
This brings us to the place where we can and must 
speak of "representation” • Nov/ we can examine the co^ ioept 
and apply it, where s u ita b le #  to the relationship between 
God and man as effected in Jesus Christ, Only nov/ oan we 
do this in a way which will not d is to r t  the message of the
m m . , p. 99. 
m m . , p. 101.
gospel.
S e ve ra l things can be sa id  regarding the conditions 
necessary for true representation. First, as Martin 
Luther rightly noted, "Representation presupposes the  
absence of the one represented". Dorothee Solle was 
also aware of this precondition, but applied it w rongly. 
Without a doubt, mankind needs re p re s e n ta tio n. For his 
rebellion, in fact, amounts to absence : he has withdraw
from community with God tmô. oim do nothing himself to 
restore this relationship. But to deduce from that 
fact that god is absent because we do not now encounter 
him directly is her error. A direct relationship to God 
"whose home is  in jji.#cGeg,si]3le light" (1 Timothy 6Bid, 
my italics) has never been possible. The relationship 
is  always mediated— through a burning bush which is  not 
consumed (Exodus 3:2, , through the Word (Jeremiah 1:^ ,^
11, 13§ 2si; 3el; et al*), through tongues of fire (Acts 
2g3), etc., and, supremely, through Jesus Christ. This 
is especially true for the sinner vdiose rebellion has 
broken all bonds of relationship. As true as this is, 
however, we ought not to deduce from it that God is absent 
and does not appear at all* "The re p re s e n ta tio n  by Christ 
is precisely not a replacement for an absent God ?/ho does 
not appear, rather ... God mediates himself through him­
self, placing earthly riiediation in his servioe g God repre-
IMA., p. ?. Gf. Luther, m .  7, p. 742.
sente himself by speaking to us through Jeeus Christ*e
60appearatioe and by means of the message about it*" But
this means that a more positive form of direetnoss is
p o s s ib le . Solle confused "directness"
and "un-Biediated-nesB" (iBYâœllliâiSlâil) • She ignored
the fact that directness can also refer to "the intensity#
the wholeness and undisguised character of a personal 
61relationship".'" This is what is effected by the fulfil­
ment of the promised "I Mill Be There". "The mediation 
by Jesus Christ# Christ's representation# is the possi­
bility of a direct relationship to God,"^ '^  It is mediated 
and yet d ir e c t  (complete and personal).
The second of Luther's preconditions for true repre­
sentation ie this 2 "the representative must be in a 
position to carry out the work of the one represented".^^ 
Again# S o lle  was not totally unaware of this. Her corre­
sponding element was voluntariness— — free existing for 
another. But she did not realize that this must also 
include a freedom of ability. "Only he can stand in 
another*s place who (a) does not already# as it i s ,  stand 
in the same place 9 v/ho (b) has the freedom to go there ; 
who (c) has at his d ispo sa l whatever special ability is
;m m ., p . 140. 
,ïMâ.. p. 140.
62  ^ p , 140.
IM A * *  pp. 7 -8 . O f. L u th e r, WA. 6 , p . 298.
needed in this place The necessity of these three
conditions of freedom is quite evident. Someone who
already stands in the same place# in the same condition of
absence as the other obviously cannot represent him# but
himself needs a, representative. Someone who is bound to
his own oondition is unable to stand in the others place
and thus cannot represent him. On the other hand# someone
who is forced by his very nature to stand in the others
place cannot represent him because of this fact# namely *
that he is in the others place by nature and thus violates
the first of these three Gondition.s of freedom. And
finally# someone who does not have the ability or talent
or strength needed to represent the other clearly cannot
effect an adequate representation. This means that one
63parson cannot "play God" for another#  ^because he has 
neither the freedom to stand in God's place nor the 
ability to do so. Indeed# man has no ability at all of 
his own and can mediate God to another only by God's 
seIf-giving grace. This also means that man cannot 
represent another man 00yam ;D,e,o. before God. For no man 
is free of the sin and guilt because of which the other 
stands under God's judgment.
This does not mean, however, that we are without
SlM* » P* 8. (I have replaced three commas with semicolons
to clarify this sentence in translation),
'liriLst the Hepr 
1 9 6 7), p. 142,
üf" David Lewis, trns. (London,
representation @ without hope, The New Te at ament— and 
as noted earlier, herein lies its newness— proolaims 
the fulfilment of YHlrlH's promise in Jesus Christ. In 
Jesus the Promiser himself fulfils his promise to us.
All this— — -and espeeially how far this surpasses anything 
Dorothea Solle said— can be seen by asking three 
questions: 1* How far does the representation reach?
How radical is it? 2, From Whence does the representative 
come? 3* And# hovf is he able to do what is claimed of him?
in the
extreme situations of guilt# death and standing coram.
Src. we can only declare our solidarity with others. Our 
study of biblioal anthropology has shovm us that we all 
stand in the same situation of guilt as rebels against God 
and his self-revelation in encounter with men. For this 
reason there can be no representation by man for man*
Me need "a, completely different representation which reaches 
further then the merely human. Of such speaks the Christian 
doctrine of representation; upon such situations it has 
reflected# and in them it proves itself."
only
he who does not already stand in the same predicament can
effect true représentâtion.
Therefore the New Testament never 
neglects to mention along with his 
ÇOhrist'fi] identif ication his non- 
identical being, his sinlessness
66
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(2 Cor. 5:21; Heb, 2:11-14; 4:15).
With him representation is a truly 
voluntary turning from the position 
of innocence to the position of guilt 
(Php, 2:6ffJ.
Notice here the paradox-dialeotic method inherent also in 
the New Testaraent, Christ is both identified# yet non- 
identical with man. This is necessary for representation 
to be truly substantial and rsidical# for it to be " * exchange • 
(katallpige) in which the Promiser in his Son takes possession 
of the world, guilty of rejection» with this rejection 
itself (2 Oor. 5*19).
onrist's repre-
Ben tat ion reaches us in our extreme situation. Only he is
in a position to represent us. But how is he able to do
this? In the Nev/ Testament this question about Jesus’
ability is answered clearly and decisively. His life was
one of complete obedience. He acted not on his own will
but on the will of his Father. Likewise# his ability or
power was not his own but God’s. This peculiar unity
between Jesus and God is, in the New Testament, just as
central and necessary as his identification with mankind.
Everything v/hich is said about Jesus’
Bolidaz'ity with man and his interven­
tion for him, thus about the 
nobis ("for us'*) of Jesus’ appearance, 
only has meaning .., when everything 
her© happens in the initiative and 
power and presence of the Promisor.
... This peculiar unity ... is the /-q 
basis of Jesus’ ability ....
m â.‘. p. 1 0 5.
IMA*, p. 1 0 3. 
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Besides being closer to the witness of the New 
Testament, this is much more satisfying than wha;b Dorothea 
Solle presented, giving much greater basis for hope, à 
representation along the pattern she proposed is a bleak 
thing. It does not reach the radical depths of guilt 
and death and standing cp.ram,J2.#o,. It requires a repre­
sentation of men by men, all of whom are in the sojne 
predicament and therefore have neither the freedom nor 
the ability to be representatives. Thus# judged also from 
a purely huiaan point of view, judged by Solle*s own 
criterias her proposal is inadequate, The Ohalcedonian 
definition of the two natures of Christ, besides growing 
out of the New Testament witness, is necessary to our 
understanding of soteriology. Otherwise, Jesus Christ 
would have been unable to effect what we claim of him.
Whatp then, of the "experience of the 
death of God"? l’or Dorothee Solle this 
characterized the modern age in theological 
terms. By this she meant that a "direct rela­
tionship to God” is no longer possible.But, 
as we have pointed out a lre a d y, for Christians 
there never has been a "direct relationship to
God"I "to us is granted only a pevelatio medi- *71 " - *
. This, then, is not a peculiarity of
the post “enlightenment era. Faith hsis never
-"lir-rrirr-rnMrii rrr-i " ri-im—n-T-iTi~rii in'" in it—iir-iiTTiinniri-tT.tnirrtrr [nr^ mfiril-^ iii ii m 'l tTrr-nnn fci j mtn  ...- W MW miMWi iii
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Of. p p . i30f.
p. 139.
been a human poasi'bilitys "the God of Christian 
faith is not a possible God who would he under™ 
stmidahle as a result of v^rays of reflection 
possible to man." Faith is only possible as 
God's gift, "by the power of the word of promise 
itEielf, by the spirit of this vmrd, the Holy 
Ghost.
But what jls true is that we kill God for 
others. "God is not dead, but we kill him, i.e. 
we make the promise and warning of the Promisor 
into dead, hollov; words, something believable 
into something unbelievable, in different ways 
but with the same result,Thus, we are 
responsible for the "experience of the death of 
God"* We cannot represent him because we have ^
neither the freedom nor the ability to do so, 
but also because he does not need i t ~ h e  is
not dead. Rather# his Name itself says "XHWHÎ \ V
• '■
He isj" But we must stop killing him. Or said \ t-.
positivelys As well as proclaiming the gospel \
in v/ords we must witness to it in action eo that 
the words do not become hollow, empty of meaning.
a M . . pp. 143-144.
f p. 144« 
IMd.. p. 145.
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THE CHRISTIAN AND POLITICS 
Introduction
Up to this point the thesis has concentrated on 
Helmut Gollwitzer’s "theology" in the narrow, literal 
sense of the term. We have been concerned with developing 
an appropriate language for speaking of Cod and with the 
results of this in the area of the relationship between 
God and man, there developing a soteriology using the 
concept of representation. In doing this we have been 
unfair to Gollwitaer. A division into chapters and 
sections is necessary in writing a thesis# but it is 
arbitrary. Often there are several possible ways of 
organising the material. In this case, however, any 
systematic organisation of that type does an injustice to 
the holistic nature of his thinking. We already have had 
occasion to mention the paradox-dialectic method used by 
Gollwitaer. It is evident here, too, on a more basic 
level. Traditionally theology has to do with God and his 
relationship with mankind, and ethics is concerned with 
man's relationship with other men. Eor some they exist 
side-by-side in virtual independence. For others the 
connection is a logical one, ethics grows out of or is 
derived from theology. But for Gollwitaer they are so 
closely bound together that to speak theologically is 
to speak ethically, and vice versa. The strength of the 
"and" in Jesus* summary of the Law— "You must love the
the Lord your God ... mid your neighbour as yourself"
(LWce 1 0s2 7, my italics)--— -is racognized fully and deter­
mines the nature of his writings, For this reason, "an 
examination of the theology of Helmut Gollwitzer" must 
devote a substantial section to what is more usually- 
called ethics. And it must be remembered that this is 
not an independent section, but rather an integral part 
of his theology.
In a sense Christians share in the two natures of 
the Christ to whom they bear witness. As men, sinful men, 
they live contsmpora3?y lives in a contemporary world 
situa,tion, sharing the joys, hopes, problems and weaknesses 
of the others around them. They are identified with them, 
part of humanity. Yet they are also non-identical, dif­
ferent, special. They have experienced God's encounter 
with mankind and by his grace have accepted the promise 
it includes. Thereby they have also accepted the oomraand 
inherent in that promise*. They have a special task in 
relation to the world in which they live. And it is to 
that aspect of theology that v/e now turn in this chapter.
To describe this area of concern I have chosen the 
word "politics" rather than the more traditional one, 
"ethics". There are two major reasons for this. The 
first has been alluded to already. In common usage, 
ethics, to a greater or lesser extent, is seen as something 
distinct from theology. The preference for "the Christianity 
of politics" or "political Christianity" is an attempt to 
draw attention away from this distinction to a more holistic \H.
\
approach. In the second place, the term "ethics", however 
incorrectly, commonly implies an absolute detemination 
of some course of action or other as Christian way 
for all time. In the face of that Gollwitzer is a con- 
textualist. Each situo.tion must be examined and met in 
the light of the experience of God's encounter with mankind. 
The solutionp then, will change as the situation is dif­
ferent , Thus, I am taking "politics" not in the narrov;, 
party-politics sense of the term. Rather, and more origi­
nally, politics has to do vfith the selection of courses of 
action to deal with the problems raised by inter-human 
relationships on the national and international level.
Gollwitzer*B manifesto in this regard can be found 
expressed most clearly in the title essay of his book,
Christians everywhere must be 
made to realize that something special 
is demanded of them, even in political 
life. What is demanded of them is 
their freedom* The serious threats to 
humanity and human values in the 
second half of the twentieth century 
compel the Christian to face the 
question of his freedom and its impli™  ^
cations in public life.
On the basis of that it is not surprising that a great
many of his published writings deal with this %)roblem of
the relationship of the professing Christian to political
life# as even a quick glance through the 1.1st of Works by
Helmut Gollwitzer will show. Thus, even if his "ethics"
1
“ The Demanda of Freedom, Robert W. Penn, trns, (London
1965), p. 3».
were not an integral part of his "theology", we would 
have reason enough here for including a chapter on his 
ansv/er to this problem.
Correctly, as indicated above, that should be in the
plurals "his answers to these problems'*. For each new
situation must be examined in its own right. The old
answers and conventions do not necessarily apply today.
"Rules and conventions resulting from comnon experience
are not there in order to relieve the individual of the
necessity for decision, but to help him decide by prior
clarification and testing, and by the support of the 
2Gormunity. " There must be a re-examination of the 
situation, and that means, for Christians, looking at the 
problem in the light of the gospel. "Christian politics 
in my opinion means getting a grip on the tasks vfhloh 
Clod sets before us". ^ That is, Christian politics means 
acting on the judgments discovered in the encounter with 
the Word of God.
This political involvement seems to have two stages. 
First, after hearing the Word of God, the Christian must 
speak it to his fellovmen. He must state clearly hov; the 
particular course of action proposed stands in relation 
to God's will and gra.oe. "Therefore, the church must 
first of ©,11 carry out its comission and tell the poli-
® .îMâ.. p. 130.
Uhwilllna: Journey. E.M. DelaooOT, i;ms., with help from
Robert W. Fenn (London, 19^5)» P« 21^ .
tiolans what God's conmand says to This does not
mean giving a olear, practical blueprint of political 
action to solve the problem. Rather, it means pointing 
to the way of obedience, "It has not got to wait to say 
that until it has found a practical method of implementing
li
this fact politically".
Second, after having pierced the political fog with 
Amos-like statements, the Christian can, and must, go on 
to methodological discussion, "Only after such plain 
speaking can the church proceed to talce part in delibe­
rations about the way in which this is to be translated
6into political practice". In this way the idealism of 
the first stage is saved from becoming unrealistic.
Separating these stages, as I have done “ -.following 
Gollwitzer's own lead— , does not mean a complete divorce 
of proclaiifiation and political action. We have already 
spoken in an earlier chapter of the hermeneutical nature 
of theology's task. Having ascertained the gospel message 
behind the proclamation which is its subject matter, Chris­
tian. theology must then go on to translate and proclaim it 
in relation to the actual situation of its particular age. 
One aspect of this contemporaneity is involvement in 
practical, political discussions, realizing, of course.
"The Christian in the Search for World Order and Peace", 
ins %.K. Matthews, ed., K§mQaaiM.e_§ox0£me^^
(New York, 1966), p. 51.
, p. 'w.
6 "The Christian in the Search for World Order and Peace", 
on. cit.. p. 51*
that "these discussions lack basis and direction, if they
are not preceded by the clear statement which is fundamental
?to the whole problem,"
In making such a "clear statement" the church must
not only proclaim God's will, but must point also to the
true facts of the situation. Theology is to give a response
to a situation in the light of the biblical witness to God's
dealings with men. Obviously, to ignore either side of
this would be to invalidate the response. In other words,
"the church must not cloud this clear issue but must be 
8its servant".' The church must not for partisan reasons 
depict things different than they are. It must aim always 
at a clear, unambiguous presentation of the truth and its 
consequences.
The criteria, then, for judging Gollwitzer*s political 
v/ritings are not primarily practicability and convenience. 
Rather, we must asks Is he obedient to God's will as 
declared in the Bible, especially by the life of Jesus 
Ohrist? And: Has he presented the facts clearly and
unambiguously, or has he attempted to cloud the issue in 
favour of his ovm position?
Since he is speaking to an "actual situation existing 
at a particular time"^ and in a particular place— namely,
7 n p. 40.
8 "The Christian in the Search for World Order and Peace",
on. cit.. p. 51*
 ___ p *
West Germany in the second half of the twentieth cent wry 
— — , his words cannot he expected to have universal rele­
vance, temporally or spatially. This is particularly the
case with his remarks about the German situation about
re-arming West Germany and about the re-unifieation of 
Germany, And to a c e r ta in  extent his approach to the 
question of Israel and Jewish-Christian relations is very 
German, i.e., strongly coloured by a sense of guilt 
regarding the atrocities comitted by the Third Reich.
On the other hand, the problems of nuclear weapons, 
Conmunism, and war in general are faced by all countries 
today, Gollwitzer'8 remarks in these areas, then, are of 
some relevance beyond Germany and will, therefore, be 
examined in this chapter.
Christianity and Communism
Although forced by later circuiastances to make an 
intensive study of Communismi, Helmut Gollwitzer* s interest 
in this ideology began very early* His imprisonment in 
Russia was, indeed, a source for his later studies, provi­
ding the opportunity for a certain amount of investigation 
through prison librairies and through encounters with the 
Russian officials and people. But his interest even pre­
ceded this. As noted in the biographical section, his 
contact with Gunther Dehn at Jena prompted an interest in 
Socialism and Communism as political theories. Thus, he 
wa.s to write Inters
Before 1933 there was nothing outside 
the Church which held my attention more 
than Marxism, The analyses of Marx and 
Lenin helped me to understand contem­
porary events, the crises, the war and 
the rise of Fascism •.. . •,, Already 
I regarded the Soviet Union with 
lively interest, alternatively sym- 
path!zing and criticizing ••, ,
His early attitude, then, if not wholly sympathetic, 
was at least not completely antagonistic, and he could 
says "I was quite serious in my attempt to bridge the 
gap between our differences". During the early pmrt of 
his Russian imprisonment his appeal was for "co-operation". 
But the response to this appeal among the petty officials 
he sums up ass "Anyone who does not see co-operation as 
submission must be exposed as a. hypocrite", it is 
certainly true that "his entire experience in Russian 
camps was one long attempt at openness to the Coimunist 
based on Christigm freedom from the prejudices of another 
ideology.
Events following his release forced Gollwitzer to 
make a further, more detailed study of Communism, This 
resulted in the paper delivered on Z October 1958 and 
3 March 1959 to two sessions of the " 
authorized by the atuâiea^ememspMS^^
UnwillinumjLV, p. 118. 
p. 1^ 19. 
p. 163.
*12 Charles West, Gommmiism and the Theolp,g:ians (London, 1958), 
pp. 2A6-247,
âkâââHdtSl» But even in this definitive work Gollwitzer 
did not abandon his attempt at g o-operation,
The essay may be understood as 
a contribution to the Christian- 
Marxist dialogue* It was written in 
inner and outer oontaot v/ith those who 
through their situation in life are 
continually involved in this dia3.ogue.
The dialogue compels us to leave the 
quiet aloofness in v;hioh the historian, 
sees a historical movement as a unity 
whose essential elements are necos- 
barily and indissolubly linked* What 
the dialogue seeks to acoomplish is 
the dissolution of these connections*
Their necessity, because it has a 
historical chaï'-acter,' must be regarded 
as merely relative, since, like his­
tory itself, it is still open to the  ^
future and undecided.
Before going any further we must be clear about one
things Communiam is not a simple phenomenon. J u s t  as
there are denominational differences within the church,
so, too, there are ideological divisions within Communism.
To distinguish these carefully would become technical and
tedious, certainly beyond the scope of this section or
even this thesis. Thus, I am tending to use Gommuniem
and Marxism interchangeably, as synon;yi[ns. Gollwitzer
16points out the inaccuracy of this and attempts to
*1 Jt
 ^Published subsequently in an expanded form ass
Simule (Tubingen, 1962), in the series® Iteslimms.- 
Btudien, A. Folga. ETs The Christian Faith and the 
Marxist Criticism of Ifeligion. David Cairns, trns. 
(E d in b u rg h , 1970).
p. ix.
S M .  » p.
maintain a distinction* 'The comments, however, cam retain 
their validity without this as long as we remember that 
they refer primarily to Marxism and the Russian attempt 
at realizing that ideology*
Traditionally the church™"-— -with the exception of 
some of the Orthodox branches— ™, beoa,use of various 
historical factors reaching as far back as the Emperor 
Oonstantine, has supported the west and pronounced an uncon­
ditional 'Ho* to Oommuniem* But one question must be askeds 
By pronouncing this *No* to Communism is the Christian 
community being truly obedient to God’s Word? For "not 
every *Ho* is a *Ho* obedient to God simply because it is 
a *Ho* * The resistance of Jerusalem to Hebuohadnozzar's 
men and Peter's sword-stroke against Malohus (John 18glOf.) 
are not acknowledged as the true *Ho* of f a i t h . W e  
must always remember that the God of the Bible is Lord 
not only of the church, but also of the enemies of the 
church, and even of the Ultimate Enemy, the antichrist or 
Satan. Therefore, "the Philistines, Nebuchadnezzar, Pilate 
and the 'persecutors of the primitive church are regarded 
as servants and tools of God, whose government is not 
limited by their power, but confirms itself by means of
1 Q
them, and God uses their chastening to chasten his people*"*'' 
This attitude has important consequences for our
B jM- , p. 10.
18 Iblâ., p. 9. Of. J. Hajnel, glreistenheit tmter marxia-fclaohen 
MsffigaMfi (Berlin, 1959)» pp. 7ff.
approach to Marxism, From the outset Karl Marx repudiated 
all religion, including in that repudiation Christianity 
which he saw as merely a special case of religion, calling 
it "the opium of the people". Thus Marxism appears as 
an enemy of Christianity, and, indeed, of all vmstern 
society v/hich, since the fourth century, has been moulded
in one way or another by Christian teaching. The example
of the Bible means, then, that we must examine Oomiunism 
in a double way, that is, we must look for the valid 
points of the Marxist criticism of religion as well as 
the factors in it to which we must pronounce a loud and 
determined 'No*. "Theology ... will first have to dis­
tinguish what is valid in this criticism from what is out
p A
of place 9 inadequate and false"*"
Basically there are two points at which Gollwitzer
sees the Marxist criticism of religion as being pertinent 
and applicable to the church, 1, The first is the result 
of the church* s long-standing involvement v/ith the emperors 
and rulers of the v/est. "The church was incapable, in the 
nineteenth century, of grasping the true significance of 
the rise of the proletariat, beca.use of its long heritage, 
going back to Constantine, of association with earthly
1 q Marx did not invent this phrase. For its derivation and 
a survey of its use historically, of, "Excursus on 
the expression 'Opiwa of the People'", ins The
pp. iSff.
20 3!M ™ B £lS îim X 9â*À .S lâ-âM J!!S B d,S l^
p. 150.
21power," * Historically, the Edict of Constantine and 
thereafter the dissolution of the Roman Empire thrust 
upon the church the responsibility for law and order in 
the western world. Quite properly she took over and ful­
filled this task. Indeed, she even went further and 
hecmiG identified with this task. But she did this at 
a very high price, "She renounced largely her task as 
the great disturber, the creator of unrest, the prophetic 
advocate of the lowly and the oppressed§ she sanctified 
the existing order. Thus she became incapable of recog™
pp
nizing her new task,"''" And a*gain, elsewhere®
This valid element includes the 
observation of the universal social 
conditioning of religious life, and 
the charge that frequently religion 
serves the interests of the ruling 
classes. In the case of Christianity 
in particular this criticism of reli­
gion makes us aware of a transition 
which is repeatedly to be observed in 
the various epochs of Christian his­
tory-*— a transition from a critical 
challenging of the existing order by 
the Christian message to an ideological 
support of the existing order. Further, 
it draws om? attention to the singular 
limitation of most Christian movements 
of renewal (e,g, mendicant orders,
Pietism, methodism); they limit the 
thrust of their attack and challenge 
to the sphere of the private person, 
remain socially conservative, attacking 
the heathenism of individuals, but not 
of institutions.
Ohristentura und Marxismus" , ins Unterwegs (Berlin), 
■vol. 1, 1951. p. 105 as quoted In: Mest,
p. ?M.
23
p. 151.
To this 3-ist might be added also the "Jesus People" whose 
only comment on society as a whole was to withdraw from it.
In short, Christianity beoam© identified completely 
with the ruling classes. Despite many deliberations and 
statements calling for social reform, despite the countless 
sermons of social concern delivered to "Sunday Christians", 
despite all claims of identity with the dovm-trodden, by 
and large the church has remained inactive and, by its 
inertia, strictly allied with capitalism, "In the new 
social enoyolioal of John XXIII, capita-
lism is called *a radioally perverted economic order* -
but in v/hich of the lands, in which Oatholicism is the 
dominating world-view, has the Ohuroh of Home even made 
a faint attempt at the realization of its social teaching 
in such a way as Communism has attempted to do with its
phi
own doctrines in the lands dominated by it?" " ' Nor does 
this criticism apply only to the Roman Catholic branch 
of the church. Similar examples could be adduced against 
all the major Protestant denominations.
Having agreed theit here Marxist criticism of religion 
is directly applicable to Christianity in its historical 
embodiment in the church, what should our response be? 
Surely we must excise this conservative element and cast 
it into the fires of hell. Then the church can again be 
revolutionary and Christians can fulfil their responsi-
Ibid., p. l'+9. n. 6.
bility "for such a social Utopia as their proclamation of 
the Kingdom of God and the commandment to love our neigh-
9 ^
hour makes obligatory upon them." And where already
"reforms are achieved in a revolutionary manner, as in
Cuba £md China , .., the Christian task is to oo-operate
in order that the transitory despotic phase may be alle™
P6viated and shortened.”'"
This does not mean that the Christian must sanction 
this despotism* "The right social contribution of Chris­
tians is always and everywhere directed toward the huma­
nizing of society, toward the establishment of freedom and 
equity before the law and toward the formation of areas of
9*7
freedom in which the individual can act responsibly.'*"''^  
Rather, we must show very clearly v/hat in Comiunism the 
ohuroh is obliged to say 'No* to. "It is now up to us to 
show that Christianity is not a class-conscious supporter 
of the 'reaction*, that is, of those powers interested in 
keeping things as they are ; that the Ohuroh is able to 
free itself from the chains of class distinction: that 
our 'no* to Marxism is directed to its Messianic claims
OpL
and not to its social revolution."
IMâ.. P- viii.
pA
"The Christian in the Search for World Order and Peace"«
p. 59.
m m . ,  p. 58.
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2é The second point at which Gollwitzer recognizee 
the Marxist challenge to Christianity as being on the mark 
is in the Oomnmist appeal to scientific reason and to 
faith in the capacities of the natural man* Thus® "Marxism 
shows up the degree to which Christianity has adapted 
itself to a contradiction of its basic faith# in the 
faith of the Enlightenment*"^^ Christianity itself har­
boured and promoted this idealistic faith in man's capacity 
to understand and control his environment*
By displacing the elements of magic 
and myth Christ lenity opened the way 
to a rational and immanent (i.e* 
scientific) interpretation of the 
world* Christianity is partly respon­
sible for this atheism because of its 
failure to deal with the questions 
thus raised, and through a misguided 
attempt to dominate the intellectual 
life, and through inadequate grasp 
and manifestation of the import of
the message entrusted to it. ^
Marxism absolutized this faith and pushed it to its furthest
logical conclusion. Hence, it can accurately point to the
weakness of most Christian apologetics*
But something very positive ought to be learned from
this 8 that "the Christian message cannot demonstrate the
indispensibility and superiority of its promise by reference
to the reality as it is accessible to man before his eyes
31are opened by the gospel," If one attempted a demonstra,tion
West, p* zk?.
. p. 138. "Immsjientism" in Ooll- 
witzer's writings means the explanation of the world 
entirely within itself.
ghe Christian Ealth and the Marxiat Grl'kioimLMLMllsloB,
Po 166 •
on this basis it would prove merely that the Marxist 
oritioism was oorreot# that Christianity was nothing more 
than "a product of need, created for the purpose of satis­
fying Thus, this suspicion and criticism should
force us back to a truer representation of our biblica.1 
faith.
Feuerlmch and Marx agreed that God is just a, means 
to an end (and, in their opinion, an unsuccessful means). 
For them need was prior and religion (God) a subsequent 
explanation *
But this scheme breaks down as 
an attempt to explain the origin of 
the biblical message of God. Hero 
the possibility does not precede the 
reality, the need does not precede 
its satisfaction, but the reality 
creates the new possibilities, the 
needs, #i,d their appeasement. God 
is not a means valued by man •.. but 
before all value, before what he can «o 
signify for human life, he is Himself.
The Marxist denial of the existence of God at this 
pseudo-scientific level also shows us a second thing, 
namely# that in the CoKMunist-Christian dialogue the 
partners are talking often about different things. What 
the atheist denies is not what the Christian affirms, To 
believe that you understand the biblical God well enough 
to say of him, "He does not exist", proves, on the con-
32 IbM. 9 pp. 166-167.
Ibid., p. 167. The objection that Christ came to bring 
reconciliation, the answer to a prior need, can be 
answered by pointing to the fa,ot that this reconci­
liation is already promised in the Name (YHWH) which 
belongs to him who is prior to all as Creator and 
Promiser alike.
trary, that you have not unclex»stood this YHMH and thus 
are not# in fact® denying him. "Karl Barth therefore 
rightly said *. « that the arguments of Marxist atheism 
did not deal with the God of the Christian confession» 
hut a •conceptual idol* » and that it was an important task 
of the Christians in conversation with the Marxists to 
deny his identity with the God of faith.
The Christian approach to Marxism receives its par­
ticular character from the background against which it 
works, a background it derives from the gospel* This
background attitude is characterized by tv/o basic elements s
(a) freedom from partisanship in this world, and (b) free­
dom from this world itself*
(a) The Christian ultimately belonge to neither west 
nor ea,st. "Because we belong absolutely to our new Master,
Christ, we are no longer identified for weal or woe with
one of the two world p o w e r s The gospel is the Good 
News for all people.
Panicky fear of a victory for the 
opposite side leads to biased thinking, 
which sees only the crimes of the 
other side and is blind to those of 
its own, and which even declares every­
thing to be good and just that furthers 
the interests of its own side. By such 
an attitude» Christians betray the 
freedom given to them in the gospel, 
and the commission that God has given 
to each in his political camp. ..*
Only when we Christians seise the
ffiM-» P* 1 6 9B citings K. Barth, Brief an, einen, Pfswrer 
M U M ^ Æ  (Berlin, 1958), ppl 1 9 ™  ^
35 XThe Demands of Freedom, p. 76.
privilege? which the gospel has given 
us, of a frank and just viewpoint and 
a candid word of criticism of our own 
side, will we truly serve our own 05
countries. ^
(b) Similarly, the Christian is really the citizen 
of another kingdom, the kingdom of heaven (Phllippians 
3:20), He is a resident alien in the world. Therefore, 
no conflict in this world oan have absolute signifioance 
for him, "O'hey have been rendered harmless. The cleavage 
is no longer final g it een no longer prevent brotherhood
ray
— -on the contrary it kindles brotherhood,However, 
this does not imply a political neutralism, a,s we sha,ll 
see shortly. Rather, it indicates the proper Christian 
approach to such oppositions and conflicts.
And, further, also connected with this second Christian 
freedom,
a Christian Is free from the domination 
of fear. As long as w© are afraid, our 
flesh tries to defend itself, and in 
its fear uses even the Gospel as a 
weapon of self-defence, for fear 
justifies every means, But the re­
deemed slave must know that his former 
masters cannot do anything to him* 
they can neither help nor destroy him,
In short, then, the Christian is able to say 'Yes* 
to two aspects of the Marxist criticism of religion, viz., 
that by and large the church has become identified with
I
"The Christian in the Search for World Order and Peace",
p. 60.
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The Demande of Freedom, p. 77
 ^ ILM_2 eaiMâ_.M-£^00â2m» pp. 76-77.
the re3Jjiquishiiig its true revolutionary
character, and that the îSnlightenment idea of man, espoused 
by the church for many years» logically leads to humanism 
and not to the Christian God. And the Christian is §.Mje 
to say this 'Yes' without fear because he, as a Christian 
pe;q ,se * belongs neither to the capitalist no3? the com­
munist camp and because, by the same token, he does not 
belong to the ivorld and fears no reprisals in it,
Nevertheless, there are some things in communism, as 
it appears historically, to which the ohuroh must say a 
very firm 'No', "The oomaunist superstition about force, 
about the end justifying any means ; the claims of the 
Communist party to a. monopoly of Imov/ledge of absolute 
truth and of mcontrolled authority not subject to any 
higher justice*— — all these are characteristics of com­
munism that make it impossible fo3? the Christian to be a 
Communist, as long as coMaunism is as it is, and they also 
oblige a Christian to disagree v/ith i t . O f  course, 
such a 'No® must be accompanied by a similar 'No' to the 
horrors and inhuinanities of capitalism.
These are practical problems, piroblems which relate 
to communism as it is practised. But practical problems 
can be corrected without altering the basic theory. 
Therefore, we will not dwell on these. However, there is 
also a theorotica,! p^ roblem in Marxism for the Christians
"The Christian in the Search for World Order emd Peace" 
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its Mossianisra. Originally communism was a %'evolutionairy 
movement calling for social reform. Dialectical and 
historical materia,lism were developed first as socio­
economic theories. As such they are not necessarily 
atheistic* Indeed, the early Ohristian communities were 
undoubtedly communistic (Acts 2 g W-45)# And forms of 
communist life are followed even today by some Christian 
sects, e.g. the Mennonites and Hutterites. There is no 
basic conflict be'Weon Christianity and materialism as an 
economic system* However, later the atheistic meteiphysios 
was added and materialism was tranformed into an ideology. 
Now "the criticism of communism f3?ora the Christian angle 
is not that it is too materialistic, but too idealistic, 
not too rationalistic but not rational enough, Or, to 
put this somewhat differently? It is not Utopianism which 
must come under criticism from Christian,ity. Rather, it 
is the communist lack of awareness of the distinction 
between Gospel and Law which must be challenged. The 
Utopia which Marxism attempts to initiate is not in itself 
wrong* Indeed, the Christian community ought to practise 
many of the things which would also be found in the ideal 
communist society. But that is only one side of things.
To do that alone Is to separate the promise from the 
Promisor. "Bettor, more consistent and impressive than
« anrfrtrr»*r*
all attempts within theology# Marxism has attempted to 
preserve the promise and at the same time eliminate the 
Promisor,"
Of course, it is equally true that the ohuroh has made
the same mistake from the other side, Marxism can point
with justification to the way the church has forgotten
the social content of the promise.
The Marxist separation of the social 
content of the promise from the Promisor 
who promises himself to us is just as 
heretical , *. as the cuetoBiary sapa™ 
ration in the ohwoh of the self-proraise 
of the promising God from its social 
content. Thus# today, it is not a 
question of the conquest of Marxism, 
but of the conquest of two heresies, 
that of Marxism and that of the church, 
in order to gain the whole content of 
the promise •
.Finally, and following on from this, Gollwitzer points 
out positively what form the Christian response must take, 
The practical aspects are well summarized in his synopsis 
of a lecture on "Marxism and Christianity", delivered in 
the Free University of Berlin in the winter of 1958-1959*
9* Among the truer forms of 
witness that the Christian community 
must offer ares
(a) Evidenoe of profound penitence » 
which is concerned not only with the 
shortcomings of earlier generations but 
still more of our own,
(b) Detaoliment from all false 
associations opposing communist 
atheism* .,*
(c) A new joyous and assured de­
votion to their Christian faith, demon­
strated by willingness to suffer. ...
 ^* %usoruch und Anspruch. Heue Folge (Munich# 1968), p. 229* 
Ibid. . p. 229.
(d) Support for efforts aimed at 
removing the conditions *in which man 
is a hivailiated# enslaved# forlorn, 
contemptible creature * (Marx),
1 5. The church's proper social 
contribution is always along the lines 
of humanising society, the maintenance 
and improvement of justice, and the 
eétablisWent of areas of freedom as 
spheres of individual responsibility....
1 6, The church in the communist 
state makes her contribution to 
changing the communiât system, i.e. 
the ending of totalitarianism!
(a) by her independent existence, 
her congregational life, her services 
and her message, ...
(b) by participating, as an 
organization as well as individual 
members, in society® by taking part 
in the building up of society# while 
at the same time refusing to worship ^_
its official gods ....
On the theoretical side, Ohristians cannot allow the 
Marxist identification of Christianity with religion and 
the biblical God with the gods of the religions. Thus, 
there must b© some attempt to correct this mistalcen im­
pression. This is partly accomplished by pointing to the 
real conflict, "The real antithesis which theology must 
insist on, is not that be*bv/een religion and atheism, but 
between the 'God for us* of the gospel, and the human 
refusal to live in the strength of the vital reality of 
this *God for In other words, the real antithesis
is between Gospel and Law, between God’s gracious inter­
vention and man’s impudent and arrogant rejection of it
Sl?0...D§Saa.da-.o.ffrpM sm» PP- 139-1^ 1-0, 141-142.
The Christian Faith and the Marxist Criticism of ReliiÇîion,
p. 136,
by claiming to bo able to save himself. Then "Ohristians, 
as messengers of this divine intervention, are sent forth 
to the communists as to all other men, to proclaim a 
clear ’Ho’ to the messianism of self-deliveranoe, hut 
also God's 'Yes' to the atheist as a creature loved and
lb ^
sought by God. " This means that the emphasis is on 
proclamation rather than argument, demonstration rather 
than proof, and conversion rather than defeat.
The great hope in this is the fact that communism 
can change, that like all other hUKian movements it is 
subject to the Lordship of God, Indeed, already today 
there is no uniform brand of communism such as Lenin and 
Stalin envisaged. And despite the recent invasion of 
Czechoslovakia (20-21 August 1968) and the subsequent 
severe imposition of a particular form of communism, there 
are groups within the eastern bloc striving to "humanize" 
Marxism.
OiiX'iBtianity and Nuclear War
The problem of nuclear weapons must be seen in the
light of two things g (a) the Christian attitude to war
and the use of force in general g and (b) a clear analysis
of the present age, this "age of transition".
God does not want murder. In harmony 
with the text of the 5th commandment s 
"You shall not commit murder", the
The Demands of Freedom, p. 143,
church was always of the opinion that 
eases are conceivable in which to kill 
a man is not murder# hut can happen in 
obedience to God's will. But God 
stands opposed to murder.
This is the starting point and one of the keys to
understanding Gollwitzer*s argument regarding nuclear war.
Indeed, he did not refuse to do military service in the
second World War, even wearing the uniform of Hitler's
army although he disapproved of Hitler's regime. At one
time he argued in favour of taking up arms at the call of
ones country. By implication he says that at one time#
in the past# it had been possible to distinguish a belluia
qusjum and thereby justify the use of force# even killing.
At any rate, he does not deny the historic possibility of
4*7making such a distinction. ' And when he returned from 
Russia and "heard ... Hans I wand, Martin Niemo'ller and 
Heinrich Vogel saying .,, that v/ith the j^ atomicj bomb the 
relative# conditional and limited 'Yes' that the Church 
had hitherto said to v/ar was at an end", he "did not see 
this and brought forward all the arguments of" traditional 
Christian war-ethios,^^
Pie Christen wid die AtejmaffgA, 4th ed. (Munich, 1958), 
pp. 42-43.
4’? Cf..Die Christen und die Atomwaffen. p. 48 § mid the
article, "Kriegs XV", ins Die Relirgion in Gesohiehte 
und Ge^enwart. 3rd ed. (Tubingen, 1957), vol.^W: ^
col. 66ff, A parenthetic remark ins "The Christian 
in the Search for World Order and Peace"# op. cit.. 
p. 5 1, shows Gollv/itzer's approval of such a dis-binc™ 
tion.
'ghfi-.Pefflanfls of Freedom, p. 135.
No longer does Gollwitzer take that stand. The modem 
weapons of mass annihilation'— —atomic# biological and 
chemical (ABC) weapons— have evinced a different ansv/er. 
"The old dispute about the ethics of war is ended® all 
Christians, if they heed the word of God, cannot do other 
than assert that they cannot take part in a nuclear war, 
and that the employment of nuclear v/eapons is a misuse of 
God's c r e at io n . O r  again® "God's law says No to 
atomic w a r , T h e s e  are strong, ooimiiitted statements.
The pilgr-lmage is complete. And it is a pilgrimage.
This is not a reversal of his earlier position, but a 
development of it based on the same princip3.es, "Our 
fathers* aim to civilize war can now only be paralleled 
by efforts to abolish it a lto g e th e r ,  pursued with the same 
e a rn e s tn e ss  and the smae devotion of hard thinking, carrying 
on the w ork  of our fathers with th e  Imowledge that the 
old Christian ethics o f  war was n o t  impracticable, as is 
often said today, but in its application shows that there 
cannot be a 'just' nuclear war and that this is in fact a 
contradiction in terms,"
This development in Gollwitzer's thinking is based 
partly on the different nature of the new weapons.The
a m . ,  pp . 132-133 .
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destruction wrought by modern weapons of war is far more 
extensive than the limited effect of so-called conventional 
weaponry. While the older weapons could be used on 
civilians, such use was considered unjust by the Christian 
ethics of war. The new ABO-weapons permit no such dis­
tinction, Combattant and non“combattant are both killed 
indisoriminately, Similarly, sonventional armaments had 
only a limited effect. Our modern weaponry, on the other 
hand, destroys vegetation and may affect generations yet 
unborn. A helium nustmu under the old criteria, had as 
its purpose the rehabilitation of the enemy. Just as the 
police use force to capture a criminal with the intent of 
restoring him. to society at some future date when his 
anti-social attitudes are corrected, so, too, the use of 
force in war was meant to stop unjust acts and restore 
good international relations. The war did not preclude 
the possibility of a negotiated peace. How, however, our 
ABO-weapons have made this impossible. The only goal a 
modern war c&m have is the annihilation of the enemy and 
unconditional surrender. By the same token, a defensive 
war, formerly permitted in the Christian ethics of war, 
is a thing of the past. For defence implies the use of 
only enough force to stop the unjust attack. The new 
weapons, then, cannot be used defensively because they 
would inflict an unjust measure of retaliatory suffering, 
Finally, in a war where the opponents both have ABC-weapons 
in equivalent strength, the use of them would mean self- 
annihilation, suicide. In short, the very nature of these
new weapons does not permit the humanizing distinctions of 
the traditional Christian attitude to war,
The other factor influencing Gollwitzer’s judgment 
on the use of nuclear weapons is his analysis of the present 
age, an age which he in many places calls "a time of 
transition". It is a strange time, with many conflicting 
elements, But we must "get used to this situation and 
work out the consequences of it,"^^ What, then, does he 
see as the characteristics of this "time of transition" 
and their consequences?'^ *^'
I, As noted above, the nature of modern weapons malf.es 
them unsuitable as a means to political ends. Yet, there 
has been no abolition of war Therefore, the pos­
sibility of a war waged with conventional weapons still 
lies open. For this reason, hoping to limit war, even 
the nuclear powers retain standing armies equipped with 
conventional arms. Similarly, they avoid direct conflict 
with each other and settle for supplying conventional 
weaponry to opposite sides in smaller wars*— e.g. the 
civil war in Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli war, or the India- 
Pakistan conflict. For they know that a direct confrontation 
would very quickly escalate into a nuclear war.
II, Military armaments still retain their deterrent 
character, That is, by having nuclear weapons and thereby
"The Christian in the Search for World Order and Peace,"
Of. "The Christian in the Search for World Order and 
Peace", pp. 4?-49.
having the possibility of using them, one country prevents 
another nuclear power from making any unjust advances for 
fear of the consequences, e.g. the Cuba missile crisis.
Only if a country Imew it was so superior that retaliation 
was impossible would it ever consider actually using 
atomic weapons. Therefore, today’s nuclear balance or 
equilibrium makes the deterrent effective, thus bringing 
a certain tenuous peace,
III. Finally, in this "time of transition" v/e find 
a large number of sovereign countries, Each has its ovm 
complex of foreign policies and international conflicts.
But this sovereignty is actually limited, either by an 
inability to compete in the arms race (smaller countries), 
or by treaties (larger countries). Nevertheless, a certain 
causes heads of governments to risk the consequences 
and engage in war. Therefore, the great powers have been 
forced into a type of policing at an international level. 
But they are unable to properly fulfil this task because 
they are in corapetition and so taka sides as it suits their 
ovm purposes, and because they daren’t risk an ultimatum 
with the threat of nuclear war.
Hence, this "time of 'transition" is a time of uncer­
tainty, Nuclear weapons have brought about a certain 
peace. No country has dared to actually use them since 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But the factors delineated above 
make it a shaky peace indeed. What is the solution?
0?he pacifist position is untenable. To only shout 'No* 
to nuclear war, or even to war in general, is so negative
as to be Impossible, Also, it is totally unrealistic,
"The "Yes' to the Gospel and the "No* to waz* must go
together“ ™or both v/ill be lost,"^ ^^  In this manner
,  46several things can. be said,*
The church’s primary task here is one of clarifi­
cation, -Having gained a full understanding of the nature 
and consequences of the new weapons and of the present 
situation she must spread this understanding to all people 
and nations. For as long as people look at the new 
weapons as being merely quantitatively and not qualita­
tively different from old sxBmraents the possibility of a 
nuclear war remains very real. The corollary of this 
first task* then, is to drav; out equally clearly the 
fact that these new weapons do not fall within the old 
category of morally legitimate uses of force. This means, 
also, pointing out that poaoe has become not only desi­
rable but necessary, A return to limited conventional 
war by means of a ban on nuclear weapons does not guarantee 
that they would not be used. Hence, the church must try 
to change the present situation as well by t.hv/a.rting every 
attempt at absolutizing ideological positions, In other 
words, she must point to the fallacies in the propoganda 
of both sides of the present "cold vmr". At the same time 
she must oppose openly and emphatically the present idolatry
^ Of. Pia^Ugâm-AaJâêis.8MaliÆ§.jffl^ . vol. i?
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of force which implies that "might is right" and must 
encourage people in general and statesmen in particular 
to rely on an impotent right. This means* finally, 
reflecting anew on the strength and promise of the 
Christian missionary commission. If we more actively and 
sincerely witnessed to the fulfilment of God's promised.
"I Will Be There" in Jesus Christ, as is our duty, the 
underlying interpersonal relationships which are at the 
root of the psychology of war would he changed. That is,
X
we must become more aware of the political implications V
of the gospel,
The Word of God and Politics
What, then, does the gospel say to us? What is the 
Word of God foi» today? As hinted above, it has not 
gro\m silent, "It does have something very definite to 
say. It gives us clear and practical guidance even for 
political life." Of course, not all om? questions are 
answered. Me must still use the intelligence God gave us. 
Nevertheless, God's Word "speaks quite distinctly about 
those things concerning which there must not be any dif­
ference of opinion among us, about what v/e have to stand 
for together, what this 'different behaviour* of the 
Christian community is in the political field, where the
The Demands oi"..Freedom , p. 63,
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Christian community must not equate itself with the world, 
as Paul says (Romans 12), nor do what everyone else does, 
but believe in and witness to the rule of God, even in 
the political sphere,
Me have mentioned alreo^ dy that Gollwitzer, obedient 
to the New Testament, regards Christ as the fulfilment of 
the Old Testament promise given in the Name, YHWH, Oiu* 
relationship with God is now mediated perfectly through 
Jesus Christ. That's where we learn most completely of 
God's encounter with man,. This christo-centric approach 
now becomes very obvious. "Inquiring of the Mord of God 
means inquiring of Jesus Christ. And the answer comes 
not as a detailed plan, but as his whole life and death 
a3.id resurrection. It comes, new to each person, but yet 
always the same (paradox-dialectic), This, then, is how 
Gollwitser heard the Mord of God in the 1950'a and how it 
still speaks todays
"1. In Jesus Christ God reveals himself as a God of
00 r TPeace". "They [Christiang are sent by the 'God of peace'
(1 These, 5;&3) with the 'gospel of peace' (Eph, 6s15) into
*7
the world as pacifioi (Mt, 5*9), as peacemakers,"
Therefore, Christians must be peacemakers in personal life
EÛâ. t p. 6!|'. 
2Mâ'> P*
m m . . p. 64.
6*1 Die Christen und die Atomwaffen, p. W.
among individuals, in political life within the nation, 
and in international life. They should aim at co-existence 
with other nations, at co-operation within the state, and 
at harmony among individuals. All because God in Jesus 
Christ has shown his desire to live at peace with mankind.
62"2, God is a God of righteousness, who loves justice." 
This has very little to do with the system of courts and 
law within any given country. Such laws are made by men 
of a certain age to help regulate the behaviour of the 
people for the benefit of that nation or the majority of 
its citizens in that era. But the Word of God will help 
us to distinguish between right and wrong at a, particular 
time •
As Creator and Lord, God has ultimate claim on man.
He created the state for man and not vice versa. There­
fore its power must remain limited. It cannot demand that 
man should contravene his ultimate responsibility to God.
"A just state only exists where the power of the state 
restricts and controls the powerful, and where the rulers 
acknowledge God's eternal law.
"3, God in Christ is a God of m e r c y , T h i s  has a 
double significance for Christians, It means they have
 ^o
“  , p. 67.
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felt God's meroy, that they Imow themselves to be sinners
and yet forgiven* It also means that they, too, are ready
to forgive. Gollwitzer's examples here deal especially 
with German-Israeli relations. But his analysis of guilt 
and forgiveness and their place in politics applies 
equally to other instances, e.g. the relations between 
white Anglo-Saxons and the brown and black people they 
exploited in the days of the Empire ; or in inter-racial 
relations within a country (white and negro in the USA, 
white and North American Indians and Eskimo a in Canada, 
Malay and Chinese in Malaysia-Singapore, etc.).
Finally, what matters ultimately is not results but
God's blessing on what we do. For without that we cannot
live, all our good results are for nothing.
Blessing comes only through seeking 
and listening to the will of God, even
in politics. If we choose the path
of repentance and turning over a new 
leaf, even in politics, then we choose 
life. If we persistently choose the 
right and not evil and terror, then 
we choose life. If as far as in us 
lies we choose peace everywhere, we 
choose life.
Political Christianity
From Helmut C4ollwita@r*s life and from the develop­
ment of his thinking on certain political questions»— —  
especially the German question -we can determine two
m m . , p. 73.
stages of political Christianity.
In the first the Christian is called to he a watchman, 
a sentry, along the lines of Ezekiel 33«1-9. The Mord of 
God gives him special vision to see the coming storms 
while they are still at a distance. Before passions 
become inflamed he can cry out a warning, making clear the 
alternatives and their consequences. Thus, Gollwitzer 
appealed against the re-arming of West Germany because it 
would seriously hamper any movement towards a re-unifica­
tion of Germany.
The second stage is reached only if the warnings of 
the sentinel Christians are not heeded. The danger arrives 
and passions become heated. A just solution is no longer 
possible because people are more concerned for their own 
particular political parties. Now the task of the Chris­
tian is prayer and repentance. We must ssiy with the 
Evfongelieal Church in Germany (EICD)s "We accuse ourselves 
of not having confessed more bravely, of not having 
prayed more faithfully, of not having believed more joy­
fully and of not having loved more passionately", Thus, 
the Christian community becomes truly a "kingdom of 
priests" (Revelation ls6s 5«10).
"Stuttgarter Erklarung des Rates der BKI) vom 18.10.19^4'g" g 
quoted in: Vietnamji_jsraW ,
2nd ed. (Mimioh, 1968), p. 6^*
PREACHING AND PROOLAMATION
Introduction
We began this examination of the thought of Helmut 
Gollwitzer; after a brief biography, with a study of his 
concept of the nature and task of theology. We said then 
that theology was the search for the gospel behind the 
temporally determined formal shell and the subsequent 
translation of this message and the proclamation of it 
for contemporary persons. By method, then, the theologian 
goes first to the biblical witness and then takes this 
to himself and to other people. We have seen how adhe­
rence to this concept of theology leads one to regard 
certain ways of speaking about God as inappropriate. We 
have also examined Grollv/itzer's positive attempt a.t 
appropriate language about God, In the chapter just com­
pleted we briefly examined two practical examples of the 
political side of theological proclamation.' In this 
chapter we turn to an even more specialized form of pro­
clamations preaching.
Once again, as with political Christianity, for 
Gollwitzer Christian preaching is an integral part of 
Christian theology. Theology is the ascertainment and 
proclamation in contemporary forms of the essence of the 
gospel. And that, precisely, is what preaching is, applied
in the specific context of Ohristian public worship. The 
same criteria which determine appropriate theological
language will also determine the form and content of 
Christian sermons. That this is most definitely the case 
with Gollwitzer's preaching will be seen as v/e progress.
Gollwitzer*s "call" to preach came very early in his 
life. "Fifteen years before the time when preaching began 
to be dangerous in Germany, fifteen years before 1933» 
young pastors experienced a 'need to preach* (Predigtnot) 
which drove them to ask with new iaitensity why there really 
must be preaching in and by the church, v/hat the peculiar 
nature of this type of speaking is with regard to all 
other human talk# what it is based on and where it gets 
its authority emd certainty." He soon f olio v/e d in this 
movement, receiving his own Pyedigtnpt. This still holds 
him 80 securely tha,t on his 60th birthday he could writes 
"the situation in the pulpit was for me, just as for my 
theological teachers, the centre of my theological exis­
tence, and the collective demsvid and responsibility of 
this situation can be equated with no other situation of
address*"— — not with the professor’s chaAr, not with the 
2lectern." And despite a clear awareness of the diffi­
culties and short-comings of preaching today-— — -indeed, 
also of the inadequacy of the stereo-typed services of 
worship used generally today— , he is certain that this
.. und lobten Oott. PMdigtsn gehalten in der
G erne in de Berlin-Dahlem 1938 bis 19^f*0 (Neukirohen 
196^!"), p. 7.
 ^ Neu® Polge. Predigten aus den
Jahren 19j4-19g8 (Mmloh, 1968), p. 234.
3form of proclamation has not had its day.
But that analysis must come later. First v/e must 
look at Gollwitzer's theology of preaching. What is 
Christian preaoh^ jog? What are its sources and methods? 
After m'ïswering these questions we will be able to see 
in the proper perspective his ooments on its place in 
the church today.
A Preaching Theology
Weijfceraagm  (lit. "to say further”) 
and weiteraehen (lit, "to give further")itVHinfWwajeuu«WfWf4t‘we#*wwnwKtwu.wi*u». ^  ^  Sw./ f
“ •that is v/hat we are dealing with. 
Through that the Word of life came to 
us, and through that it should press u 
on from us to othex*s.
3 It is interesting to note that this high regard for the 
"preaching situation" is shared also by the leaders 
of many secular groups. Ernesto *Che* Guevara,
Mao Tse Tung and Fidel Castro are the first to come 
to mind. All three put great emphasis on the 
gatherings of the guerilla hand, the "congregation", 
v/hen the leader would "preach", that is, he would 
remind them of the basic promise to be brought into 
reality by their revolution, and would then go on 
to instruct them in the application of this "gospel". 
The same methods are being used also by the leaders 
of student and social revolt. It seem that the 
importance of "preaching as a means of reaching 
people at the level of commitment, generally 
diminished in the larger branches of the church, 
has not been forg;otten by those groups which are 
today truly radical and revolutionary. Perhaps this 
is just one more proof that the church, as MarxisDi 
claims, is a conservative institution whose aim is 
the preservation of the present class structure, i.e., 
keeping the rich rich and the poor poor. Buch 
speculation, however, although it is interesting and 
seems to bear some measure of truth, is beyond the 
scope of this thesis*
Neue Folge, p. 220.
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words with which Helmut Gollwitzer characterizes Christian 
preaching we osn derive several things about his concept 
of preaching,
"It is not merely a beautiful address for decorating 
festive occasions? it is not merely pious men speaking 
their minds according to the mottos 'What fills the 
heart overflows the mouth'? it is also not merely in­
structing the hearer regarding historic events of the 
past or regarding established doctrines of faith".
6Certainly, the preacher is  human-— -a  contemporary person. 
To be sure, he carries out his office in a hmnan setting, 
i.e., he must use huimn, contemporary language because 
his hearers are human and contemporary. And, in the 
case of the person who speaks not on the spur of the 
moment but after much deliberation, he may spend several 
houi's preparing and writing what he will say in his sermon. 
Nevertheless, Christian preaching is not speaking a human 
word. It is not just "#;^ pn. und_g;eben" . Rather, it is 
"WEITERsa^ien_ im WEITER^eben". "For it is not ourselves 
that we are preaching, but Christ Jesus as the Lord"
(2 Corinthians 4*5). Expressed positively, Christian 
preaching "is man's obligatory service to the living Word
.A. md 3,obten Sott. p. ?.
6 Much has been said of this already and more will be said 
again later.
*7of God".* The preacher and his preaching are subject to 
this Word g they become tools of this Word as it gains 
power over and liberates its hearers.
Compare this with what was said in Chapter 2 about 
the nature of theology§ We remarked there that although 
I GBXL set out to do theology, I cannot myself guarantee 
that I will be successful. The success depends upon the 
self-giving of God himself. The content, then, of good 
theology is God's self-révélation. It isn't man's word 
about God but a human tool of God's reaching out to man. 
Such vocative, confessional theology leads necessarily 
to preaching conceived in this way,
gjL Closely related to the above, the content of
"For th is  is
What I received from the lord, and in turn passed on to 
you" (1 Corinthians 11 §23)# However much each preacher  
changes the language or the form of what he passes on, 
the content, the gospel, remains the same—— -assuming, 
of course, he is  doing his job properlyt To be sure, it 
comes new to each hearer. Nevertheless, it has and 
maintains an identity. "That is the hermeneutic problem 
in whose aporia theology and proclamation die if the 
confidence dies before Weitqr<g:abe can take places the 
confidence in this Word that it can preserve its identity 
through diverse mouths and heads, thus confidence in the
?
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fact that it is not a mere complex of ideas but the Word 
as a living person, at the same time both Word and Person."^ 
Christian preaching is not "A b S g a g e n , , but
Here, too, the concept of preaching derives directly 
from the concept of theology as a whole. On many occasions 
we emphasized that to separate the Promiser from his self- 
giving in the promise is to destroy theology. One is 
left v/ith empty, hollow words. Bo, too, in preaching, 
when v/e pass on to others our witness to God's encounter 
with men, we are also passing this enoounter on to them.
Just as ow? faith was evoked by proclamation— — the procla­
mation by another person or the proclamation of the
biblical witness» similarly, our proclamation can
evoke faith. But it can do this only in so far as we 
pass on the Promiser along with his promise.
On the other hand, Christian preaching is not
Without a doubt, part 
of the task of theology is to translate*— -meaning by ^
that more thfm mere verbal translation»— and repeat
\
unchanged the message handed down by our forefathers in  ^\
the faith. Indeed, to change the essence of this message \V
in any way is not just heresy, but apostasy. The aim of (' '
such translation and repetition is to make the essence 
of the message understandable to the hearer, à preacher K
is on safe ground as long as he stays within his biblioal
text. But this safety is not to be olung to by the
Christian, Christian preaching
is not an historica.1 report about 
what onoe was thought, ,«• It is 
not the past that preaching has to 
serve, but present and future life.
If that is to happen by in­
struction from a text coming out of 
the past, then one must go beyond the 
text, moving, of course, in the 
direction indicated by it, extending 
it, but going beyond it. Thus, into 
new terrain outwith the protection of q 
the text,
It is not "WIBDlRsagan und WIEDER&mben" , but "ilJTERsagen
.®.Œ$SSgeÏ!Sa” •
Here the oonoept of preaching is derived from the 
aspect of theology examined in the last chapter, from 
political Christianity. Remember, though, this is not an 
appendix to what wan said in Chapter 2, For Gollwitzer, 
ethics is an integral, necessary and important part of 
theology. So, too, is this aspect of his concept of 
preaching, A great many of today's questions and problems 
are not dealt with in the Bible in a literal way. There 
is no mention in it, for instance, of nuclear war, of 
abortion, of pollution, etc. Yet, the Christian believes 
that the gospel touches his whole life. To answer these 
questions, then, theology must follow the leads given in 
the Bible and go beyond them to speak God's Word to these 
problems. So, too, must Christian preaching.
^ îMâ.. p. 231.
If, then, these are for Gollwitzer the iimin charac- 
teristies of preaohing which is truly Christian, on what 
sources may it draw? Mhat methods are appro%)riate to it? 
What is this identity which characterizes it? And v/hat 
guarantees this identity? The answers to those questions 
may seem simple, and ought to he obvious from what has 
been said so far in this thesis. But as simple and 
obvious as they are, they bear repeating because they 
are so central to Gollwitzer's whole approach to theology.
All of Helmut Gollv/itzer*s published sermons would 
be called biblical sermons— and in a loose sense, 
expository. As he says of himself « "He (the author] 
affirmed the salutary custom in the evangelical churches 
of Europe of ensuring that every Christian address adheres 
to the text by binding the sermon to a specified biblical 
passage and therefore practised nothing other than
1 Q
textual interpretation."^ It would not be fair to say 
on the basis of this that he would claim all Christian 
preaching should be textual preaching. That was simply 
his practice. But it is true to say that it must be 
biblical. That is, its primary source is the testimony 
of the Old and Nev/ Testaments. It is tied to a particular 
man of history (Jesus of Nazareth) in whom God's promise 
to be with us (YHMHg Emmanuel) became a reality for all 
people.
m a . ,  p. 22?.
Every Christian address has a text, 
one and the same texts the Emmanuel 
... . By exchanging this text for 
another it ceases to he a Christian  ^
address.
That sounds extreme on first reading. Nevertheless, it is 
consistent with all that has been said so far. If all the 
earlier comments regarding the concept of theology and the 
criteria for appropriate talk of God are accepted, then 
this cannot be denied, A concept of theology for which 
the Bible is central is bound to produce a demand for 
similarly biblical preaching.
But, at the same time, preaching must be contemporary. 
The preacher has a double obligation. "Indeed, he has to
do with two partners -and he owes his honesty— honest
to God!— to them both, to his hearers and to the text," 
Like his hearers, the preacher cannot separate himself 
from the age in which he lives. "He is himself the heathen, 
the doubter, the one of little faith and the atheistic 
contemporary to whom the gospel is incomprehensible and
*1 o
incredible, and to whom the Bible is a closed book." ^
His duty to his contemporaries, his hearers, and his duty 
to himself as a contemporary prevent him from turning his 
sermon into a mere repetition of the past. At the same 
time, his duty to the Word ensures timt he does not slip
JMâ.. p. 226. 
ÆMâ.. p. 224. 
.ïMâ. . p. 224.
from speaking in contemporary forms and terms into adapting 
the living Word to contemporary axioms. It is a difficult 
but necessary balance. To dissolve the contemporary pole 
of this double obligation is to reduce Christian preaching 
to a dead historicism or an equally dead dogmatic biblicism. 
And to dissolve the biblical pole is to lose the very 
content of true Christian preanhing*
Thirdly, Christian preaching, as a part of Christian 
theology, must be pacmli&âl» i.e., prophetic and political. 
We have already noted how "
indicate an extension beyond the literal limits of the
text. This plus, this "weijiOT", comes in the practical,
prophetic indications of the sermon. "A sermon which clings
anxiously within the historical limits of the text and thus
does not venture upon its prophetic task would be the
expression of a church which runs on the spot and merely
lArepeats its tradition." Just as God risked his divinity
by becoming human in Jesus of Nazareth, just as "Christ 
Jesus ,. did not cling to his equality with God but 
emptied himself" (Philippians 2s5ff«)» so too, the preacher 
must venture beyond the direct protection of text and tra­
dition, The biblical God is a living God, and his %iIord is 
a living Word, Therefore, it simply cannot be repeated 
like some dead letter. The situation of the world has 
changed since the biblical writers made their witness. And
* Ibicl. , p. 232, To a certain degree this would seem to be 
a good description of a large segment of the church 
today.
Dioclern» contemporary preaohing must be directed at this 
new situation. "In the rapid changes of the world the 
church only receives the defensive help of the Canon when 
it goes beyond the historical limits of the early Chris­
tian proclama/bion contained in the Canon.
After all this, only a few remarks about the methods 
of preaching or sermon preparation are needed. Since the 
biblical text— -or more accurately, the promise witziessed 
to throughout the Bible and especially its fulfilment in 
Jesus Christ— is the starting-point for all Christian 
preaohing# exegesis is the first task to be performed.
But this is executed in the light also of the contemporary 
situation. For the biblical texts are historically con­
ditioned. And the present situation is far removed 
historically and culturally from the biblical situation.
In the exegesis which precedes 
preaching this historical distance 
must be reflected upon and the his­
torically conditioned nature of the 
text must be determined as accurately 
as possible. However, this must be 
done not as an end in itself but so 
that the actualization of the text, 
its be m g  heard by us modenn people 
for us today, does not happen through 
an arbitrary entry but as an extraction 
of the lines of the text leading up 
to our modern situation,— ^thus, so 
that with all that we are today and 
all that distinguishes us from the 
man of that age and with what imites 
us with them we find ourselves in the 
extended line of those addressed at 
that time.
. p .  232.
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ThuSî the biblical exegesis must be balanced by a 
full analysis of conditions of the modern world. The 
preacher, as a modern person, must, indeed, be the first 
hearer of the living Mord of God. But, with his ©ye on 
the new situation he must not asks how does this changed 
situation affect what the gospel has to say to modern 
man? Rather, he ought to ask instead: how does this
gospel address me, and through me my hearers, in this 
new situation? The direction of movement must always be 
from the gospel to the oontemporary world, from God to 
man* This balance of the biblical and the contemporary 
and the neeessary direction of movement is the expression 
in Christian preaohing of the same balance and direction 
in theology as a whole. The German Christians in 1933 
by and large failed to make a vital witness to the gospel 
not because they ignored the changed circumstances, as is 
generally thought, but because they paid too much attention 
to it. They v/ere concerned about the consequences of the 
new situation on their proclamation. What could they say 
in the midst of these terrible events? Thus, their pro­
clamation was reduced to comfort and consolation in 
troubled times. In other words, they allowed the situation 
to become the master, "But the Lord wh.o sent us is not the 
situation together with its lords, but he whose dominion 
makes us free precisely from the dictates of the situation,
mgiafwOTMPW* ntre-wimme w ctfiw i
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The Lordship of God means that in the face of changed
oiroumstances our question ought to be s what are the
consequences of the gospel in this new situation? And
it means, fux'thar, that we are free to take the risk of
proclaiming these consequenoeB not just in a general way,
but in far-reaching concrete terms.
Throughout the preceding, one serious problem seems
to have been ignored: the problems for exegesis raised
by the historical element of Christian faith, i.e., by
the fact that "Christian faith is real faith in a real
18historical Man, Jesus Christ." It has not been ignored. 
Nevertheless, before we turn to the problems of preaohing 
today, v/e must make specific reference to v/hat Gollv/itzer 
says about the relation of faith to historical research 
and criticism.
Msjffigagj__
After a first reading of Helmut Sollwitaer's
sermons and exegetical material one is tempted 
to accuse him of ignoring historical criticism. 
Indeed, he always skips over it very quickly 
claiming that such v/ork should precede 
preaching but has no place in the sermon.
18 "The Jesus of History and Faith in Jesus Oîirist”, Fr.
Gabriel Hebert, s.s.m,, tms., ini Theolggv (London),
vol. 6 5, 1962, p. 90.
Of. âaSETJiSlLJaâ-lttgSrmîl. Weue Folge, p. 228
One is thus tempted to conclude that he offers 
it only a small place in the spectrum of 
theological work. But such a conclusion would 
be most untrue and unfair. In fact, the very 
content of Christian faith demands that we 
give an important place to this type of 
analysis, "As being faith in the real histo­
rical man Jesus Christ, Christian faith is 
dependent on Historical Criticism, and stands 
to it in a relation which needs to be defined 
further" •
Jesus can be received only through pro­
clamation, The disciples received him through 
his seIf-proclamation directly. We usually 
receive him through his self-proclamation 
mediated by biblical proclamation and/or the 
proclamation of other CtelErtians. This is the 
greatest miracle of all* and the basis for all 
other miracles : that God has submitted, con**
descended, to coming into such an historical, 
contingent and personal association with man 
that proclamation by other men becomes the 
primary means of passing this association on 
to others. This human tradition, then, becomes 
importaait. But, because of this reliance on 
proclamation, faith
must use historical criticism to 
learn the meaning of the tradition.
This is the task of all Exegesis,
. • • Critical exegesis is then a safe- 
guard on this right use of Scripture,
In other words, it prevents us from treating the
O 0
"The jQsus of History and Faith In Jesus Christ", on. oit., 
p. 90.
JMâ... pp. 90-91.
Bible as being in itself 'holy'. It is truly 
'Holy Scripture* because of him to whom it 
bears witness. But it is a human witness 
directed to men and, therefore, best honoured 
by submitting it to 'profane research*.
Scondly, "Ghristian faith ,,, subjects
99
itself to historical criticism"To many 
this would seem to be absolute folly. For them 
Christian faith is utterly opposed to histo­
rical criticism, and such scientific research 
would lead to the dissolution of faith itself.
But such warning and prohibition weakens "what 
God did when the Word was mad© flesh? for then 
God himself entered within the sphere of con­
tingent historical events, into the field of 
that which can be historically affirmed and 
can also be historically called in question, 
while still remaining the Lord of lords,
This point is very important, Jesus was 
not a vision or spectre. All men could look 
at him. Faith was not a precondition but a 
response. Today this means that he exposes 
himself also to the sterile, scientific obec- 
tivity of the historian,Similarly, faith 
does not demand an abandonment of historical 
facts. On the contrary, "truthfulness to fact
9
is a disciple's duty,""'"^  In this way Christianity
aiâ.. pp. 90-91 
a m . , p. 91.
qU,
I do not wish to become involved in the question of whether 
or not an historian can actually be objective. In 
accepting the extreme position that he can smd must 
be, the argument thereby ensures its validity for the 
more moderate position as well,
25 Jesus of History end Faith in Jesus Christ" , on, oit, ,
p, 91.
is preserved from becoming pure mysticism or 
;9nosis. Whether Jesus lived is certainly a 
legitimate historical question* By this and 
certain other historical facts— e.g, that 
Jesus was an Israelite and stood within that 
HeJ^ SisgJipM Plrta.. that he came among-them at 
a particular time proclaiming a message for 
v/hich he was subsequently executed, that the 
grave in which he was laid was seen by the 
disciples a few days later to be empty, that 
this same Jesus then presented himself to them 
in such a way that they had no doubt that it
was he by such facts Christian faith stands
or falls, because for it "Jesus is not a raer© 
vehicle or syrabol of universal truths, but is 
the actual Object of faith and love*"^^ The 
historical .reality of Jesus is retained in the 
biblical witness and is necessary for a genuine 
Christian faith. Nowhere did the biblical 
writers run away from the facts of history.
To be sure, they interpreted them. But they 
did not try to escape them. (Cf. Mark 12sl2-l4 
and parallels, where in a fit of pique Jesus 
curses the barren fig tree— surely a mo st 
difficult text!) "Christian faith has therefore 
a restful untroubled certainty that historical 
criticism will not shake but will confirm these 
things as facts.
Thus, there is a certain "dependence" upon 
historical research necessary to Christian faith. 
But this is a limited rather than an absolute 
"dependence". In other words, Christian faith
ry.d., p. 9 1.
Ibid. , p . 92.
goes beyond what oan be examined by historical 
research. If an image of Jesus gained from the 
historian v/ere all we had and needed, three 
things would follows (a) the "neutral or 
imcommitted historian would be better qualified 
to tell us who Jesus is than the confessing 
Christian witness",'" His judgment of the facts 
would b© unco3-0tired by the involvement implicit 
in faith end thus he would give a clearer 
picture. Me have already established, however, 
that such involvement is necessary in order to 
ÎÜ10W whom we have to do with here, (b) The 
"gospels were intended to be read as historical 
chronicles simply, and so might be shown onPQ
historical grounds to be untrue". The great 
truth that we have learned from Bultmann is that 
the texts of Scripture are not chronicles but 
an interpretation of the events of history by 
the eyes of faith. Although disproving a basic 
constitutive historical event such as those 
indicated earlier would make faith untenable, for 
the most part historical criticism can have no 
effect on faith which is a matter of our response 
and relationship to these events, (c) "God-made- 
man does not only enter upon the field of history 
but is also as regards his divine nature subject 
to historical study and criticism.To admit 
this is impossible. It has been argued consis­
tently and persistently tlmt God cannot be the 
subject of human study and examination. Me have 
also tried to show the necessity, from a biblical
PH Ibid., p. 92, 
iMâ.. p. 92. 
Ibid., p. 92.
point of view and a human one, of affirsiing 
bpjgï Christ's divinity anycl his humanity.
Without a doubt, the human side, the incarnate 
side of his being is subject to study, but not 
the divine side. It is the subject of affir­
mation and faith. As Lord of lords, he is 
examiner and judge of the historian, not the 
historian of him. Thus, it might be more 
accurate to say that Christian faith is "bound" 
to history but not "dependent" upon historical 
criticism.
Historical research cannot bring certainty 
”~-*-only a greater or lesser degree of proba­
bility, But, in place of such an incomplete 
and uncertain account, the confessing witness 
gives certain and complete knowledge of Jesus 
Ohrist (of, 2 Corinthians 5&16). For such 
testimonies, and the gospels are in this cate­
gory, are not historical biographies but, in 
Martin Kahler's words, "proclamation of the 
Crucified One as Messiah".And, finally,
Jesus is unique in that he cannot be separated 
from his mission, from his being Emmanuel, God- 
with-us. OlVierefore, proclamation, not historical 
statement, is the only way of reporting about him.
Nevertheless, historical research is not 
without benefit to Christian faith. It conti­
nually reminds us of Jesus* humanity and thus, 
v/hen heeded— — and, unfortunately, there have 
been periods in ohuroh history when it was not—  
prevents a docetio christology. In focusing so 
sharply on Jesus* characteristics which are 
time-bound it also sets in relief what in the 
incarnation skips beyond the framework of time.
As quoted by Gollwitaer, jjgid., p. 92
And, by coming on its bllnd-aUeys because the 
texts do not permit a strictly biographical use, 
historical research shows us how clearly this 
subject matter does not fit into our previously 
devised categories.
What, then, does Gollwit%er say to the 
historian? "The historian cannot be forbidden 
to go behind the New Testament text and ask at 
one point or another * what exactly happened*; 
for this is the historian's trade,Indeed, 
he must be encouraged in this because of the 
historical nature of Christian faith, because 
there are oortarn constitutive events of history 
to whose reality faith is bound* But in 
pursuing his examination, the historian must 
be aware constantly of the limitations of this 
"dependence" as delineated above. He must 
remember that he cannot treat the Bible as a 
resource for biographical information, To do so 
would be to use it as something other than what 
it is and was intended to be. Further, his 
so-called "neutral" quest for the historical 
Jesus may be interesting as an abstract study, 
but its results will never replace the New Tes­
tament witness to these events. Objective facts 
do not bring faith; only the proclamation by 
faith evokes faith. And, finally, those aspects 
of the Christ-event which can be verified belong 
to the whole picture of Jesus. They must not be 
separated from the affirmation of his divine 
nature, Here God met us in human form. To 
separate these two aspects is to destroy the 
unity necessary for it to have any real memiing.
Although this sort of recognition of the
Ibid., P. 93.
value of historical criticism saves Gollwitzer* s 
theology from 'being a fundamentalist bi'blical 
literalism, it does not save it from the chor^ ge 
of being mildly docetio, Christian faith is 
not just "hound" to history, hut in a sense is 
actually "dependent" upon it. It is not depen­
dent on history for the full content of faith, 
hut for the constitutive events which make faith 
possible. If historical research should show, 
for instance, that there never was a Jesus of 
Naaareth who was put to death for his teaching 
gmd was later seen to have survived death, then 
Christian faith would be based on a mare parable 
which was incapable of effecting the fulfilment 
of the promise attributed to it. Thus, the 
dependence upon verification by historical 
research is profound, Gollwit%er has paid lip- 
service to this and has let it become overshadowed 
by talk of the limitations of historical criti­
cism. But to proclaim consistently the paradox™ 
dialectical witness he derives from the New 
Testament he must play up faith's dependence 
upon this research, not play it down, Otherwise 
he soon becomes guilty of a mild docetism, which 
admittedly has been the "ox*thodox" church position 
since not long after the Oouncil of Ghaloedon.
The Problem of Preaching Today
From the outset it must be realised that, although 
Helmut GollwitKer points to severe problems confronting 
the preacher today, he does not abandon proclamation 
completely.
Naturally, I do not mean that 
the task of proclamation, thus the
taste of leljsrgasga and 
■ nas* nâa” lus "aay. "‘Xu %'emàins" ' ull^ . he
comes", and with it also remains the 
fact that faith comes from hearing 
(Romans 10) and should he made audible 
for another,
H© does not allow his experience of the present situation 
to determine what he preaches, rather he sees a change in 
the method or form involving a change in the whole nature 
of public worship and congregation,al gatherings. Before 
we examine that# however, we must note his analysis of 
the problem.
Various things present themselves to different 
theologians today as making preaching problematical. The 
so-called "crisis of faith" raised partly by modem tech­
nology and partly by modern theology is perhaps the most 
commonly indicated* A close second would probably be 
the "hermeneutic problem", this historical, metaphysical 
and apistemological distance of the text from "us today". 
Smaller factors, often alluded to, are denominationalism 
and institutionalism in the church. But these, disturbing 
and discouraging as they are, are not the factors which 
make preaching problematical for OollwitBer, "All this 
weighs heavy and makes preaching difficult (perhaps in a 
most necessary and salutary way:), but it must not place 
it as such in q u e s t i o n , Thus, he points to two very
33 Zuspruoh Xjtid Ansprugh. Neue Folge, p. 234.
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different things.
"1, The preacher stands facing a silent listening 
congregation to which is given no possibility for questions, 
objections, improvements and completions."'^ In the past, 
such an authoritarian approach to the sermon was seen as 
an illustration of the authority of God's Word over man.
But to affirm that is to move into ideology. It is true 
— — and it must be always the preacher's prayer— , God's 
Word can use the words of the sermon in reaching out to 
other persons. It is also true, God does condescend to 
do just that, Nevertheless, the sermon is in no way 
identical with God's Word. Nor can the preacher claim to 
have any monopoly of or control over God's Word,
In addition to this, as the general level of education 
and literacy rises— — or in a student context -— -"the real 
appropriation of what is heard is only possible in active 
participation in meditation on the content".In the 
past, the action of hearing— and true hearing is active, 
not passive— *-was perhaps sufficient, However, even then 
the aim of preaching was not to gain the hearers* assent 
to the preacher's witness of faith, but to evoke a similar 
response of faith to the Promisor behind the promise. In 
general, though, an authoritarian approach is certainly 
no longer possible, The increased awareness of most congre™
IM d .  . p. 235.
E ? M . . p. 235.
gâtions today demands a learning situation in which all 
share as equals. After all# faith is not the product of 
speoialised theological training. It is perhaps not 
enough even to give time for discussion before or after 
the service-— «-a practice which is becoming more and more 
common. This leaves the unbalanced situation of privi­
leged pulpit and captive congrega/cion unchanged. It is 
still the ideas of the "expert" which are being discussed, 
as if he had a monopoly on revelation.
This privilege becomes most injm?ious when one takes 
the office seriously. Me ha.ve already said preaching 
must be practical, even politicals But the preacher's 
social position means that he does not experience first­
hand the questions an.d conflicts of his congregation, 
Despite the present trend among both Protestant and 
Catholic clergy to shed the clerical garb in an attempt 
to be simply one of God's people, nevertheless, in the 
eyes of his congregation he is still "different", "Thus, 
to translate the instruction of the gospel into concrete 
life he needs the advioe of others through their expertise 
and experience just as much as they need his theological 
expertise,To affirm an authoritarian view of preaching 
is to deny the need for this counsel. Thus, the "preaching 
office" must remain subservient to the coimunity's mission 
of proclamation. And this view is confirmed by modem
.îMà., p. 236.
research into the relationship of office and community in
the apostolio and post-apostolic ohuroh#
With his theological training, the 
pastor is an assisting advisor of the 
congregation, Neither must he he the 
sole preacher, nor muet proclamation 
in public worship in the future occur 
only in the form of privileged mono- 
logue by the pastor. 38
2# Secondly, and following closely from this latter 
aspect of the first problem, Gollwitzer recognises the 
difficulties raised in the modern situation by hie demand 
for concreteness in preaching# "Because of the task of 
textual interpretation, because of the shortness of time, 
because of its insertion into the sacral structure of 
public worship, oonoreteness in the sermon is possible 
alvmys merely in indications,His sense of fairness 
prevents the preacher from making an example of his own 
practical intentions. Thus the indications are reduced 
to a bare minimum having either no effect, or else unde­
sirable results: "many ignore them or at any rate do not
notice the demand intervening in them, others are annoyed 
because they see only the difference of opinion and, there- 
fore, in good faith, blame the preacher for a misuse of 
the pulpit,
Undoubtedly, if what Gollwitsor says is correct,
3^ m m ., p. 237. 
3^ m m . , p. 237. 
m m . ,  p. 237.
the moBopolistio sermon and the worship service centred
around the sermon are outmoded. Many, therefore# have
moved towards a more liturgical, ouitic service in which
the serraon has reduced importance. Gollwitser adamantly
rejects this proposed solution, saying that in "the
alternative between sermon™centred public worship and
GUltic celebration" the evangelical theologian must decide
A1in favour of the former, '
This does not mean we must abandon regular congre­
gational meetings for worship altogether. Rather, a new 
balance must be sought. "We need congregational assemblies 
(and what, then, are public worship services, if determined 
by the New Testament and not by a general concept of the 
sacred, other then assemblies of the congregation as 
Christians to equip them for their life and service in the 
world?) in which information and discussion have their 
place as well as biblical interpretation, prayer, hymns
litO
of praise, prophetic address and the eucharist," " This 
means being open for a complete revolution and re&rgani- 
aation of congregational life. The Sunday service centred 
around the sermon or the cult will no longer be central, 
but just one among many other forms of assembly. The 
congregational office of witness and proclamation will be 
central. No longer will there be a distinction between
IkM.. p. 235. Cf. also» ... laid loMeo Gotl, p. 8.
m m . ,  p. 238.
"sacred" and "profane" congregational meetings or offices. 
In other words, the public life of the congregation as it 
constitutes itself in assemblies must be a reflection of 
the totality of life. Only within this framework# and 
not as the only occasion for gathering, will "preaching", 
in the narrower sense of the textual interpretation and 
application effected by a person with specialised theolo­
gical training, have any valid place. Only there oan it 
function legitimately as "exhortation and demand",
GOXiLWITZER'S PMGK IN MODERN THEOLOGY
Intro due tion \
Ab I said when introducing the plan of this thesis, 
an assessment of a theologian who is still alive and 
active is a very difficult affair# This is borne out by 
the great diversity of comment made by the various critics 
of Helmut Gollwitger's work, Any criticism made faces 
the prospect of being nullified by his next book. On 
the surface it might seem that this difficulty would be 
compounded by the researcher's ovm basic agreement with 
Gollwitzer's a^ pproach. Nevertheless, an accurate 
assessment is possible and must be attempted#
Aoouraoy in criticism involves drawing attention to 
the key issues and coBimentlng on their strengths and weak­
nesses, giving reasons for the evaluation# These might 
be arranged with the weaknesses in one section and the 
strengths in another. However, that would be confusing 
in this instance# For the very issues which give Goll- 
wit%er*s approach its strength also raise the most serious 
and basic questions. Therefore, I shall malœ my evaluation 
topically, beginning at the most crucial level and moving 
to the more peripheral. These remarks will then lead to 
some suggested hints as to the way forward for Christian 
theology.
The Why
Two major questions were raised in the oourse of the 
earlier ohaptera and we must return to them now. For by 
them Gollwitîser*a whole approach stands or falls. The 
first has to do with the validity of one of his constitu­
tive tautologies, the second with the real possibility of 
pursuing this method,
Gollwitaer has given us a theology which claims to 
be centred around the Bible, To these texts it must go 
for the message it is to translate and repeat for modern 
man. By the standard of the proclamation recorded in 
these texts it must judge all subsequent proclamation, 
including its own. And in the light of the witness of 
these texts it must comment on the affairs of men. Laying 
aside for a subsequent section of this chapter the question 
of method-—“ Whether we actually can follow the method of 
biblical exegesis required of theology by Gollwitser— — , 
we are faced still with the even more fundamental 
questions why must Christian theology be tied so closely 
to these texts interpreted in Gollwit%er*s way? Or, 
phrased differently, why must Christian theology use this 
method of beginning with the Bible and then moving to man 
in his present situation? Other people, similarly 
claiming to be doing Christian theology, have reversed 
this methodology. Why are these other methods inappropriate?
My earlier suggested solution— this is a constitutive 
tautology for theology as practised by Gollwitaer— is not
a satisfactory answer. It was necessary, at that point 
in the thesis, so that we could pursue the examination of 
his thought without being delayed by what will prove to 
be a long discussion, too long to be placed in a footnote 
or an excursus. Nevertheless, it avoided, the real thrust 
of the question. After all# those other theologians also 
claim that their methodologies do justice to the biblical 
witness. To ensv/er that they are not doing Christian 
theology despite their claims, although logical from 
Gollwitzer's point of view, is simply another evasion of 
the issue and a retreat into dograatic circularity. In 
fact, Gollwitser never offers such a siraplistio answer. 
Yet, it does seem, at times, to be implied.
The real question, which demands an answer, is not 
whether Christian theology needs the biblical witness,^ " 
but the priority and nature of its relationship to Scrip­
ture, And the only answer which is not an evasion is one 
of demonstration, that is, of showing the u3,timate con­
sequences of alternative theological methodologies 
developed on the basis of other possible relationships,
1 Altizer and Hamilton seem to deny, in their most ra.dical 
moments, any need for either a Christian tradition 
or the biblical proolamation. Nevertheless, the one 
thing that saves them from becoming out-and-out 
atheists is their retention of elements from those 
texts, e.g. the person of Jesus (Hamilton) or the 
Incarnation (Altiaer). Similarly, though perhaps 
tmconaoiously, they retain elements from theological 
tradition. Of, Langdon Gilkey's remarks noted ins 
Thomas J.J, Altiser and William Hamilton, Radical 
TliepXo^ gyi_^ d„1Jie.jD©a:^  (IndianapolisTl93^),
p. 2 7, n. 5.
of showing that ultimately they do not acooiaplish# in 
their own terms, what they intend.
This demonstration I shall execute using three 
alternative positions representative of three major 
streams in modem theology.All three claim that the 
type of absolute theism which Gollwitzer sees as essential 
to the Bible# and the methodology implicit therein, are 
neither possible for man today nor necessary in theology. 
Further, as proof of this underlying disagreement, all 
three develop their positions by beginning, ostensibly# 
elsewhere than in the Bible. I shall demonstrate, either 
that they have made a prior theistic assumption not unlike 
Gollwitaer's and that it is necessary for their repre­
sentation of the biblical witness on their own terms, or 
that they have made a prior theistic assumption which is 
no more acceptable to modem man than Gollwitzer's.
%^,_ 0hri8tian Atheism. "Death of God theology" is 
not an unified school of thought. The names frequently 
associated with it rang© from Gabriel ?ahanian with his 
"new iconoclasm" , through Pau3. M, van Buren with a revival 
of the verification principle, to Thomas J.J. Altizer 
and William Hamilton who present a near-atheism, Yahanian, 
in fact, does not belong in the category, as he is speaking
9
" I have divided modem theology into these four streams 
“— the one Gollwitser represents plus the three
alternatives to be discussed here on the basis
of William Hamilton's suggestion in; Radical 
Thoolmgy and the Death of, God, pp. 4-5,
of the death of idole, thus clearing the decks for an 
affirmation of the true and only God. In this he differs 
only verbally with Gollwitzer. Van Buren, likewise, can 
be eliminated from our discussion because his real purpose 
is simply to translate the traditional message into the 
secular terms of logical positivism, without questioning 
deeply what he is translating* The alternative of 
"radical theology", then, is represented by Hamilton and 
Altizer.
In their "radical theology", which for the sake of 
simplicity I am calling 'Christian atheism*, we meet what 
seems to be the greatest break with past theology and with 
the Bible* And that is precisely their intention, "The 
death of God group from that",*' i.e.,
the noo-orthodox or biblical "-theology tradition* That is 
not to say, however, that they abandon either completely 
— even though that seems on the surface to be their 
claiBi, Although their vnritings are intended as attempts 
at starting afresh in theology, they still profess to be 
making a contribution to Christian understanding, that is, 
they are claiming to witness truthfully to what happened
 ^I recognize tha,t there are striking differences between 
their two approaches, and some of these will be 
noted as the ©.rgument proceeds. Nevertheless, the 
similarities are substantial enough to group them 
together here, Also, the fact that they joined 
forces to collect some of their essays into one 
common volume would indicate a mutual recognition 
that any differences between them are not basic,
h
 ^RMioaLlMolo&T__and th.Q Pes:bh_,Q;L.GaA, p. 2? (my italics)
in and because of the life of Jesus Christ* "The death of 
God theologians claim to he theologians# to be Christians# 
to be speaking out of a community to a community."-^  Thus# 
there will have to be some implicit connection, however 
tenuous# v/ith Christianity of the past* Otherwise the 
claim to be Christians becomes meaningless.
The prime reason# they argue# for having to make this 
new stsrt in theology is the event of the "death of God". 
This is not simply a theological expression of man's 
inability to experience God directly any more (Solle). 
Rather# it means God no longer exists. He no longer makes 
himself Imovm to man in ,any way* The the 1st presupposition 
is no longer possible for man and# thus# for theology# 
because the God who once had dealings with men simply does 
not exist now. This fact must be reflected in theology 
and must be reflected upon by theology* It must explain 
what it means to be a "radical Christian"# a Christian 
after the "death of God",
Central to Hamilton's attempt at working this out is 
the person of Jesus, He is not an object of faith, it is 
argued# but our "standpoint". We are to see the world 
through his eyes and to see him in the world. In his life 
he sought out the outcasts, the sick, the maimed, the 
unvfanted and unloved, to be with them. Now he sends us 
to be neighbours to them. Thus# faith ie no longer the
3 rMJ,. , p. 28.
way of îmov/ing God. It "is more like a place, a being 
with or standing beside the neighbour.Our relationship 
to Jesus ought to be one not of faith, but of obedience. 
And we are to find and serve him in the world,
Altizer, on the other hand, turns to eastern mysti­
cism, especially the "coincidence of opposites", to rein­
terpret the Incarnation, In this he is concerned, in 
view of the "death of God", to find a way of regaining 
a sense of the "sacred" in the midst of the "profane" 
present. Taking a cue from Nietzsche, he argues that to 
seek the "centre" of life outside the present in some 
special place or time, either past or future, in fact, 
negates life. And modern man cannot do that. We find, 
on the other hand, that by affirming life it gains meaning 
and significance. The "centre", then, is actually every­
where and "eternity" is in every Now, In the moment we 
say this Yes to life, the "coincidence of opposites"— ^ 
sacred and profane— takes place in such a way that the 
profane is transformed without being annulled. This idea, 
Altizer claims, is inherent in the Incarnation, Thus, 
even in the face of the event of the "death of God", we 
can confess Christ's presence in the Now, and begin, then, 
to love the world as his body. We need cling no longer 
to past forms of Christ's incarnation, "The Word appears 
in our history in such a way as to negate its previous
 ^IfeM., p. 36.
expressions.”*^ Me now îmow that the Word ever again 
■becomes flesh in pur present# in pjiu? time# in pur 
existence.
These two attempts at Christian atheism# appealing as 
they may be, raise serious questions. Hamilton must be 
asked how it is that Jesus can demand this obedience of 
us. A person who has studied extensively in a field might 
legitimately demand some respect for his opinions# but not 
unconditional obedience. Similarly» one whose experience 
was extensive might demand consideration for his counsel» 
but# again# not unconditional obedience. But Jesus of 
Nazareth was neither one of great learning nor one of wide 
experience. The most one might say is that he was a man 
of great insight. Yet, even admitting this » we could only 
give him conditional obedience. Jesus# then, is not the 
sign of hope and optimism that Hamilton makes him out to 
be.
Nevertheless# fully recognizing this objection, 
Hamilton maintains his allegiance to Jesus, "Jesus is 
the one to whom I repair# the one before whom I stand# the 
one whose way with others is also to be my way ~t;)qcause 
t h m m , in his words# his life# his way 
with others# his death# ïha&%_aoL_n(^^ I
am drawn, and I have given my a l l e g i a n c e , It now seems
^ ' ■ S I . M l
 ^ , P« 137.
8 Hamilton# "The Shape of Radical Theology"# in a Christian 
Century. October 6# I965# p. 1221 (my italics).
that the answer to the problem lies in this unusual item 
in Jesus* life. Since unconditional loyalty can ‘be given 
to an historical figure only if something unconditional is 
disclosed in that figure# we must deduce that, for Hamilton# 
the "something that I do not find elsewhere" of Jesus* 
life is# in fact, the disclosure of something ^conditional. 
Or, to put that in other words, the vmy of stem ding beside 
our neighbour to which Jesus points us, as recorded in the 
New Testament, demands our unconditional obedience because 
it is the will of "unconditional being", That, however, 
requires the saîïie sort of theistic assumption ass In 
Jesus is fulfilled God*s promised "I will be there". In 
fact, it seems difficult to conceive of the difference as 
anything but verbal. Thus, if the one is impossible for 
man today, the other must likewise be impossible,
Altizer's argument is not dispatched so quickly, In 
dealing with trcjnscendenoe he uses a model derived from 
eastern mysticism. Transcendence, then, means that which 
is quiescent, motionless and remote from the processes of 
life. In mysticism, the aim is to negate the world snd 
3.ose oneself in the transcendent whole, Altizer# however, 
inverts this. We must, he argues, affirm the world and 
negate only the past. In this way we will find transcen­
dence in the Now. The symbol of transcendence inhering 
into time is the Incarnation of the Word,
But it is difficult to see how transcendence, as he 
conceives of it, can inhere in time and space and still 
remain transcendence. For in doing so it has ceased to
be quiesoent; motionless and remote. His desire to say 
that through the Word becoming flesh in Jesus Christ we 
have transcendence present in every Now seems to be, in 
fact# not unlike saying that in Jesus Christ God has ful­
filled his promised "I will be there". Once again, the 
differences are verbal rather than substantial# and the 
one is neither more nor less acceptable for modern man 
than the other.
In both of the raajor developments of Christian 
atheism, then# the conclusions presented can only be 
reached by assuming something substantially similar to 
wha.t Helmut Gollwitzer would claim is the biblical witness. 
The demand for an ethical involvement in the world 
(Hamilton) is certainly salutary. And it must be noted 
that Gollviritzer also makes this demgmd. However# the only 
way the demand oan be universally and unconditionally 
valid is if Jesus is not just a man, but also the loous
of God's seIf-fulfilment of his promise.
Similarly# the call for a sense of transcendental 
presence without a negation of the present (Altizer) is 
very appealing. Yet# it can only be said to occur if 
transcendence is experienced, instead# as a "being" who 
is not remote but related# not quiescent but active in 
history. That# according to Gollwitzer# is also the 
biblical witness. To bind oneself to this witness in a 
primary way# then# is to ensure that one does not abandon
these elements which must be present for Christian atheism
to accomplish what it purposes.
IÏ4--SteytjâæJîmmâîàSâSS. 3;h.ls modem movement of
theology is even more diverse than the former. It derives# 
in the main, from Rudolf Bultmann# and from Martin Heidegger 
as interpreted by Bultmann # but develops this l:me of 
thought beyond them in varying degrees. Within the scope 
of this thesis it is impossible to go into all these 
differences. Nor is it necessary. The demonstration can 
be made on the basis of what presents itself as their 
consensus of opinion. The weaimess of their approach# it 
seems to me# lies inherently in the areas of common ground.
The great differences between the world-views of 
biblical man and of modern man are recognised. On this 
basis it is recognized also that Christian theology today, 
whether or not it once could# cannot simply repeat the 
biblical message in the same form. Nevertheless# they 
are convinced that the Bible has something very important 
to say. Thus they seek to find a way of interpreting this 
to modern man— “ hence the name 'hermeneutics*.
The modern clues# then# that make such a reconstruc­
tion possible come in the concepts of "event", "encounter" 
and "oomitment". We cannot know God, they argue# apart 
from our experience of his encountering us. Any talk of 
God apart from this experience of encounter is meaningless 
and must be traiaslated into talk about our response and 
relationship to him. The mode of this relationship is 
"existential «commitment". The Christian is convinced so
deeply that God has encountered mankind in the event of 
Jesus Christ's life, death and resurrection that he risks
his whole existence in the world on God's behalf»
In this re“presentation of the gospel we are faced 
with the same problem that arose from Hamilton's work.
If we wholly define God's existence in terms of our 
experience of his action, that is, if we actually intend 
that God does not exist apart from our experience of his 
encounter with us, then "existential commitment" to God 
really means commitment to self and ones own experience.
In that case there would be no justification for demanding 
the type of self-sacrificing existence in the world which, 
they claim, is part of the New Testament ethic.
On the other hand, however, perhaps they are not 
intending to deny God's aseity. It may well be that they 
are saying simply that we can apprehend God only in our 
experience of his action in encountering us. This, then, 
is Bii epistemological statement which, in itself, says 
nothing of God's existence, except that he acts in a way 
which we can understand. Now, this latter representation 
of their argument is nothing other than an ostrich-like 
evasion of the problem. Modern man cannot speak in theistic 
terms, they think, therefore it is better to translate 
them into existential ones which are within his ken. But 
to speak of "encounter" and "commitment" necessarily in­
volves the existence, either real or assumed, of some other 
being who/which encounters me and to whom/which I am 
committed.
In short, then, this interpret sit ion needs the very 
theistic basis its proponents are so eager to do without.
It is implied precisely in the way they have chosen to
speak of man's apprehension of God* If it is true that 
modern man can no longer think theistically# then it is 
equally true that he will have to reject Christian herme­
neutics* If# on the other hand, the possibility of 
theistic language still exists* then Christian hermeneutics 
must be rejected as dishonest, although well-meaning.
This movement, in conclusion, represents a healthy 
awareness of how we can aTOrehend God, But in speaking 
of man's relation to God it has had to assume a form of 
absolute theism which Gollwitzer would claim is safeguarded 
by adherence to the biblical witness. And, to be honest, 
these writers ought to achftit this and face the problem of 
speaking of God's existence beyond our experience of his 
action*^ This, too, according to Gollwitzer, is demanded 
by Scripture. To bind ones theology to these texts, then, 
ensures that one does not ignore this element, Gollwitser's 
proposed methodology provides a safeguard against the 
weakness of Christian hermeneutics,
'fbe third alternative 
movement in recent theology which I wish to discuss 
briefly is represented most clearly by the "process theology' 
of Norman Pittenger, Also v;ithia this movement are John
 ^That this is beyond our understanding is admitted. let, 
that is not a serious objection* The possibility of 
holding beliefs beyond our understanding is argued 
cogently and convincingly by Murdith McLean, "On 
Believing that which is Beyond our Understanding",
(Toronto), vol. 1* N°, 3, Winter 1971* pp. 213ff*
B. Gobbsf Jr., Daniel D, Williams# Charles Hartshorn© and 
Schubert Ogden, It represents an attempt consistently to 
do justice to both the transcendence and the imrftanence of 
GodI using as a model Alfred North Whitehead's "new meta­
physics" (process philosophy), Thus# it is tackling the 
very root question of talk of God, "To find a way of 
asserting simultaneously the absolute difference of God 
from everything else @ and his relation to everything else, 
without diminution of the difference, is without any doubt
1 n
the key problem for theological thought,"
Christian panentheism begins by studying the world 
as it exists. Although there is much in its thought that 
is theoretical and speculative, its doctrine of God is 
developed primarily on the basis of his activity in the 
world. "In prooess-thinking the meaning of the concept 
of God is not derived from abstract theory but from obser- 
vation of the world and its concrete actuality," " From 
this observation we leam that the world is not static 
but dynamic. Consistent with post-Ein a te inian physios, 
the world as a whole is seen as being 5,n process and as 
a process. At the same time# we are also learning from 
our observation that the world and everything in it are
*1 n
Ronald Gregor Smith, The Doctrine of God, K, Gregor Smith 
and A.D. Galloway, ads. (London# 1970), p. 89.
Morman Pittenger, PEogaâaJaîmashiJâaâ.ü»^^
(Welviyn., I968), p. 39.
interrel8,tecl. Hence# there can be no possibility of iso­
lation, If there were a supreme being, then, he could 
not be "perfect" as taught by absolutistio theism, i.e., 
unchangeable, impassible, self-sufficient. A supreme 
being, should one exist, must be affected, rather, by 
what happens in the wo rid “ “ supremely affected.
If we now turn to the Bible, we note a remarkable 
correspondence between these deductions of process philo­
sophy, made by abserving the world, and the idea of a 
"living God". Pittenger points to th e  giving of the 
divine name to Moses, as recorded in Exodus 3§ 13-14.
Usually rendered "I Am Who I Am", this obscure piece of 
Hebrew might equally well be translated "I Will Be Who X 
Will Be". Thus, for process theology, God's being will 
change as he is affected by the process of which he is 
the sum of the parts and more.
This view of God is "panentheistic", as distinct from
"theistic" or "pantheistic". In pantheism God is com­
pletely identified with the cosmos. In traditional, 
absolutistic theism, according to Harts home, God is 
completely independent of the cosmos, affecting it but 
unaffected by it. Panentheism, on the other hand, repre­
sents God as being both all-inclusive and at the same time
something independent, "Panentheism is to be distinguished
I M A . , pp. 1 1 -2 4 .
“3 Charles Hartshorne, < PP. 88-90.
My summary of Christian panentheism has relied more 
heavily on Pittenger than on Hartshorne. Whereas 
the approach of the former is primarily phenomeno­
logical, the latter*s is philosophical. Nevertheless, 
both are subject to the criticism presented in the 
ensuing paragraphs,
from pantheism* the view that God just is the oosmos# in 
that it insists that deity is personal* and has a real 
unity rather than being a mere collection of entities.
It agrees with traditional theism that the individual 
essence of deity, that without which God would not be God, 
is independent of the cosmos,” And it is to be dis­
tinguished from absolutistic theism in that God is 
affected by and immanent in the cosmos. Thus God has a 
"di-polar" nature* He is, at one and the same time, both 
abstract and concrete, eternal and temporal* infinite and 
finite* supremely absolute and supremely relative ("sur- 
relative" * Harts home ) *
There is great appeal in this restatement of theology. 
It tries to represent accurately the "living God" concept 
of the Bible. And because it is In accord with much 
modem thought— existentialism* post-Einsteinian science, 
modern philosophy of history, depth psychology (including 
the recent Transactional Analysis ) "— and with the erapiri- 
piricist temper of our times * it might, at first glance, 
satisfy modem man, However, on further examination this 
appeal is seen to be superficial,
In the first place* process theology does not accom­
plish its purpose. It intends to present a new metaphysics, 
free from the dualism of the old (God/cosmos, natural/super-
•j U
Hugo Meynell, "The Theology of Hartshorns", ins The
of, l'h?P.lQ.g:iSal.^ Mjt§3 (Oxford), vol. xxiv,
part 1, April 1973» P* 1^8.
natural* min d/mat ter, tran sc en den t/imman en t, etc.). But 
instead of solving the paradox® the process theologians 
simply push it back into God's own being, so that they 
speak of him as being "di-polar". Indeed® in some ways, 
Christian panentheism might be described as a sophisti­
cated form of Christian gnosticism. The crass dualism 
is softened into the idea of a di-polar God, and Instead 
of speaking of the cosmos as emanations from God, God 
becomes all-inclusive of the cosmos. Nevertheless, the 
similarities are very striking,
In the second place® process theology makes a theistie 
assumption not unlike Gollwitaer's, and certainly no more 
acceptable to modern man. Hartshome's analysis of the
*î
ways God and the cosmos could possibly be related —
God »= cosmos (pantheism)® God ^  cosmos (absolutistic 
theism), God —  both cosmos and something independent 
(panentheism) — —has omitted a fourth possibility® the 
one represented by Gollwitaer, viz., God ^  cosmos, but
3 4 In actual fact® they often seem to solve this paradox by 
dissolving the transcendent pole. Thus God ceases 
to be di-polar and becomes totally immanent, This® 
however, I take to be a result of their concern to 
right the supposed wrong of traditional theism by 
speaking of God's immanence, One would wish that 
more time would be given to speaking about how God 
is more than just the whole cosmos, about the dis­
tinction between panentheism and pantheism. For the 
sake of this critique, then, I have represented what 
they would claim is the advantage of process theology 
and have not been side-tracked by this weakness 
derived from the polemic against absolutietic theism.
16 Of, S* Paul Schilling, God in an âge of Atheism (Nashville, 
1 9 6 9), p. 202. " . .
is in ultimate relatednesa, creatively sustaining it and 
being affected by it, God's being is not the process nor 
the sum of its finite parts, but his activity is hindered 
and advanced by their deeds. Process theologians take as
17a, constitutive tautology the existence of a di-polar God, *
Go-Xlwitsser* B constitutive tautology is the existence of a,
transcendent/immanent God. The difference is only verbal,
Thus, by the same token, the one is neither more nor less
acceptable to madem man than the other. The skeptic who
has difficulty with the concept of a timeless Being who
intervenes in time will have equal difficulty with the
concept of "infinite temporality",
Christian panentheism, then, is not unlike Gollwitier’s
biblical theism. Indeed, Pittenger takes great pains to
explann that it truly reflects the witness of the Bible.
And in the aspect of God's relatedness to the world this
18is true. However, as I pointed out in a footnote, the 
process theologians have tended to make too little of the
17 In both the phenomenological and philo so phi o al branches 
of this movement such a theistie presupposition must 
be made. Pittenger, after observing the vmrld, pro­
claims that if a God exists he must be relative, in 
process, But jhat such a God in fact does exist is 
still a presumption. Hartshorns, on the other hand, 
tries to "prove" God's existence by reviving the 
ontological argument. However, like St, Anselm and 
Descartes before him, he achieves for those who 
already believe a valuable analysis of what they mean 
by God's necessary existence, but does not "prove" 
this for the skeptic. It remains a constitutive 
tautology.
18 a, p. 203, n, 15,
otherness of God, I have suggested that this tendency 
derives from their primary interest in correcting v/hat 
they see as a deficiency in traditional absolutistic theism 
and in divorcing Christian theology from Aristotelian meta­
physics. The endeavour is indeed laudable, But to pre­
vent it from becoming the sole interest they need to 
develop more fully their thinking about the other pole of 
God's being. Here the most effective safeguard v/ould be 
the close adherance to the Bible suggested by Gollwit%er,
In short, then, all three alternatives-— — Christian 
atheism, Christian hermeneutics and Christian panentheism 
-— require a theistie presupposition not unlike that made 
by Gollwitaer; all three present positions no more accep­
table to modem mans and all three have inherent vm aim es ses 
which could be avoided by a closer connection ?/ith the 
Bible as a safeguard. Admittedly, this has not proved 
Gollwitser's constitutive tautology, but it has verified 
it, that is, it has demonstrated its value and validity in 
comparison with alternative approaches.
Perhaps, though, one more thing needs to be noted 
before proceeding. The claim to be doing Christian theo­
logy is a claim to be part of a tradition. The first 
Christians referred directly to their personal experiences 
of the life, teaching, death and resurrection of Jesus whom 
they called the Christ, They v/rote letters to other parts 
of the Christian community when unable to go in person.
And, as the direct, personal experience receded further 
into the past, the community began to gather together in
written form the recollections of the witnesses. From the 
great quantity of material so produced the community 
selected a relatively few which they recognised as most 
clearly and accurately defining the experience they vmre 
'witneSBing to. By A.D. 200® this process of canonisation 
was virtually completeend subsequent generations of 
the community were to judge their proclamation by the 
criterion of this canon* That* then, is the tradition 
to vfhioh the Christian theologian belongs. To reject this 
criterion is t;o divorce oneself from this tradition* 
Clearly* Gollwitser has attempted to remain a part of 
that-tradition. Whether or not the same could be said of 
the alternatives we examined above is irrelevant to this 
thesis. It is enough. to note that by his method of giving 
priority to the biblical proclamation as the safeguard of 
modern proclamation * GollwitBcr ensures that his theology 
is Christianj i,e,® within the Christian tradition.
The How
We turn now to the second question raised earlier in 
the thesisÎ is it possible to follow the method Helmut 
Gollwit%er has proposed? Is it possible to go first to 
the Bible and let its witness determine the direction of 
our theology? And with this question we encounter the
ïâââi G.H. no da, me_Authj)xity._af_jbhe,M M a . Second
Torehbook Edition (New Yoa?k, 1962), pp. 186-187.
most serious problem in his approaoh. It has been dealt
o 0
with partially in the exeureus on the "theological oircle".'" 
But a further difficulty must he acknowledged here,
A person is a:ffectecl to a greater or lesser degree 
by all the previous events in his experience and his 
cultural heritage. Objectivity, in any absolute sense, is 
impossible. Me have silready noted that the biblical texts 
must be assessed in, actu, i.e., as a participant in the 
community of faith. But beyond this, a person also brings 
his cultural and experiential, bias. In other words, avi 
attempt at theology cannot be made in a vacuum, Thus, 
theology in the Tliited States takes a, very different 
character from German theo3.ogy, gmd recently "black theo­
logy" and latin American "theology of liberation" have 
developed each with now outlooks. Similarly, each gene­
ration brings its own problems and means of expression, 
thereby producing its ovm characteristic theology. Every 
person, then, approaches these texts out of the context 
of his national and cultural tradition and of his gene­
ration.
At the saaae time, each person brings with him his own 
set of probleias and questions. Undoubtedly these are 
partly conditioned by his heritage and his generation.
!8ut they will include also factors determined by personal 
experience, For example, in an over-simplified way, a
pp. 35“^W.
person who was made to feel inadequate and unwanted by 
demanding and domineering parents may well bring to his 
reading of the Bible a personal identity problem. In short® 
then, every person will be seeking, albeit unoonsciously, 
miswers to his personal and cultural questions, and 
solutions to these problems* And every attempt allowing 
the Messenger behind this message to put the reader in 
question will be clouded by these conscious and unconscious 
problems and questions.
It is not irrelevant to mention here that theology 
is undertaken by people who are also sinners. It matters 
not whether one adopts the extreme position of the total 
depravity of man or some more moderate position, one still 
admits that man's insight and understanding, response and 
action are affected adversely. If we take seriously the 
biblical view of the universality of sin, then we must 
admit that any hmian attempt to discover the "kernel" of 
the New Testament will be tainted by this sinful state 
and any apperception of the Messenger behind and within 
the message will be clouded by this rebellious fog.
On the surface, then, theology, as Gollwitzer has 
defined it, seems to be impossible, or at least to be 
executed always imperfectly. Not only is the success of 
our theological undertaking always a matter of grace,
91
Of, With Wilhelm Weischedel, Denken und Glauben, Bin
Streitgesprach, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart, I965), p. 39 
also p. iSE kO.
but a3-so the very attempt at theology seems to fall within 
the sphere of grace. Reduced to its simplest terms, then, 
only he can attempt theology— *-to say nothing of suc­
ceeding in the endeavour-— to whom God has given eyes 
to see, ears to hear, and a heart to understand (of. Mark 
4s10-12 g Isaiah 6s9“10). Gollwitser warns at one point 
that this does not justify the deduction of a theory of 
predestination, Rather, it is simply a description of the 
facts. "Jesus describes here nothing other than the 
llptu^ i separation which is accomplished by the veiled 
coming of the kingdom. The one perceives the mystery in 
the veiling, the other sees the veiling itself and—— in 
reality sees nothing-— his 'hearing* does not become
09
'understanding'." In other vmrds, God gives not only 
the message which forms the primary subject matter of 
theology, but also the faculties for hearing it rightly and 
thus for under8 tan ding theology correctly.
In reality, therefore, the answer to the question of 
how theology is possible within the limits Gollwitser im­
poses can be put simp.ly? by God's grace. Apart from 
that it is impossible. But, given God's grace, it may be 
undertaken and can attain success. "For men ... it is 
impossible, but not for Gods because everything is pos­
sible for God." (St. Mark 10s2?)
This may not sound encouraging to the person who
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pp. 88-89*
wants to undertake to do theology. Undoubtedly he will be 
attracted more to a methodology which olaims to begin at 
the human side and to work towards the divine. It can be 
demonstrated, however, that this opposite extreme position 
in fact offers no greater promise. The claim to ha.ve 
begun with wlmt man is able to understand and to have had 
no recourse whatever to what might be classified as 
revelation is, in the western world at any rate, an empty 
one. For, despite all its shortcomings and its far- 
reaching syncretism, we stem culture has been permeated 
by Christian teaohing and precept. Unconsciously we take 
various aspects of this for granted, And it is very likely 
that this unconscious cultural background will determine 
our approach to the problem of what man can or cannot 
understand. This is not to mention, of course, a general 
Christian belief that in no age or nation has God left 
himself without a witness, that is, a memis of revealing 
himself and preparing people to find him.
At the same time, even if one were able to discard 
all previous Christian influence and proceed "objectively", 
the result would not be theology but a phenomenology of 
human understanding. And to claim at the end of it all 
that this delineation of human aspirations and abilities 
is a better form of theology is to take a giant step into 
the humanist-athe1st camp. For, if God supplies nothing 
but the answers to human aspirations and exists in no way
beyond human ability to understand existence, then the 
criticisms of such as Feuerbach become valid and fatal
for Christian belief. On the other hand, if there is more, 
if Ctod provides more than satisfaction of human aspirations, 
if God's existence transcends human ability to understand, 
then the theologian cannot rely solely on a study of what 
man is able to understand. At some point he must allow 
God to speak and present himself in his difference.
But how is this possible? Only on the basis of the 
grace of God, Apart from that it la impossible. But 
given God's grace it may be undertaken and can attain suc­
cess*
For neither methodology, however, has the question 
been answered. It has been simply pushed back another 
degree. We must still ask how, by grace, it is possible 
for God to reveal himself to man and for man to encounter 
God, We must define a little more closely this grace which 
overcomes the distortions imposed upon the message by man's 
nature— either because he is too human or not human 
enough.
Gollwitzer, without specifically mentioning the term, 
has it in mind when he says that "human ways of speaking
can correspond" to God,^ -^  God, in his condescension,
allows himself to be known by man. And man, although sin 
has defaced the lmagCL_d(ei in him, retains a faculty for 
receiving this gift, this grace. One would wish, however, 
that Gollwitser would explain more explicitly where the
ghe Existence pf_^od_a@_ C_g n f , James W.
Le itch, tms. (London, 1965), p. 151 (my italics).
limits of this correspondence lie and elaborate more
clearly the distinction he notes between
and analggiia relatioi^ This might prove a profitable
step forward in theology and serve to heal the breach 
between the two extremes of methodology frequent3„y 
referred to in this thesis, We must return to this,
briefly, in the next section of the present chapter. For
the moment, however, we must concentrate on the notion of
grace,
Grace is an important concept for theology presented 
m  this way. The stronger the emphasis on the otherness 
of God, on the distinction between God and man, the greater 
the need for a bridge across the gap. Nor should this be 
regarded as a purely subjective, human need. More perti­
nently, to reveal himself to man whose being is so totally 
different, to establish contact with and encounter man in 
such a way that man vmuld recogoieie with whom he has to 
do, to be able to condescend to confront man in history,
God must have a point of contact with man, a bridge across 
the gap. For Gollwitser, this bridge is called grace,
"It is a sign of grace that we can predicate the words 
•being’ and ’existence* both of God and of the creation, 
without detriment to their tpJi^Ute^gLlrker in the two 
references."
m a . , p. 185. 
m â .  , pp. 210-211
Again, one would wish for more clarity here, (loll- 
wither uses the t ocable 'grace* as if its meaning were 
generally understood and agreed upon* But since that is 
not the cEise, there is a danger that the vocable * grace * 
is being used as a talisman to solve difficult problems 
and, at the same time, evade the real issues. Neverthe­
less, a consistency of use of this vocable can be inferred 
from Gollwitser*s writings, even though it is never art!-
9/v
Gulated."'
Primarily, grace is the relationship between man and 
God established by God's encountering man and man's response 
of faith. "What the Christian says of God is soad on the 
basis of concrete confrontation with him within history as 
a result of his address and action within history, to which 
he has to testify."  ^ This gives no special now eyes to 
the believer, to make him different from the non-believer. 
Rather, it establishes the point of contact, thereby 
giving propriety to our inappropriate concepts and words. 
Without this re-established relationship (réconciliation) 
our attempts to speak of God in even the most limited and
?6"" I say this despite one place where he seems to deviate s 
"Christian talk of God can remain true to ... its 
origin and object only in having the ,Q0U3?ag:e 
appropriate to its comiaiaaion" (Ehe Bxisten.og_.a,t 
SM™â§_£aaÊesasâ~MJ!âtËii, p. 200, my Italics). 
Gollwit%er here seems to identify "courage" and 
"grace". For at other places, speaking appropriately 
of God was seen to be possible only on the basis of 
grace. However, courage is but a fruit of grace, 
as is appropriate talk of God.
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The Existence of God as^J^onfessed by Faith, p. 199,
narrow way would resemble an entomologist, essaying to 
speaîr. definitively of insects, never halving seen one.
One will notice at onoe the great similarity here with 
one of the basic truths of a "subjective" methodology, one 
which proceeds from the human to the divine. Our îmow- 
ledge of God is limited to a knowledge of hoi? he pre­
sents himself to us in. this personal encounter. "It is 
not the essence of God that is comprehended by |h.ui,Tian v/ords^  
merLarmisâmm» his action in history among us and 
upon us 9 and this they can denote precisely because it is 
action in history and, as such, action that is directed 
towards us and takes us up ha to communion with him.
But the difference — and, to ray mind, the great strength 
of the so-called "objective" approach which Gollwitser 
pr0pounds— lies in the next step.
The "subjective" approach is content to make its 
proclamation of the Gospel to modern man on the basis of 
only this first step. This is all man, on his own at any 
rate, can understand. Therefore nothing will be said of 
vfhat is beyond— -or, more accurately, who is beyond. Yet 
to do this is to ignore the very basis of even this level 
of speaking of God. To speak at all of a relationship 
implies immediately the existence of at least two part­
ners. A proper reticence keeps us froBi claiming to know 
the other partner (God) in himself, in his whole being.
S M . , p. 185.
Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to assime that he is 
who he reveals himself to he and no other*
Gollwitser*s "objective" approach, then, pushes the 
affair further by speaking in a confessional, vocative 
way of this partner who encounters us. In this relation­
ship of grace which God establishes with man, man dis­
covers that he has to do with an Other who reveals himself 
as more than just an extension of our needs. We gain from 
the relationship more than we expected— “love, forgiveness, 
hope, new life. Here we have to do with one who reveals 
himself as existing fp^ _ us. But "God's being, if it were 
exhausted in his being-for-us, would be only a being-for-
our-sake : God would then in fact be only a function of our
29needs," To adequately express our understanding of our 
partner in this relationship, then, v/e must be prepared 
to speak, however improper our language may be for this 
task, of God's existence apart from us, of God's aseity.
In summary, the two major approaches to theology are 
not as opposed as the arguments between their various 
proponents v/ould indicate. As I see it, they are speaking 
at different levels, trying in different ways to witness 
to the same experience of being encountered by God, The 
"objective" methodology espoused by Helmut Gollvfitger is
9 Q
Ibid., p, 220, This important argument comes from a
section (pp. 220-232) which Gollwitzer, unfortunately 
entitles an "Incidental Note". I regard this as 
not just an incidental note, but his crucial argu­
ment against the "subjective" methodology.
the more radical, i.e., reaching to the roots* The "sub­
jective" methodology is the more superficial*
To be sure, the "How" question has not been fully 
ansv/ered* And we shall have to return to it yet again in 
the next section of this chapter. We have attempted to 
demonstrate, hov/ever, that an alternative approach to 
doing theology will have to answer the same questions 
eventually, that is, when it presses beyond its concern 
with the human experience of the relationship with God to 
a consideration of who the other partner in that relation­
ship is in reality,
The What
In the previous two sections of this chapter, while 
dealing with two questions raised in the body of our 
examination of the theology of Helmut Gollwitser, some of 
the criticism of his approach has been discussed, An 
attempt was made to demonstrate the usefulness of his 
methodology, as compared with three alternative streams of 
modem thought* Then, adopting a simpler division of
methodologies- -into "subjective", moving from the human
experience to speak of God as we experience him, and "ob­
jective" , on the basis of an evoked faith speaking of the 
God who condescends to reveal himself in relations with 
men- , I endeavoured to effect a form of peace between
the two, seeing them as differing in emphasis and radica™ 
lity rather than as opposed in essence and subject matter.
But this discussion has not yet brought us to what 
I regard as the most serious questions raised® and left 
unanswered, by the approach adopted by Gollwitser. Nor 
have the various reviews of his publications gone to the 
root of the matter* Very often they have had a defensive 
tone, retaliating for the serious questions he ra.ises 
about the alternative methodologies.
In this section, then, I will begin v/ith a brief 
examination of two further oriticisms which deal more 
with what Gollwitaer has written than with his basic 
methodology. These, too, it seems to me, have not reached 
the real problem areas. Therefore, I will go on to indi­
cate these unanswered questions and the seriousness of 
their natui'e,
Gollwitser has been accused of defensive conservatism, 
It is said he is unwilling to accept the vast changes so 
universal in the world today. Kis theology has to do 
with what ought to be, rather than with what :ceallxJ,s„.
"I must state frankly that I am out of sympathy with 
Helmut Gollwitser’s attempt to re-establish the orthodox 
doctrine of God, It seems to me to be based on the familiar 
Canute-style of argumentationt to counter the rising tide 
of change with a more &md more strident reassertion of 
what is pupppsed. to be the case.
If that were truly what Gollwitser was about, I would
Aliatalr Kee, m g . Christian Faith
without Belief in God (Harmondsv/orth, 1971), p. 196.
have to confess my ovm lack of sympathy. Too often in 
the face of change and opposition» the ohurch has answered 
with entrenchiaent. Such an attitude» far from aiding the 
spread of Christian faith » has proved debilitating» The 
long history of the church’s attempt to manacle the pro­
gress of scientific research gives ample evidence of this 
disposition and its outcome.
That» however» is not what Gollwitaer is doing. 
Rather* Gollwitser is attempting to speak of matters that 
lie at the basis of Christian faith* Our statements about 
how we ought to relate to others imply a source for this 
sense of obligation. It is this source which concerns 
Gollwitser. Thus » ho is not merely reasserting "what is 
sunnosed to be the case" » but is attempting something 
much more radicals to speak of what must be the case for 
our more peripheral statements to have the meaning we 
wish them to have.
Elsewhere* and more sympathetically, it is noted
that Gollwitser *s writings lack any elea.r statement of
the doctrine of the Trinity,
that precisely the event of Jesus 
Christ' crucifixion placing God’s 
existence in question necessitates 
a kqinij^ri^' statement, ... GO;ll- 
WITHER hints at the possibility of 
speaking of God’s self-relatedness in 
a footnote ... . Curiously it remains 
at that footnote* although without a 
doubt only the possibility hinted at 
here could preserve GOLLWITi^ ER's book 
from the aporia into which it must ^
have floTO by now, 31
31 Etoerhard Jungel, Gottog Seln .1st Im Werden. Veraniwortllchs
Rede von Sein Gottes bei KARL BARTH, Eine Paraphrase
That Gollwitser regards this criticism as serious is 
demonstrated by the faot that he acknowledges the criticism 
and admits it is an unfortunate oversight not to have 
spoken specifically of what is ever present as a back- 
ground to his statements,
I feel, however, that this gives too much away.
Indeed, Clollwitzer*s theology is trinitarian, in the same 
sense as the How Testament is trinitarian* In this thesis 
I have tried to reflect and hold together Gollwitzer* s 
proclamation of the tri-unity of the God-in-himself, the 
God-for-us mid the God-in-comunity of God’s being* This 
is a doctrine of the Trinity jjLXtm*
To be sure, it is never presented systematioa.lly or 
explicitly. But that is not an "unfortunate" state of 
affairs* Ra,ther, it is one of the strengths of Gollwitser*s 
approach. In this reserve when speaking of God, he reflects 
most closely the biblical practice. In this hesitancy to 
use conceptual images he remains obedient to the second 
commandments "You shall not make yourself a carved image 
or any likeness of anything in heaven or on earth beneath 
or in the waters under the earth? you shall not bow do mi 
to them or serve them" (Exodus 20s4-5)* This prohibition
(Tübingen, 1965)» PP* 4 and 111, n, 146; referring to 
Gollwitaer, The Existence of God as Confessed by 
Emith» PP* 187-168, n. f,
» p. 9. "The
Ohristian doctrine of the Trinity is the unexpressed, 
but unfprtimately not explicit, background of this 
book" (p, 9 , my italics).
of idolatry applies not only to physical representations,
hut also to any conceptual objectification of God.
Thereby it is not only forbidden that 
we should worship God in the form of 
created nature* perhaps in the image 
of a golden calf or in statues of 
human form; thereby also there is 
given not only motive for the dispute 
between the confessions regarding 
images ? the deepest meaning of the 
commandment lies in its sharpening of 
the faot that it is not man’s affair 
to get hold of God in definitions and 
descriptions. Wo have not to hold 
God fast to the images which we our­
selves make of hiim. W© have not to 
conceptualise him ; for that means 
setting him before us as we would 
something in our fantasy and in our 
memory which belongs to our spiritual 
property & earthly subjects, persons, 
experiences. What we can concep­
tualise (vorstellen), we can also lay
aside (abptellen )   and thus even
annul (a îA m sjbellen ).
In other words, Jühgel, following Barth, is correct in 
his contention that any talk of God’s being must be 
trinitariaïi. All Christian theology, to reflect adequately 
the nature of the Wholly Other who yet condescends to meet 
us in personal relationships within our history, must be 
trinitarimi. On the other hand, however, to transform 
trinitarian talk into dogma, into a doctrine of the Trinity 
is to run the risk of conceptual idolatry. Gollwitaer
efl. (Munich, 1965), pp. 10-11.
has attempted, successfully in my judgment, to speak in a 
trinitarian vmy® yet avoid the pitfall of conceptual 
idolatry.
We must turn now to the more deep-seated problems in 
Gollwitser*s theology. These have been hinted at in the 
exposition portion of the thesis and earlier in this 
chapter. But they must be presented again* and more clearly, 
for it is in these areas that future theology must con­
centrate its efforts.
in eja 02£cursus bearing 
this I have already indioated. the question raised
by Gollwitser*s rejection of any theological method which 
sets out to defend Christian faith on the basis of what 
man is able to understand and accept. Stated brieflys 
If, through grace* thorough God's condescension, human 
language correspond to God as a possibility bestowed
on man by God,^^ then why is it necessary to adopt the 
particular methodology proposed by Gollv/itser? If God 
gives the gift of the possibility of speaking of him appro­
priately, can he not give this gift also to one who, per- 
haps by temperament -— also God-given* — "finds Gollwitser* s 
me the do logy maccep table ?
This question in no way detracts from the evident
§up.5â( pp. 45-48.
_qqd. Gonfe.ased by Faith, pp. 151-152.
truth in Gol-lwitser* s argument * via.® that limiting our 
understanding of God to the humanly possible is to cease 
speaking of God. Nevertheless* in his attempt to enunciate 
the confessional need to speak of God as controlling the 
encounter we have with him and providing the possibility 
for speaking of him as our par'kner in relationship,
Gollwitser has tended to maîœ absolute what can at most 
be described as a preference.* He has implied that his 
methodology is the para.digm for every theological under­
taking. When this happens* when preference becomes paradigm, 
theological methodology is no longer the tool of proclamation 
but beoomes the criterion for judging the truth of the 
content of the proo3.amationi methodology beoomes epis- 
temology and metaphysics.
2. ChrigtoloCT. I have had occasion alrea# to raise 
a question regarding the relationship hetvfeen faith and 
historical criticism in Go3-lwitzer®s theology. He has 
proclaimed an historical faith* that is, a faith bound to 
an event in history and passed on within history. Because 
it is thus based on an event in history, Christian faith 
can be said to be "bound" to history. That is not to say,
 ^ This happens even where he speaks of his vocative theology 
as a preference. ”•Preference* meanss the non- 
preferable way of speaking is not absolutely ruled 
out, but must submit to the standard of the other, 
which has the nreQ^edepcp. and must receive its con­
tent from the latter"
p* 2,5 3, my italics). Thus, 
"preference" is synonymous with "authority",
â m m #  pp. 179-180,
however, that it is "dependent" upon history* For it is 
God's condescending action in meeting ub in the man Jesus 
which is constitutive for faith* not the man Jesus as the 
locus for God's condescending action*
But if, as Gollwitaer rightly contends® the two poles 
of this Ghrist-event must he affirmed together* if sepa­
rating the divine-transcendent and human-immanent poles 
of this event destroys the real meaning of faith, then 
the relationship is one of dependence, for to deny the 
historical validity of the one is to deny the relevance of 
the other* If Jesus of Nazareth never lived® then God did 
not condescend to encoimter lummnity in him. If Jesus was 
not an identifiable human* then there was no event in 
which God broke dovm the barriers of temporality to re­
establish a î?ight relationship with us.
Further, the question of the relationship between the 
human and the divine in Jesus is not answered clearly. In 
what way does the Wholly Other coincide with the Wholly 
Like? This is the root problem behind the matter of 
human language corresponding to divine reality. The con­
cept of mmlogia^jrela^^ , of functional analogy, may
prove fruitful. But the elements must be presented in 
greater detail— —what are the areas of and limite of 
correspondence? what are the criteria for judging the 
propriety of the extension of human terms to divine 
reality; and what are the implioatione of this for our
understanding, not only of God, but of man and of the 
divine -human re lat ionsh ip?
3, Grace, T'he question of the 'theological circle*
38is evaded in Gollwitzer’s writings. Even for one sym­
pathetic to his approach a problem arises® why do some 
have faith and others not? Theology, as envisaged by 
Gollwitzer, is possible only on the basis of the gift of 
faith. In other v/ords, God graciously condescends to 
encounter man in such a way that man, perhaps for the 
first time, recognizes with whom he has to do and responds 
in seIf-commitment, i.e., with faith. Theology is then 
possible. But it is evident that not all have responded 
with faith. Does this mean God has chosen not to encounter 
them? Or was his self “-revelation in the encounter so 
veiled that the îumian partners could not perceive with 
whom they had to do? Or was there some deficiency in 
their seeing and hearing, did they lack an ability that 
others possessed? To say that this is merely a description 
of the facts which result from "the veiled coming of the 
kingdom. The one perceives the mystery in the veiling, 
the other sees the veiling itself and— in reality sees 
nothing— his 'hearing* does not become ’understanding*"^^ 
  -to say that is really to ignore the question.
If God's encounter with humanity in Jesus Christ is 
for all people, why have not all people responded in faith? 
To counter that faith is a gift or fruit of grace is to
2Ma_suEKgc. pp . 35 -40 .
 ^ aiâJSîaaâa_Go^s. pp. 88-89.
\
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beg the question. For it must be asked* in that ease® why 
has this gift not been given to all people? Does this not 
contradict the universality of the Christ-event and of 
God's acting in love?
Finally, Gollwitaer, at least
by implication, accuses many of his opponents of atheism.
By concentrating on the purely human side of God's 
encounter with man they have tended to Ignore the divine 
partner. In some, this aversion to speaking of God's 
existence approaches a denial of his existence. Indeed, 
it is difficult to understand® in extreme instances, why 
they have not joined the atheist camp*
However, even as the 'subjective* methodology in 
theology tends towards atheism, Gollwitzer's 'objective* 
methodology tends towards idolatry* Despite an illumi- 
nating commentary on the commandment against idolatry 
which clearly shows his awareness of the danger of 
creating conceptual idols, Gollwitaer does not avoid 
completely this pitfall.
I have attempted to portray Gollwitaer* s theology as 
a corrective for the purely phenomenological study of the 
human aide of God's encounter with man. But his emphasis 
on the logical need to speak of God's existence in him­
self and apart from the encounter with man threatens to
pp. 10-11.
dissolve into an affirmation of God as a formai "that" 
which has lost the substance of personality, Only in the 
context of relationship does personality carry meaning.
At this poîzit® there seems to be an inconsistency in 
GollwitZ0Z‘* s argument. One of the safeguards for appro - 
priate talk of God is to adhere to a limitation evidenced 
in biblical talk of God, namely, not to leap from test!- 
mony regarding an encounter to an ontologjr of God, In 
other words, remaining within this biblical limitation, 
it Is appropriate to speak of Clod as the other partner in 
our encounter, speaking, acting, willing and loving. But 
it is trospassing beyond this limitation to proceed to 
say "God is". And to joyfuJ^ ly proclaim that it is by 
grace alone that "existence" and "being", properly pre­
dicated only of God» can be predicated also of creation 
cleanly places ones words in the realm of ontology, and 
thus, when the referent is God, idolatry.
Go da
Helmut Gollwitaer’s theology, to my mind, comes as 
a much-needed purgative for the modem theological scene. 
Because of his writings, we can see more clearly the real 
issues to be debated as theology progresses. For both the 
syBipathetio and the disapproving reader he has set in
A* 1
' Gf. , pp. izBff.
Of. alJ.. . pp. 210-211.
clearer focus the essential points of agreement and dif­
ference*
This, then, gives us indications as to the way for­
ward. Where confessional theology must refra in  from 
making absolute its  methodology, apologetic theology must 
cease rejecting 'objective* methodology out-of-hand as 
irrelevant and impossible for modern man* Where vocative 
theology must explain the 'rules' of analogical talk of 
God, most 'non-theistic* theologies must demonstrate their  
continuity with the biblical proclamation. Where so-called 
Neo-orthodox theologians must wrestle with the inherent 
doctrine of predestination in their approach, other theo­
logians must reoogniae that this same problem is present 
in the ir approaches, if only at a different level. And 
where 'objective* theology must guard against idolatry, 
'subjective* theology must guard against atheism.
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